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NAP National Allocation Plan 
NETD New Emissions Trade Directive 
RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
TFEU Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the Study 
1.1.2. Climate Change versus Economic Growth 
Climate change has become one of the most actual issues in European and also global 
politics, as the phenomenon of global warming has been widely acknowledged to have a 
potentially serious undermining effect on our well-being. Although the world average 
temperature has been observed to have risen at a growing pace ever since 1850
1
, it was not 
until the beginning of the 1990s that the first global agreements were concluded with the 
objective of reducing global greenhouse emissions, notably in the form of the UNFCCC 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development in 1992. Although climate change has been widely 
recognised to constitute a serious menace to long term economic growth and development
2
 
and in spite of the efforts to conclude a legally binding global agreement on emission 
reductions, national governments and policymakers throughout the world have so far been 
reluctant to implement sufficient measures to tackle climate change. Paradoxically, the 
main reason for this reluctance has been that the introduction of radical measures for 
reducing greenhouse emissions has, inevitably, an astringent effect on short term economic 
growth.  
The importance of short term economic benefits to national policymakers – who are 
generally selected for a limited term and whose accomplishments are therefore measured 
rather on the basis of short term than long term results – is reflected by the fact, pointed out 
by OECD, that many of the key environmental challenges could be addressed at a cost of 
just over 1% of world GDP in 2030, or about 0.03 percentage points lower average annual 
GDP growth to 2030.
3
 Furthermore, there have also been disagreements regarding the 
division of responsibility for emissions reductions between industrialised countries and 
developing countries.
4
 In the absence of a global climate agreement which would bind both 
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 IPCC, Fourth assessment report: Climate Change 2007, Section 3.1.1. 
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 The U.S., for instance, have thus far refused to take part in a global emissions reduction treaty that would 
exclude significant greenhouse gas –emitting developing countries, such as China and India, arguing inter 
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industrialised countries and developing countries, the EU has stepped forward by making 
unilateral commitments to reduce its greenhouse emissions. The EU’s assumption is that a 
unilateral commitment increases the pressure on other countries either to adopt similar 
unilateral measures or, in the best case, to participate in designing a global emission 
reduction agreement. Moreover, the Commission estimates that being a forerunner in 
climate change combat will also have a positive effect on the EU’s competitiveness, as 
tackling the climate and energy challenge contributes to the creation of jobs, the generation 
of "green" growth as well as the development of green technologies.
5
 The EU has lifted up 
the combat against climate change as one of the Union’s essential policies by introducing 
the so called Climate and Energy Package in 2007. The EU climate and energy package 
constitutes a unilateral measure of tackling climate change and it has the objective of 
transforming the EU into a highly energy-efficient, low carbon economy and its first step 
has been to introduce the so called 20-20-20 targets, aiming at  
 a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels;  
 20% of EU energy consumption to come from renewable resources; and   
 a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels, to be 
achieved by improving energy efficiency. 
Furthermore, the EU has offered to increase its emissions reduction to 30% by 2020 if 
other major emitting developed and developing countries commit to undertake their fair 
share of a global emissions reduction effort. 
1.1.3. The Challenge of Climate Policy: Negative Externalities  
The general reluctance to introduce sufficient measures for reducing greenhouse emissions 
ultimately stems from the market failure referred to as negative externalities, which is 
undoubtedly one of the core reasons for most environmental problems. Externality is an 
economic concept referring to a cost (negative externality) or benefit (positive externality) 
that is not transmitted through prices and has therefore an unintentional (positive or 
negative) impact on an external party, for which no compensation is made.
6
 Activities of 
economic units, such as enterprises, typically cause such costs and benefits to the society 
                                                                                                                                                                                
other reasons since China has been contributing to global warming for only 30 years, while the developed 
countries have been doing so for 200 years. 
5
 European Commission’s website on the Climate and energy package 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm, visited 21.7.2012.  
6
 See e.g. Frank, 2006, p. 607 and chapter 5. 
3 
 
which they did not take into account in their decision-making.
 7
 In other words, the 
functioning of an undertaking causes phenomena that have a general economic effect, but 
lack a clear, economic value/price for the undertaking itself. These externalities lead to 
market failures, e.g. in the form of too much pollution produced or too low prices of 
products responsible for pollution.
8
  
In an environmental context, negative externalities occur where enterprises lead by the aim 
of profit maximization do not have proper incentives to take into account the negative 
environmental impacts of their activity.
9
 This may have several reasons. Firstly, the 
environmental harm caused by the enterprise may not occur instantly, but only 
“somewhere in the future”, and does therefore not directly affect the current profitability of 
the enterprise itself. Consequently, the costs of e.g. a warmer climate may not be borne by 
the enterprise that contributed to it, but rather by future generations. Secondly, the 
enterprise in question may not be the only responsible for the caused environmental harm, 
but merely one contributor among possibly thousands of others. This is generally the case 
with greenhouse emissions. Consequently, an individual enterprise may not consider it 
worthwhile to invest in technology that would reduce its greenhouse emissions; unless it 
has a guarantee that also (all) other enterprises will make the same commitment.
10
 This 
may be illustrated by using a simple example:
11
 
It is in the proper interest of a fisherman to aim at maximizing his own catch. 
However, as all fishermen practicing fishing in the same lake aim for the same goal, 
the result is eventually a disaster, as all fish populations in the lake become extinct 
and the fishermen will either have to figure out another way to make their living or 
else move away to another lake (where the same disaster would ultimately occur). It 
would unarguably be in the common interest of the fishermen that each and every 
one of them practices fishing in a sustainable way, enabling the fish populations to 
remain healthy and providing thus a secure living for all the fishermen. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of an individual fisherman, the ideal situation 
would be the one where he would continue maximizing his own catch while the 
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 Määttä 2003, p. 122. 
8
 Tietenberg 1996, p. 48. 
9
 Skogh – Faure 2003, p. 95-97. 
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 The phenomenon where two individuals might not cooperate even though it would be in their best 
interest to do so, is generally referred to as the prisoner’s dilemma. See e.g. Begg – Fischer – Dornbush 
2008, p. 173. 
11
 Modified version of Rosalind English’s example in her article Cooperation and public goods: an 
evolutionary perspective on environmental law (2011), s. 279. 
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other fishermen would reduce their fishing to a sustainable level, ensuring thus the 
future of the fish populations. Respectively, an even worse alternative to a collective 
disaster would be the situation where the individual fisherman fishes in a sustainable 
way while all other fishermen keep maximizing their catches. In this case, all 
fishermen would eventually lose their living, but the “honest” one would still be far 
worse off than the others, as he has not benefitted from the reckless fishing anyhow. 
The prisoner’s dilemma caused by negative (environmental) externalities also occurs 
between States, as emission reductions realised by one country or area only has a limited 
overall effect unless other countries commit themselves to making similar reductions. 
1.1.4. Emissions trading as a Market-Based Instrument to Combat Climate Change 
The aforementioned difficulties regarding the conciliation of long term costs of climate 
change and short term costs related to emissions reductions – often simplified as a 
confrontation between “environmental” and “economic” interests – demonstrate that 
achieving globally significant reductions in greenhouse emissions will require that also the 
short term economic realities will have to be taken into account in designing instruments 
for combating climate change. This has increased the demand for market-based 
mechanisms in achieving greenhouse emission reductions.  
Emissions trading has rapidly become one of the most common market-based instrument in 
the battle against climate change, as it was introduced as the main greenhouse emission 
reduction mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol.
12
 Accordingly, emissions trading programmes 
have also been adopted on regional and national level. The EU has implemented a system 
of carbon dioxide emissions trading (the European Emissions Trading Scheme, “the EU 
ETS”) in order to fulfil its greenhouse emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol in the form of the Emissions trading Directive 2003/87/EC. Although the U.S. has 
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, some of its States have introduced similar emissions 
trading systems to be applied on a State-wide or an inter-State level.
13
 Also New Zealand 
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introducing a federal emissions trading scheme for greenhouse gasses, emissions trading has been applied 
on a federal level in the form of the Acid Rain Program imposing a trading system for SO2 emissions under 
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has adopted a national emissions trading system (The New Zealand Emissions trading 
Scheme) and local emissions trading schemes have equally been introduced in e.g. Japan 
(the Tokyo Emissions trading System) and Australia (the New South Wales Greenhouse 
Gas Abatement Scheme). 
Emissions trading is an economic instrument aiming at maximizing the cost-efficiency of 
emission reductions.
14
 It is founded on the idea that emissions should be reduced where it 
is least expensive or most cost-efficient.
15
 An emissions trading scheme sets a price for 
emissions, making emissions a tradable unit. It creates thus an artificial market for tradable 
emission units, enabling (or forcing) undertakings to take the economic costs of emissions 
into consideration in their decision-making. In other words, costs of pollution are 
internalised as a part of the undertakings’ own economy, making emissions trading a 
prima facie efficient way to tackle the market failure caused by negative externalities on 
the level of individual undertakings. As emissions’ trading creates a price for each unit of 
pollution, it can be seen as an incarnation of the polluter pays principle. It also aims at 
minimizing the economic cost that emission reductions cause to undertakings, making it a 
more attractive alternative to often inflexible direct command and control -regulation from 
the viewpoint of industry.
16
 
1.1.5. Carbon Leakage as a Negative Externality Undermining the Effects of 
Emissions trading  
Although emissions trading is theoretically an efficient way of mitigating the effect of 
negative externalities, it does not prevent all forms of negative externalities in practice. 
The main imperfection of emissions trading has so far been the difficulty of creating a 
global emissions trading market which would cover all sectors of activity that cause 
greenhouse emissions. So far, emissions trading markets are only local or regional: some 
countries or regions, such as the EU, have adapted an emissions trading scheme, while 
others have not. These regional differences in the level of emission-related regulation may 
lead to so called emission leakage, or in the case of carbon dioxide emissions, carbon 
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 Määttä, Kalle 2006, p. 217.  
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 Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 173. 
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 See OECD Observer 1997: Do Economic Instruments Help the Environment? Studies simulating the effects 
of policies using economic instruments in reducing air pollution in different areas of the U.S. have shown 
that, on average, the cost of achieving a given environmental objective through command and control –
policies was six times higher than for cost-minimizing instruments, such as tradable emission permits. 
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leakage. Consequently, carbon leakage has been lifted up by the EU as one of the key 
challenges of the EU ETS. Carbon leakage is defined by the European Commission as the 
prospect of an increase in global greenhouse gas emissions when companies shift 
production outside the Union because they cannot pass on the cost increases induced by the 
EU Emissions trading Scheme to their customers without significant loss of market share 
or profits.
17
 Carbon leakage can be seen as a form of a negative externality. The market of 
emission units is not a genuine, global one, but only local and artificial, meaning that an 
undertaking does not necessarily need to pay for its emissions; it can simply move its 
production into a country where no markets for emissions exist. 
Carbon leakage is a severe menace to local and regional emissions trading schemes: it may 
in the worst case lead to an increase in overall greenhouse emissions while putting the 
regions and countries who try to reduce emissions at a competitive disadvantage compared 
to those who do not lift a finger to prevent climate change. This would completely reverse 
the aims of emissions trading. One of the main problems in designing measures for the 
prevention of carbon leakage is the fact that some sectors of activity are more prone to 
carbon leakage than others. The carbon leakage risk is not particularly significant in sectors 
of activity where it is possible to pass on the direct cost of the required emission permits 
into product prices without having to fear a significant loss of market share to such 
competitors who are not part of the emissions trading scheme.
18
 In the EU, this is generally 
the situation with e.g. electricity companies, as the electricity sector in the Union is not 
exposed to significant international competition.
19
 Reversely, energy-intensive sectors 
which are facing a strong international competition cannot pass on to consumers their 
increased costs resulting from the obligation to purchase emission permits, as this would 
lead to losses in market shares to competitors outside the emissions trading scheme. The 
resulted loss in profitability may allure an undertaking to consider shifting its production to 
a country which is not part of an emissions trading scheme. The different degree of carbon 
leakage risk between different sectors typically require that carbon leakage preventing 
measures are only applied to certain undertakings, which may cause problems in relation 
to, inter alia, competition law and rules of equal treatment. 
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 The EU ETS State aid guidelines draft, section 7. 
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 Faure et al. 2008, p. 74. 
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1.2. Research Questions, Scope and Structure of the Study 
The purpose of this Study is to assess how well the current EU ETS responds to the 
challenge of carbon leakage prevention while fulfilling the general objectives of the EU 
ETS, i.e. achieving cost-efficient emission reductions to achieve a pre-determined level of 
CO2 emissions and internalising the costs of emission, while remaining compatible with 
the policies and objectives of the EU in general. The analysis will be conducted by 
examining the mechanisms for carbon leakage prevention introduced by the Directive 
2009/29/EC (the new emissions trading Directive) and searching for potential weaknesses 
and judicial inconsistencies that it may give rise to in the third emissions trading period for 
2013-2020. The EU ETS shall be assessed from five different viewpoints. The five criteria 
for assessment have been chosen as to best reflect the main purposes of emissions trading 
as well as the main judicial problems it causes.
20
 It shall, subsequently, be examined 
whether and to what extent the EU ETS: 
(1) is, in its current form, compatible with EU State aid regulation (support measures 
designed for carbon leakage prevention may involve financial aid which may 
qualify as State aid under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[“TFEU”]);  
(2) complies with the polluter pays principle in accordance with Article 191(2) of the 
TFEU (the EU ETS aims at internalising the costs of pollution by creating a price 
for CO2 emissions, and can thus be seen to implement the polluter pays principle); 
(3) promotes dynamic efficiency (the cost effectiveness of the system is analysed by 
applying criteria of economic efficiency. In this respect, focus is laid on dynamic 
efficiency, as it appears to be the most important form of efficiency in the context 
of emissions trading, as shall be explained below.);  
(4) responds to the objectives related to the EU competition policy (support measures 
for carbon leakage prevention may favour certain sectors or undertakings over 
others); and 
(5) truly prevents carbon leakage.  
On the basis of the analysis, this Study shall suggest and review two separate models for 
how the current EU ETS may be improved. The first model is based on the scenario that 
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 More detailed reasoning concerning why the said five criteria have been chosen as the basis of the 
analysis shall be provided below in Section 1.3 as well as in Chapter 3. 
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free allocation of emission allowances will be used as the main mechanism for carbon 
leakage prevention. The second model shall assess how carbon leakage prevention could 
be implemented in an auction based system by using auction revenues for financial support 
for carbon leakage prone sectors of industry. It needs to be noted that the applicability of 
the alternative models presented in this Study shall only be considered from the 
perspective of legal and economic theory, meaning that the practical and technical aspects 
regarding the design of such systems shall not be taken into account. In other words, the 
purpose is to assess whether the models presented in this Study seem to provide an 
economically and judicially plausible alternative for the current system, not to present a 
comprehensive or “ready” scenario of how the current EU ETS could be amended.  
In addition to the two alternative models presented in this study, a variety of solutions to 
the emission leakage problem has been applied in practice or suggested by legal academics 
and economists. The U.S Acid Rain Program and the RGGI aim at preventing emission 
leakage by cost containment, notably in the form of safety valves and early reduction 
credits, whereas the Californian system relies on a load-based emission cap for load-
serving entities combined with emission portfolio standards requiring load-serving entities 
to meet an output-based emission standard per kWh. Suggestions in academic literature 
involve, inter alia, the introduction of a Baseline-and-credit –system where no overall limit 
for emissions is laid, the expansion of the EU ETS to cover imports as well as border tax 
adjustments i.e. import fees levied by countries belonging to an ETS on products 
manufactured in third countries that do not have similar restrictions on emissions.
21
 
Although these solutions – especially the alternatives of border tax adjustments and the 
extension of the EU ETS to cover imports – may well provide interesting alternatives for 
the current EU ETS, their feasibility in the context of the EU ETS shall not be analysed in 
this Study. This results from the fact that the implementation of such systems would imply 
significant changes in the basic structures of the current EU ETS, and a closer examination 
of these options would require a massive analysis well beyond the limits of this Study. This 
Paper shall therefore focus on alternative solutions whose implementation appears prima 
facie more realistic. 
 The Study is divided in six main chapters. Chapter 1 functions as a general introduction to 
the main themes and research questions of the Study, notably the phenomenon of emission 
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leakage in the context of an ETS. Chapter 2 serves as a general introduction to the EU ETS 
and the main solutions it has adopted for carbon leakage prevention. Chapter 3 provides a 
more detailed reasoning regarding the applied approach and perspective of the Study, 
arguing why the aforementioned assessment criteria have been chosen to form the base of 
the analysis. The most central, and also the longest, Chapters of the Study are Chapters 4 
and 5, which form the actual analytic part of the Study. Chapter 4 consists of an analysis of 
the EU ETS’s provisions and mechanisms designed for carbon leakage prevention where 
separate assessments of the EU ETS are conducted from the perspectives of the State aid 
provisions of the TFEU, the polluter pays principle, dynamic efficiency, competition and 
their effect on carbon leakage. Chapter 5 shall then present the aforementioned two 
alternative models for the development of the EU ETS. The functionality of the latter 
model (auctioning and re-cycling of auction revenues) shall be analysed by using a similar 
assessment as applied in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 6 shall sum up the conclusions that 
can be made on the basis of this Study regarding the functionality of the current EU ETS as 
well as the possibilities to improve its eventual weaknesses. 
1.3. Methodology of the Study 
As stated above, the purpose of this Study is to assess the functionality of the carbon 
leakage prevention mechanisms introduced by the new emissions trading directive and 
present alternative solutions that could improve eventual weaknesses and incompatibility 
issues found in the current system. The assessment is done by assessing from five 
perspectives the effects that the mechanisms are likely to have during the next emissions 
trading period. It already follows from the knowledge interests of this Study that it cannot 
be categorised as traditional legal dogmatics, as the knowledge interests of the latter one 
(i.e generally systematising the law in force and providing recommendations regarding its 
interpretation) are of a rather static and internal nature.
22
 Even de lege ferenda proposals 
presented in the context of legal dogmatic research merely aim at presenting new 
interpretations or systematisations of the law in force or removing internal inconsistencies 
within it.
23
 In other words, legal dogmatics does not generally question the functionality of 
a legal instrument as such, as it rather focuses on purely legal issues, such as the internal 
coherence of law. The essential purpose of legal dogmatics is therefore to provide 
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 Määttä, Tapio in Miettinen & al. 2004, p. 119. 
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 See Määttä, Tapio in Miettinen & al. 2004, p. 148. 
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information for authorities applying the law, not to critically view the law in force with the 
purpose of signalling the legislator how the law should be developed.  
In this Study, however, the main objective is precisely to provide information to the 
legislator regarding the practical application of the law. The purpose is not to suggest how 
the amended EU ETS should be interpreted, but rather to analyse its effectiveness, i.e. how 
well the carbon leakage provisions of the EU ETS respond in practice to the proper 
objective of the Scheme, by assessing the likely effects it will have in the forthcoming third 
emissions trading period. Considering the knowledge interests of this Study, it may best be 
categorised it as an evaluation research of a policy instrument. Although evaluation 
research is a newcomer as a method of legal research compared to legal dogmatics,
24
 it has 
gained foothold during the recent decades.
25
 Especially in the field of environmental law, 
evaluation research is nowadays a commonly applied research method both in Finland
26
 
and on an international level
27
.  
Tapio Määttä, for instance, divides research conducted in the field of environmental 
law can be into three principal forms
28
:  
(1) practical, theoretical and critical legal dogmatics; 
(2) empirical legal studies; and 
(3) evaluation-, effect- and policy instrument research (“evaluation research”).29 
In Määttä’s doctrine, evaluation research aims at providing information that 
facilitates choices between different policy instruments, examining the factors 
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research method shall be referred to in this Study simply as “effect research”.   
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behind the implementation and development of policy instruments or evaluating the 
effects of policy instruments from different perspectives assessing possible 
contradictions between the goals and objectives of legal instruments and their factual 
effects.
 30
 The knowledge interests of evaluation research are therefore not purely 
“legal”, but often closely related to those of social sciences and legal economics,31 
enabling thus a larger view regarding how environmental policy instruments should 
be used and developed.
32
 Similä, on the other hand, seems to view evaluation 
research as a tool for conducting regulatory research in general. 
33
 According to 
Similä, theoretical approaches, like those of law and economics, are particularly 
useful in such regulatory research where the empirical data is limited.
34
 
A common feature in all evaluation research is that it generally requires a wider 
perspective that goes beyond purely legal aspects. This is also the situation in this Study: 
in order to be able to respond to the research question, a purely legal analysis focusing on 
the internal coherence of the EU ETS would as such be clearly insufficient. It is therefore 
necessary to adopt a broader, external view on the legislation in question and assess the 
effects of the EU ETS in the society. In order to do so, it is essential to understand the 
political background of the system, i.e. it must first be assessed what effects the EU ETS is 
intended to have in the society.  
An ETS is a policy instrument with an essentially economic nature. By internalising the 
costs of emissions and creating an artificial market for emissions, it aims at achieving a 
certain environmental result by causing economic effects on stakeholders steering them to 
change their behaviour in a way which leads into the desired result. Due to the economic 
character of the goals of emissions trading, it can reasonably be argued that any evaluation 
regarding the practical effect of an ETS in the society should be founded on an economic 
analysis. Consequently, the approach adopted in this Study is to a large extent based on 
law and economics.  
A policy instrument may have various effects in the society. Aside of the desired effects 
mentioned above that an ETS is intended to have, an ETS may also cause undesired side-
effects which may directly or indirectly undermine its efficiency or run counter the 
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objectives of other regulation. The occurrence of such undesired effects in local or regional 
ETS’s such as the EU ETS is closely connected to the fact that in order to achieve its 
desired effects (reductions in global emissions), an ETS will need to tackle the risk of 
carbon leakage by rendering certain sectors or undertakings are an advantage of an 
economic nature while the same advantage is not provided to other sectors or undertakings. 
While such arrangements may indeed increase the internal efficiency of the ETS, they may 
simultaneously cause problems external to the ETS itself, e.g. by interfering with the 
”competitive balance” on the market. Within the EU ETS, aside of causing undesired side-
effects which may hamper the realisation of other EU policies than the environment, such 
as competition, carbon leakage prevention may also turn out problematic from the 
perspective of the EU’s environmental policy itself, especially as regards the polluter pays 
principle.  
The five criteria forming the basis of the analysis in this Study have been chosen as to 
reflect both how well the desired economic effects of the EU ETS are achieved as well as 
whether and to what extent the system creates undesired effects. In other words, the criteria 
should measure the effectiveness of the EU ETS as well as its consistency with the EU’s 
policies in general. The desired effects (i.e. a change in the behaviour of undertakings 
which leads into lower global emissions) are assessed from the perspective of dynamic 
efficiency and efficiency in carbon leakage prevention. The undesired effects are analysed 
from the perspectives of the EU’s competition and State aid policies as well as the polluter 
pays principle. The choice of the five perspectives and their specific content shall be 
further explained below in Chapter 3.  
As an ETS affects individual undertakings in different ways, the phenomenon of carbon 
leakage can only be properly understood when the effects of an ETS are assessed on the 
level of individual undertakings or sectors of activity. Consequently, the economic analysis 
in this Study relies almost entirely on theories of microeconomics. Furthermore, it needs to 
be remarked that the assessment of economic impacts of a certain feature of the EU ETS or 
a specific measure adopted within shall, in most situations, be done ceteris paribus. This is 
necessary due to the fact that an undertaking’s decision to delocalise its production outside 
the EU may have various other motives than those resulting from the EU ETS and these 
motives may vary depending on the particular circumstances of each individual 
13 
 
undertaking.
35
 In other words, if factor x is bound to increase the risk of carbon leakage, it 
shall not be assessed how strongly factor x de facto contributes to carbon leakage when 
taking to account all other factors affecting an undertaking’s decision to delocalise its 
production. The analysis of economic impacts of this study shall therefore be limited to 
whether and to what extent a measure or feature contributes to certain behaviour, e.g. 
whether factor x is likely to increase the risk of carbon leakage. 
Successful assessment-, effect- and policy instrument research may often require the use of 
empirical studies as a means of assessing the concrete effects of regulation. In this respect, 
one of the main challenges of this Study derives from the fact that it aims at assessing the 
effects that the carbon leakage provisions of the EU ETS may have in the future. The 
utility of empirical examination of e.g. jurisprudence or the decision practice of law-
applying authorities as a support to the conclusions made in this Study is further reduced 
by the fact that the EU ETS has not, until now, contained any specific provisions enabling 
the differential treatment of carbon leakage prone sectors. The carbon leakage provisions 
introduced in the new Emissions Trading Directive (Directive 2009/29/EC, “the NETD”) 
have, in this respect, modified even the fundamental structures of the EU ETS. As the 
NETD will only be applied as of January 2013, the role of empirical examination in this 
Study will be rather limited: assessing the legal practice of previous emissions trading 
periods does not seem appropriate with regard to the Study’s objective, as this practice is 
based on regulation which will no longer exist in future periods. This, however, does not 
mean that the Study would be a purely theoretic one. Although there is little direct empiric 
data concerning specifically the functionality of the EU ETS’s carbon leakage provisions, 
data from empiric economic and legal studies of a more general nature is used as an 
indirect support the main theoretic arguments whenever it is suitable. 
The scope of the Study naturally brings certain restrictions regarding the conclusions that 
can be made on the basis of it. Aside of the five perspectives forming the basis of the 
analysis, one could come up with several other factors that could provide some interesting 
and useful views regarding the functionality of the EU ETS’s carbon leakage provisions. 
The EU ETS could, inarguably, also be assessed e.g. from allocative efficiency viewpoint 
or from an ecological perspective, which could provide additional information worth 
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 Such other factors include e.g. the conditions of production in countries outside the EU (availability of raw 
materials etc.), the level of corporate taxation etc. 
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taking into account in the future design of the EU ETS. The objective of this Study, 
however, is not to provide an all-inclusive overall analysis that would take into account all 
relevant and also less relevant factors, as this would be practically impossible. The five 
perspectives through which the Study has been made are simply the writer’s personal view 
on how to best measure the judicial consistency of the EU ETS with its objectives as well 
as the policies of the EU in general. 
2. EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE EU 
2.1. Different Models of Emissions trading 
As mentioned above, emissions trading is based on internalizing negative environmental 
externalities into the decision-making of market actors by imposing a unit of monetary 
value for emissions and creating an artificial market for the exchange of these units. An 
emissions trading scheme does not directly define how much each undertaking should 
reduce its emissions, but sets an overall target for emission reductions, leaving it to the 
market to decide how this target is achieved in the most cost-efficient way. Otherwise put, 
the emission units are expected to be allocated to the undertakings that are willing to pay 
most for them.
36
 It is thus up to the individual undertaking to assess whether it is more 
profitable for it to invest into reducing its emissions or to pay for the right to continue 
emitting.  
An emissions trading system can be constructed in various ways. In a cap-and-trade –
system the legislator sets an overall emission cap for the whole emissions trading scheme 
and puts into circulation a corresponding amount of freely transferable emission 
allowances, either by using free allocation or auctioning. Free allocation of allowances can 
be carried out in various ways and perhaps the most commonly used methods are the so 
called grandfathering, where emission allowances are distributed to participating 
undertakings in the proportion of their historical levels of emissions, and benchmarking, 
where allowances are granted on the basis of pre-defined benchmarks (e.g. x emission 
allowances per each ton of final product produced)
37
. An alternative for cap-and-trade is 
the so called baseline-and-credit-model (also known as credit-and-trade, benchmark-and-
trade and performance standard rate trading), where there is no absolute cap defining the 
total amount of allowed emissions, but a general performance baseline defined for all 
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 Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 175. 
37
 Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 179-181. 
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activities covered by the emissions trading scheme, indicating the allowed amount of 
emissions per unit of production (e.g. 0,5 tons of carbon dioxide per 1 MWh of 
electricity)
38
 or per unit of fuel. If an undertaking produces fewer emissions than allowed 
by this relative baseline, it obtains emission credits which it can then sell to industries who 
have exceeded the standard and who are therefore obliged to cover the extra emissions by 
buying credits on the market.  
The emission-reducing effect of an emissions trading scheme is based on the idea that the 
overall limit of emissions defined in the scheme is set to be lower than the current level of 
emissions.
39
 This creates a shortage of emission units on the market, which raises their 
demand, and consequently, also their price. If the marginal costs of an undertaking for 
reducing emissions are lower than the marginal costs of purchasing another emission unit 
on the market, the undertaking will reduce its emissions, either until the marginal costs of 
reducing emissions equals the costs of purchasing another emission unit,
40
 or until it can 
cover its emissions with the amount of emission units it possesses. To control the 
correspondence of emissions of an undertaking and the amount of emission units it 
possesses, emissions trading schemes set a responsibility for each participating undertaking 
to surrender an amount of emission units equal to its actual emissions to the operator of the 
emission unit register.
41
 In order to keep track of the amount of emissions that the 
participating undertakings produce, emissions trading schemes contain various monitoring 
mechanisms.
42
 
2.2. Short Introduction to the EU Emissions trading Scheme 
In July 2003, the European Parliament and the European Council adopted Directive 
2003/87/EC on establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community (“the Emissions trading Directive” or “ETD”). The European 
Union’s Emissions trading Scheme (“EU ETS”) has undergone a major modification in 
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 Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 176. 
39
 During the preliminary phase (2005-2007) of the EU emissions trading scheme, emission allowances were 
allocated far too generously, leading in a collapse of the price of allowances and an overall increase in 
greenhouse emissions of approximately 2%. See Press Release, European Community, Emissions trading: 
2007 verified emissions from EU ETS businesses, (May 23, 2008) and McAllister 2009, p. 409-410. 
40
 Määttä 2006 p. 217. 
41
 Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 177-178. In the EU emissions trading scheme, emission allowances are 
granted for a period of one year and shall be returned to the register in the end of that period. 
42
 Designing adequate facilities for monitoring greenhouse emissions is an enormous challenge and vital for 
the functioning of an emissions trading scheme. It is, however, not the purpose of this study to discuss this 
question. 
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2009, in the form of Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community (Directive 2009/29/EC shall be referred to as “the New Emissions trading 
Directive” or “NETD”, and the amended Directive 2003/87/EC as “the Amended 
Emissions trading Directive” or “AETD”). The background of the revision lies in the 
aforementioned Climate and Energy Package, which was agreed by the European 
Parliament and the European Council in December 2008. The revision also aimed at 
correcting some distortions observed during the first two emissions trading periods. 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the AETD, Member States are responsible for implementing the 
AETD by 31 December 2012. This chapter will present the main characteristics of the EU 
ETS and discuss some of the key adjustments introduced by the NETD. 
Launched in 2005, the EU ETS currently operates in 30 countries (the 27 EU Member 
States, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). The Scheme is based on the cap and trade 
principle. Under the original ETD, the principal responsibility for defining the amount of 
allowances granted was left to the Member States, who were to develop a national 
allocation plan (NAP) regarding the total quantity of allowances intended to be allocated 
for each emissions trading period
43
 and how the allowances were proposed to be allocated 
between sectors and undertakings. Under the amended ETD (AETD), however, from the 
third emissions trading period (2013-2020) onwards, a community-wide cap for 
allowances shall be issued each year
44
, decreasing annually by a linear factor of 1,74% per 
year compared to the average annual total quantity of allowances issued by Member States 
in accordance with the Commission Decisions on their national allocation plans for the 
period from 2008 to 2012.
45
 The annually decreasing number of allowances has the 
objective of achieving an overall reduction in greenhouse emissions of 21% by 2020, 
compared to the emission level in 2005.  
At the end of each year, each undertaking must surrender enough allowances to cover all 
its emissions, under the threat of heavy fines.
46
 If an undertaking reduces its emissions, it 
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 The emissions trading periods are divided into the so called pilot phase (2005-2007), the second phase 
(2008-2012) and the third phase (2013-2020). 
44
 In October 2010, the Commission adopted decision 2010/384/EU defining the EU-wide cap for emission 
allowances for 2013, which shall amount to amounts to 2 039 152 882. Pursuant to Article 3 of the ETD, one 
allowance signifies one tonne of carbon dioxide. 
45
 Article 9 of the AETD.  
46 Pursuant to Article 16 of the AETD, the excess emissions penalty is EUR 100 for each tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent emitted by that installation for which the undertaking has not surrendered allowances. 
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can keep the spare allowances to cover its future needs (banking) or else sell them to 
another undertaking that is short of allowances. It is also possible for an undertaking to use 
a certain amount of Kyoto certificates from flexible mechanism projects (Clean 
development Mechanism
47, “CDM” and Joint Implementation48, “JI”) in order to cover 
their emissions. The EU ETS covers CO2 emissions from installations such as power 
stations, combustion plants, oil refineries and iron and steel works, as well as factories 
making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board and, as of 2012 and 
with slightly differentiating regulations, also aviation.
49
 Nitrous oxide emissions from 
certain processes are also covered. Between them, the installations currently in the scheme 
account for almost half of the EU's CO2 emissions and 40% of its total greenhouse gas 
emissions. The EU ETS will be further expanded to the petrochemicals, ammonia and 
aluminium industries and to additional gases in 2013, when the third trading period will 
start. At the same time a series of important changes to the way the EU ETS works will 
take effect in order to strengthen the system. 
2.3. Key Amendments Brought by the NETD 
The NETD introduced some significant amendments regarding the distribution of 
allowances. As mentioned before, the Member States were responsible under the regime of 
the original ETD to decide both on the overall amount of allowances to be allocated and 
the distribution of them between undertakings operating in each respective Member State. 
Although Member States were, pursuant to Article 9 of the ETD, in principle obliged not 
to allocate more allowances during the second emissions trading period than what would 
be consistent with their overall emission reduction targets under Decision 2002/258/EC
50
 
and the Kyoto Protocol, the Commission only had a weak mandate to control the allocation 
process. It also lacked the necessary resources to thoroughly scrutinise the numerous 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Regardless of the fine, the undertaking is still obliged to surrender the “missing” allowances during the 
following year.  
47
 The CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. It enables countries with an emission reduction or 
limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex 1 Party) (i.e. developed countries) to gain Certified 
Emission Reductions (CER) from CDM emission reduction projects in parties excluded from Annex I of the 
Protocol (developing countries), which they can then use to meet part of their emission caps. 
48
 The JI –mechanism is defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. It allows a country with an emission 
reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex 1 Party) to earn emission reduction 
units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B Party, each 
equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting its Kyoto target.  
49
 For a complete list of activities covered by the EU ETS, see Annex I to the ETD.  
50
 Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 concerning the approval, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
joint fulfilment of commitments thereunder. 
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allocation methodologies as to their discriminatory effects on competition.
51
 As a result, 
the Member State’s NAPs were often overly generous in their allocation, resulting in a 
very limited overall cutback in emissions within the EU ETS sectors compared to the 
corresponding level of previous years’ emissions and so called “business-as-usual” –
projections.
52
 Subsequently, Member States no longer have competence under the AETD 
in determining the amount of allowances to be allocated, as National Allocation Plans are 
abolished and an emission cap is defined by the Commission.  
As for the allocation method, grandfathering was the principal mechanism of distributing 
allowances during the first two emissions trading periods, as the ETD only allowed a 
maximum amount of 5% (2005-2007) or 10% (2008-2012) of all allowances to be 
allocated by auctioning. Pursuant to Article 10 of the AETD, however, auctioning will 
gradually become the principal allocation method for the emissions trading period of 2013-
2020. The Commission motivates the gradual shift from grandfathering towards auctioning 
by stating that auctioning is the simplest and, according to the vast majority of economists, 
the most economically efficient allocation system.
53
 Free allocation will still be allowed (or 
even compulsory) to a certain extent, but it shall be based on benchmarking instead of 
grandfathering, meaning that the Member States’ discretion regarding the distribution of 
free allowances is restricted by harmonised ex-ante benchmarks set by the Commission 
regarding the division of allowances between each sector and subsector of activity.
54
 
Regarding the allocation method of allowances, three main groups of activity can be 
distinguished:
55
 
1. With certain exceptions regarding the modernisation of electricity generation of 
certain new EU Member States and electricity produced from industrial waste 
gases
56
, 100% of allowances granted for the production of electricity and 
installations for the capture of CO2 will be subject to auctioning.  
2. Allowances will still be allocated free of charge for certain activities for whom free 
allocation is not explicitly prohibited and that are not exposed to a significant risk 
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 De Sépibus 2007, p. 36. 
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 Grubb-Azar-Persson 2005, p. 130. 
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 Preamble of the NETD, paragraph 15. The majority of economists and legal academics have argued that 
auctioning is the allocation method which best ensures maximum efficiency. See e.g. Hepburn & al. 2006, p. 
137. 
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 Article 10a(1)(2) of the AETD. 
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 Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 265. 
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 Articles 10 a(1)(3) and 10c of the AETD. 
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of carbon leakage
57
, starting with an amount of 80% of the quantity of allowances 
determined on the basis on community-wide benchmarks, and gradually decreasing 
each year, resulting in 30% free allocation in 2020, with a view to reaching no free 
allocation in 2027.
58
 As for aviation, the amount of allowances to be auctioned is 
set at a fixed amount of 15% in 2012 and during 2013-2020. 
3. Sectors of industry that are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, as 
defined in Commission decision 2010/2/EU
59
, will receive 100% of their 
allowances free of charge, based on harmonised allocation rules.
60
 According to the 
Commission’s decision, this implies most of the energy-intensive industries.61 
 
2.4. The EU- Emissions trading Scheme and Carbon Leakage 
2.4.1. Free Allocation of Allowances 
One of the most prominent amendments in the EU ETS brought by NETD has been the 
increased attention given to the carbon leakage problem. As mentioned above, allocation of 
free emission allowances on the basis of product-based benchmarks is the primary 
mechanism used in the EU ETS for combating carbon leakage. The Commission has 
published through its decision 2010/2/EU a list on the sectors and subsectors of activity 
that are considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, and who shall 
therefore be granted all their allowances free of charge during the entire third emissions 
trading period (2013-2020). The Commission is responsible for revising the list every five 
years but it may also add a sector or subsector to the list if the said sector or subsector has 
undergone a change that has a substantial impact on its activities. This can be done at the 
Commission’s own initiative or at the request of a Member State on condition that the 
sector or subsector in question has demonstrably become exposed to a significant carbon 
leakage risk due to the said change. In addition to free allowances, the EU ETS contains an 
additional mechanism for carbon leakage prevention in the form of a possibility for 
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 As a main rule, these activities include all other sectors than electricity production and carbon leakage 
sectors, district heating and cooling, high efficiency cogeneration and a part of the industry sector. See 
Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 265. 
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 Article 10a(11) of the AETD. See also Hollo – Kuokkanen – Utter 2011, p. 269. 
59 Commission decision of 24 December 2009 determining, pursuant to directive 2003/87/EC of the 
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Member States to grant certain forms of State Aid to the carbon leakage sectors determined 
above. These State Aid measures shall be examined more closely below. 
The list of these so called “carbon leakage sectors” has been drafted on the basis of the 
principles set out in Article 10a(14)-(17) of the AETD. The carbon risk is assessed by 
estimating the ability of each sector in question to pass on the direct cost of the required 
allowances and the indirect costs from higher electricity prices resulting from the 
implementation of the AETD into product prices without significant loss of market share to 
less carbon efficient installations outside the Community.
62
 In order to assess the direct 
additional costs induced by the implementation of the AETD, the Commission took into 
account the amount of allowances that the sector would be required to purchase if not 
deemed to be exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage.
63
 The assessment of indirect 
costs related to the increase in electricity prices was based on the Union average emission 
factor for electricity.
64
 
The AETD sets various limits to the Commission’s discretionary power. Pursuant to 
Article 10a(15)-(16), a sector or subsector shall be deemed to be exposed to a significant 
risk of carbon leakage if: 
(1) The sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation 
of the        AETD would lead to a substantial increase of production costs, 
calculated as a proportion of the gross value added, of at least 5 %; and 
The intensity of trade with third countries, defined as the ratio between the total 
value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries 
and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports 
from third countries), is above 10 %. 
(2) the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of 
the AETD would lead to a particularly high increase of production costs, 
calculated as a proportion of the gross value added, of at least 30 %.  
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 Article 10a(14) of the AETD. 
63
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(3) the intensity of trade with third countries, as defined above in point 1, is above 
30 %. 
The first condition will be referred in this Study as the integrated approach, whereas the 
two latter conditions are defined as the separated approach.
65
These quantitative criteria 
are complemented in Article 10a(17) by a possibility to add a sector of activity to the list of 
carbon leakage sectors after conducting a qualitative assessment, taking into account, 
where the relevant data are available, the following criteria: 
(1) the extent to which it is possible for individual installations in the sector or 
subsector concerned to reduce emission levels or electricity consumption, 
including, as appropriate, the increase in production costs that the related 
investment may entail, for instance on the basis of the most efficient techniques; 
(2) current and projected market characteristics, including when trade exposure or 
direct and indirect cost increase rates are close to one of the thresholds mentioned 
in paragraph 16; 
(3) profit margins as a potential indicator of long-run investment or relocation 
decisions. 
The level of carbon leakage risk naturally also depends on the extent of measures that non-
EU countries have adopted in combating climate change. The risk is more significant if a 
decisive part of the global competition which a producer faces originates from non-EU 
countries with a poor standard of climate change related regulation than if the main 
competitors are operating in non-EU countries with more advanced emission reducing 
programs perhaps similar to the EU ETS. This has been taken into account in the AETD, as 
the Commission needs to assess the extent of comparability of greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction programs and the carbon efficiency of installations in third countries 
representing a decisive share of global production of products in the relevant sectors, 
before adding a sector to the list of carbon leakage sectors.
66
  
It is to be noted that the carbon leakage sectors will receive their allowances on the basis of 
the generally applied benchmarking system, meaning that undertakings are not granted 
allowances on the basis of their actual need, but on a sector specific benchmark, which is 
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defined as to favour energy efficient and low relative emissions.
67
 The benchmarks are set 
per unit of production and are sector specific. Simply put, they reflect the “ideal” amount 
of emissions (or, if expressed by using golf terminology, a “par”) that each sector should 
emit when producing a product. The overall amount of emission allowances that each 
undertaking then receives is calculated on the basis of data regarding its historical median 
output (i.e. not its historical level of emissions, like under grandfathering), or, in the case of 
new entrants, on the basis of a standard capacity.
68
  
2.4.2. State Aid for Prevention of Carbon Leakage under the EU ETS 
In addition to free allowances, the EU ETS also enables the use of certain State aid 
measures with the purpose of reducing the risk of carbon leakage. The original ETD did 
not contain any specific mentions regarding State aid measures in the scope of the EU 
ETS. The NETD, however, included regulation regarding specific temporary measures 
aiming at facilitating the adaptation of certain undertakings to the EU ETS, which are to be 
considered as State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU.
69
 Such aid granted 
on the basis of the AETD is therefore subject to the general State aid provisions set forth in 
the TFEU.
70
  
State aid granted within an ETS is typically of an interim nature, aiming at easing the 
burden that the emission reduction objectives cause to undertakings and thus facilitating 
their adaptation to the ETS.
71
 All aid measures presented above are subject to an incentive 
effect requirement, which is presumed to be met if the Member State has verified that the 
aid results in a change in the behaviour of the aid beneficiary.
72
 The incentive effect may 
be shown through a counterfactual scenario providing evidence that without the aid the 
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 The EU ETS State aid guidelines, Paragraph 6. It is to be noted that since the provisions introduced by the 
NETD will only apply as from 1 January 2013, State aid cannot be deemed necessary to lessen any burden 
before that date. Consequently, the temporary measures –mechanisms included in the AETD may only be 
authorised for costs incurred after 1 January 2013, except for the aid involved in optional transitional free 
allocation for the modernisation of electricity generation, which may comprise, under certain conditions, 
investments undertaken as from 25 June 2009 included in the National Plan. As for State aid granted before 
31 December 2012, the original ETD shall apply. As the original ETD does not contain any State aid 
provisions, aid measures involved in the EU ETS shall be assessed on the basis of Article 107 of the TFEU and 
the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. 
71
 The EU ETS State aid guidelines, Paragraphs 2-3. 
72
 Ibid, Paragraph 40. 
23 
 
beneficiary would not have undertaken the investment.
73
 In order to facilitate the 
assessment of the incentive effect of the aid, the EU ETS State aid guidelines contains aid 
form -specific mechanisms for defining, inter alia, the maximum amount of aid allowed. 
The EU ETS State aid guidelines contain four forms of aid measures that are to be 
considered as State aid compatible with the internal market in the sense of Article 107(3) 
of the TFEU. These are: 
1. Aid to undertakings in sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon 
leakage due to EU ETS allowance costs passed on in electricity prices (aid for 
indirect emission costs) 
2. Investment aid to highly efficient power plants, including new power plants that are 
carbon capture and storage (CCS)-ready 
3. Aid involved in optional transitional free allowances for the modernisation of 
electricity generation 
4. Aid involved in the exclusion of small installations and hospitals from the EU ETS 
Out of the four State aid measures mentioned above, aid for sectors exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage is the only form of State aid directly targeted for carbon 
leakage prevention. It is based on the assumption that free allocation of allowances may 
not as such suffice to remove the risk of carbon leakage in energy intensive sectors, as such 
undertakings may not only suffer from the direct costs of the ETS, but also from indirect 
costs arising from an increase in electricity prices that result from electricity producers 
passing on the costs of the ETS to electricity consumers. Subsequently, pursuant to Article 
10a(6) of the AETD, Member States may adopt financial measures in favour of sectors or 
subsectors determined to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage in order to 
compensate costs relating to increased electricity prices. Such financial measures will be 
regarded as State aid under the EU ETS State aid guidelines. The sectors in question have 
been listed in Annex II of the EU ETS State aid guidelines, and are based on the 
Commission’s decision 2010/2/EU.74  
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The Commission notes
75
 that although pursuing an environmental objective, i.e. to prevent 
an overall increase in greenhouse emissions, State aid granted for indirect emissions costs 
may have a negative impact on the efficiency of the EU ETS. If poorly targeted, the aid 
would relieve the beneficiaries from bearing the cost of their indirect emissions, thereby 
limiting incentives for emission reductions and innovation in the sector. As a result, the 
costs of reducing emissions would have to be borne mainly by other sectors of the 
economy. Furthermore, such State aid may result in significant distortions of competition 
in the internal market, in particular whenever undertakings in the same sector are treated 
differently in different Member States due to different budgetary constraints. 
Consequently, the Commission has set three specific objectives for the EU ETS State aid 
guidelines: minimising the risk of carbon leakage, preserving the EU ETS incentives and 
minimising competition distortions in the internal market.
76
 
In order to achieve these rather contradictory objectives, the Commission has defined a 
mathematical formula determining the maximum amount of aid that a Member State can 
grant an undertaking to compensate its risen electricity costs. The formula takes into 
account the installation’s baseline production levels or the installation’s baseline electricity 
consumption levels, as well as the CO2 emission factor for electricity supplied by 
combustion plants in different geographic areas. The formula ensures that the aid is 
proportionate and that it maintains the incentives for electricity efficiency and the 
transition from "grey" to "green" electricity, in accordance with the ETS Directive.
77
 
Furthermore, in order to minimise competition distortions in the internal market and 
preserve the objectives of the EU ETS to achieve a cost-effective decarbonisation, the aid 
shall not fully compensate for the costs of EUAs in electricity prices and shall be reduced 
over time. Decreasing aid intensities have the objective of maintaining (i) the long-term 
incentives for full internalisation of the environmental externality and (ii) the short-term 
incentives to switch to less CO2-emitting generation technologies, while underlining the 
temporary nature of the aid and contributing to the transition towards a low-carbon 
economy.
78
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3. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ANALYSIS 
3.1. The Relation between Carbon Leakage Prevention and EU State Aid 
Regulation 
Measures aiming at carbon leakage prevention typically involve direct financial support 
granted by the State or through State resources to undertakings, which raises questions 
regarding how such measures should be assessed in relation to State aid regulation. Freely 
allocated allowances are not an exception in this respect, as they constitute units of 
economic value. The fact that certain undertakings receive their allowances for free under 
the current EU ETS while others have to pay for them in auctions raises the question of 
whether and under which circumstances freely granted allowances may constitute 
prohibited State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU.
 79
 If this is the case, it 
should be examined whether free allowances may fulfil the requirements for State aid 
compatible with the internal market under 107(2) of the TFEU. This would require an 
analysis of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection. 
Consequently, before analysing the carbon leakage measures adopted under the EU ETS, 
the compatibility of those measures with Article 107(1) of the TFEU shall be examined. 
3.2. The Importance of the Polluter pays principle 
The polluter pays principle first appeared in the Recommendation of the OECD Council on 
Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies 
of 1972. It has subsequently been incorporated in Article 191(2) of the TFEU as one of the 
core environmental principles of the EU. Accordingly, when assessing the functionality of 
a mechanism designed for environmental protection in the EU, such as the EU ETS, the 
polluter pays principle should always be given attention. Furthermore, the importance of 
taking account of the polluter pays principle seems evident considering the mere purpose 
of emissions trading, which is to internalise the costs of pollution. Internalisation of 
pollution costs is namely one of the aims of the polluter pays principle as defined in the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and as supported by legal 
literature.
80
 The explicit content of the polluter pays principle is, however, somewhat 
ambiguous, as the question of whether the polluter should pay may have different 
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outcomes from the perspective of allocative efficiency and equity.
81
 As a consequence, the 
polluter pays principle has been given both a weak and a strong form as well as an 
efficiency- and an equity-based form of interpretation by legal academics. 
The weak form
82
 of the polluter pays principle prohibits governmental subsidies for 
pollution control equipment to ensure that product prices reflect the costs of pollution 
abatement. The strong form of the principle, in its turn, provides that governments should 
also assure the internalisation of environmental costs.
83
 Both the weak and the strong form 
of the polluter pays principle have the aim of internalising pollution costs
84
: the weak 
interpretation assumes that cost internalisation is achieved passively by refraining from 
subsidisation of pollution prevention, whereas the strong interpretation requires active 
measures from governments. Both the weak and the strong form can thus be seen as 
manifestations of the efficiency approach to the polluter pays principle, which reflects the 
idea that pollution costs should be internalised with the aim of achieving an efficient 
allocation of resources, regardless of whether these costs are distributed in and fair and 
equitable way.
85
 In other words, an efficiency approach to the polluter pays principle 
assumes that the polluter should pay for the pollution it has caused on grounds of economic 
efficiency – not because it would be fair or equitable to do so. 
The efficiency-based approach can, in principle, be motivated on the basis of the 
essentially economic nature
86
 of the polluter pays principle, i.e. it being originally (OECD 
1972) an economic tool for providing incentives to polluters to reduce their emissions. 
Aside of the purely economic aspects of the polluter pays principle, making polluters pay 
for the environmental damage they cause can, nevertheless, also be supported by equity 
reasons. The polluter is, first of all, the party who draws the direct economic benefit from 
its activity whereas the benefits (e.g. in the form of tax revenues) to the public are merely 
of an indirect nature. It can therefore be argued, from an equity perspective, that the 
polluter should correspondingly be the party who mainly bears the environmental risks of 
its activity. Secondly, it is the polluter who decides whether to pollute or not, and the 
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public rarely possesses direct measures of affecting its decision making. Thirdly, even 
though all costs of pollution were internalised to be borne by the polluter, it may still, to a 
certain degree, be able to pass on those costs to consumers in the form of higher product 
prices, sharing thus partly the burden of pollution with the public.  
Accordingly, the polluter pays principle can be distinguished as an economic principle of 
efficiency on the one hand and as a legal principle of just distribution of costs on the other 
hand
87
 (differentiated interpretation). Alternatively, the polluter pays principle can be seen 
as a principle that allocates the pollution costs on the polluter not only for efficiency but 
also for equity reasons (extended interpretation).
88
 Both the European Parliament and the 
Commission seem to have endorsed an extended rather than an efficiency-based 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle.
89
 In this study, the polluter pays principle shall 
consequently be interpreted to have two forms: a restricted one that bases solely on 
economic efficiency, and an extended one that is founded both on economic efficiency and 
equity. As several arguments can be found to support the extended form of interpretation 
and as it seems to have gained some preference among the EU institutions, special focus 
shall be laid on assessing whether the current EU ETS complies with the extended 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle. 
3.3. The Role of Dynamic Efficiency in Designing Measures for Carbon Leakage 
Prevention 
As mentioned in the introductory Section, this Study lays particular focus on assessing the 
effectiveness of the carbon leakage prevention mechanisms in the EU ETS from a dynamic 
efficiency perspective. Although dynamic efficiency may not commonly have been the 
standpoint applied in traditional environmental legal research, it has recently gained 
increasing attention among scholars and policymakers.
90
 It is nevertheless necessary to 
explain, first of all, why economic efficiency -aspects should be given attention when 
assessing the functionality of mechanisms related to carbon leakage prevention within an 
ETS, and secondly, why dynamic efficiency should be given special attention in relation to 
other forms of economic efficiency. 
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Dynamic efficiency is an economical concept which has been developed as a form of an 
antithesis of static efficiency.
91
 Static efficiency is concerned with the most efficient 
combination of resources at a given point in time, focusing thus on real time transactions.
92
 
In contrast to the static efficiency, dynamic efficiency refers to long term economic 
efficiency, taking into account not only the impacts of a measure on the current state of 
economic efficiency but also the optimal rate of innovation and investment that helps 
reducing costs in the future.
93
 The concept of dynamic efficiency can therefore be seen to 
incorporate the static aspects of efficiency.
94
 Nevertheless, dynamic efficiency seems 
indeed to have been, until recently, overshadowed by static efficiency in the thinking of 
academics and policymakers.
95
 This may partly be the result of the emergence of law and 
economics as a leading paradigm affecting both decision making and the interpretation of 
law, enabling thus the use of argumentation based on neoclassical microeconomic theories 
of short term wealth maximisation.
96
 Determinants of rates of innovations and economic 
growth are then classified as a macroeconomic topic separate from efficiency concerns.
97
 
Another possible reason for the reluctance of using dynamic efficiency as the basis for 
legal research is the fact that traditional command and control –regulation was often not 
considered to contribute to the development of technologies, as it was assumed that 
technology develops of itself.
98
 The emergence of economic, market-based instruments in 
(environmental) regulation has, in this respect, made dynamic efficiency perspectives more 
interesting. 
As mentioned above, the introduction of emissions trading as a mechanism of reducing 
greenhouse emissions is typically motivated by interests of achieving the desired level of 
emission reductions in a cost-effective way.
99
 Cost-effectiveness has also been taken up by 
the Commission as the basic motivation of introducing emissions trading as the principal 
mechanism of the EU to comply with its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
100
 The 
importance of cost-effectiveness for the raison d’être of emissions trading, as stated by the 
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Commission, can be seen as justifying an approach based on economic efficiency when 
assessing the functionality of mechanisms adopted under the EU ETS, such as free 
allocation of allowances or State aid with the purpose of preventing carbon leakage. If such 
measures are not economically efficient, their utility can be contested in the light of the 
purpose of the EU ETS to achieve emission reductions in a cost-effective way. 
What justifies the emphasising of a dynamic perspective over a static one in assessing the 
economic efficiency of measures adapted under the EU ETS would be the long-term 
character of the EU ETS. The EU ETS has set relatively ambitious emission reduction 
targets
101
, which are then planned to be achieved within a period of several years, often 
decades.
102
 Significant reductions in greenhouse emissions (such as 80% in 40 years, or 
even 20% in 15 years) will only be achieved through improvements in energy-efficiency, 
the use of low-emission fuels and other similar technological progress, considering 
especially that production rates are likely to grow in the future due to population growth 
and the growth of markets in developing countries (i.e. reductions in emissions will not be 
achieved by simply cutting production). Accordingly, a development of technologies 
which would enable the fulfilment of the emission reduction targets set by the EU ETS is 
only possible if the Scheme provides sufficient incentives for innovations. As for carbon 
leakage, inability to develop or buy emission reducing technology may be a significant 
contributor to an undertaking’s decision to transfer its production outside the EU ETS.  
The fact that dynamic efficiency has been chosen as a specific criterion of evaluation while 
static efficiency has not, does not mean that static efficiency would be completely ignored 
in this Study. On the contrary, aspects of Static efficiency need to be taken into account 
when assessing inter alia the effects of the EU ETS on the competitiveness of 
undertakings, which, in its turn, contributes to the extent of their carbon leakage proneness. 
The emphasis laid on dynamic efficiency in this Study rather reflects the idea that due to 
the importance of innovations, static efficiency alone is not a sufficient indicator of 
whether a measure adopted within the EU ETS is economically effective.   
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Allocative efficiency is another form of efficiency which may be used to assess the 
functionality of an ETS. It aims at achieving a condition in which all possible gains from 
exchange are realised.
103
 This implies that a good, e.g. an emission allowance, has been 
attained by the market participant who values it most, i.e. an optimal balance between 
supply and demand is reached.
104
 Allocative efficiency, however, is normally applied for a 
given (static) technological state,
105
 and must therefore be assessed separately from 
dynamic efficiency perspectives. As allocative efficiency does not measure incentives for 
technological development, the main focus of this Study shall be laid on dynamic 
efficiency.
106
 
3.4. Emissions trading, Carbon Leakage and Distortions of Competition 
Although the EU has not adopted any general legal principle such as “the principle of free 
competition”, competition policy can be seen as one of the corner stones of the EU, as it 
serves as the main tool for removing barriers of trade and creating a common market, 
which in its turn is one of the central objectives of the Union. The establishing of 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market is one of the five 
policy areas under Article 3(1) of the TFEU where the EU has exclusive competence. Fair 
and open competition between undertakings is generally considered to encourage 
entrepreneurship and lead to a greater variety and quality of products, enhancing thus both 
the position of consumers as well as the international competitiveness of EU 
undertakings.
107
 Accordingly, the EU competition policy aims at protecting and developing 
efficient competition on the common market 
108
 by minimising any actions that have a 
preventive, restrictive or distortive effect on competition.
109
  
As occurs from the preamble of both the original and the amended ETDs, the legal basis of 
the EU ETS is founded on the environmental policy provisions of the TFEU, notably its 
Article 192(1). The goals of one EU policy area should, however, not undermine the aims 
                                                          
103
 Frank 1999, p. 350. 
104
 Weishaar 2007, CO2 emissions allowance allocation mechanisms, allocative efficiency and the 
environment: a static and dynamic perspective. European Journal of Law and Economics 24, p. 34. 
105
 Driesden 2003, p. 4. 
106
 Again, this does not mean that allocative efficiency would have been omitted in this Study, but rather 
that shall not be used as a separate criterion in the assessment. 
107
 See the competition website of the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_fi.html  
108
 See the competition website of the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/brochures/rules_fi.pdf  
109
 See e.g. Article 101(1) of the TFEU.  
31 
 
and purposes of another. If a measure adapted on the legal base of policy A threatens to 
have some negative impacts on objectives established under policy area B, it should be 
examined whether the purposes of the measure in question can be reached with less 
harmful impacts on the goals of policy B. The more significant policy B is in relation to 
policy A, the more carefully these harmful impacts will need to be assessed. This needs to 
be taken into account when assessing the EU ETS, as an ETS may cause various distortive 
effects on competition. Such effects may, firstly, arise from the absence of a global ETS 
that would bind all sectors of activity: undertakings that are part of a regional ETS may 
find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in relation to competitors that are not subject 
to regulation obliging to conduct emission reductions. Additionally, competitive distortions 
may also arise between undertakings that participate in the same ETS. This may result e.g. 
from differences in the treatment of new entrants and incumbents or differences in the 
market structure between sectors.  
Considering the role of competition policy in the EU as one of the foundation stones of the 
original Common Market, impacts on competition on the Internal Market cannot be 
ignored when assessing a system such as the EU ETS the legal base of which lies on a 
latecomer such as environmental policy. It needs to be noted that the competition-related 
sections in this Study shall only assess the effects of the EU ETS’s carbon leakage 
provisions in relation to competition on the internal market, whereas the effects on 
international competitiveness are dealt with in the sections assessing the efficiency of 
carbon leakage prevention. The need for a separate assessment derives from the fact that a 
measure adopted under an ETS may have different outcomes in terms of competition on 
the internal market and competitiveness of EU undertakings in relation to competitors in 
third countries. The reason why competitiveness issues are assessed in connection with 
carbon leakage prevention is the close liaison of the two criteria: as noted by the 
Commission in the preamble of the NETD, the decrease in competitiveness as a result of 
the carbon constraints caused to undertakings by the EU ETS is the most significant cause 
of carbon leakage.
110
 
4.  CARBON LEAKAGE PREVENTION IN THE EU ETS 
The following Chapter shall examine the carbon leakage provisions of the EU ETS from 
the perspectives of the EU State aid regulation, the polluter pays principle, dynamic 
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efficiency, the EU competition policy as well as efficiency in carbon leakage prevention. 
Each of the said perspectives shall be assessed in a separate section and an overall 
conclusion shall be presented in Section 4.6.  
4.1. Compatibility of the Carbon Leakage Prevention Mechanisms with the EU 
State Aid Regulation 
Article 107(1) of the TFEU provides that in order for a measure to be considered as State 
aid, it must be granted through State resources.
111
 According to the European Court of 
First Instance, this implies that the aid must be the result of a unilateral and autonomous 
decision of the State
112
 and not motivated by its obligations e.g. under the EU Treaty.
113
 
The measure must also place a financial burden upon public authorities in order to be held 
as State aid.
114
 When assessing the NAPs, the Commission consequently held that aid was 
granted through State resources if more than the mandatory amount of allowances was 
granted for free
115
 and if banking was allowed.
116
 It follows that an obligation arising from 
the EU ETS to allocate a certain amount of allowances free of charge (in the case of carbon 
leakage sectors, 100%) should not constitute State aid, as the State has never had the 
option of not granting those allowances for free. In this respect, the allowances in question 
have never made part of the State’s “resources”.  
In contrast, when the Member State has the option of choosing between free allocation and 
auctioning, it loses revenues by deciding to grant the allowances for free instead of 
auctioning them. Considering furthermore that the vast majority of legal academics
117
 seem 
to reject the interpretation according to which free allocation would always constitute State 
aid, this Study shall assume that only optional free allocation of allowances may be 
considered as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Obligatory free 
allocation, such as free allocation to carbon leakage sectors in accordance with Article 
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10a(12) of the AETD, where Member States are obliged to allocate a given percentage of 
allowances for free, will therefore not be regarded as State aid. 
4.2. Compatibility of the EU ETS Carbon Leakage Provisions with the Polluter 
Pays Principle 
4.2.1. Restricted Interpretation of the Polluter pays principle 
4.2.1a    Free Allocation of Allowances  
It seems obvious that the costs incurred to an undertaking from the pollution its activity 
causes should be included in the prices of the final product. One of the very basic 
principles of microeconomics is that an undertaking manufacturing a product should be 
able to cover all costs arising from its production, preferably by making a profit that 
encourages it to continue its activity. All production costs should therefore be included in 
the product price and thus eventually be borne by the final consumers of the product. If this 
was not the case, the undertaking would make losses and would not continue its activity in 
the long run. For a long time, pollution did not cause any direct production costs for 
undertakings, which is why it was not included in product prices. Emissions trading aims at 
correcting this distortion by imposing a concrete price for pollution and making it part of 
the production costs, i.e. internalising the costs of pollution. Just like any other costs, costs 
incurred to an undertaking from its emission reduction obligations under the EU ETS 
should therefore be passed on to consumers.  
A more problematic question from a polluter pays perspective is, however, whether 
allowance receivers should pass on a proportion of the value of emission allowances to 
consumers even though the allowance itself has been obtained free of charge. Receiving an 
allowance for free does not cause any absolute costs for an undertaking, and including the 
price of the allowance in the product prices merely increases its income. These so called 
windfall profits
118
 are commonly justified by referring to the concept of opportunity 
costs:
119
 Instead of using the free allowances, the firm could have reduced its production, 
thus lowering its emissions and sold the surplus allowances at the current market price, 
gaining a profit. When selling its output, for instance electricity, the firm wants to recover 
this opportunity forgone in the product price. If producers are to be motivated not to sell 
those rights, the lost profits of such a sale need to be compensated via the energy prices.  
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As explained above, the restricted interpretation of the polluter pays principle is based on 
economic efficiency, requiring that pollution should be given a monetary value, 
internalising it in the decision making of undertakings with the aim of achieving an 
efficient allocation of resources. The efficiency-based interpretation can be considered to 
withhold both the weak (no subsidisation of pollution) and the strong (cost internalisation) 
forms of the polluter pays principle. In order to assess whether the EU ETS’s rules 
concerning carbon leakage are compatible with the restricted interpretation of the polluter 
pays principle, both the weak and the strong form of the principle shall be examined. 
At a first look, windfall profits resulting from free allocation may seem to contradict the 
idea that the polluter should pay: free allowances are often granted for the worst polluters, 
who then pass the “prices” of the allowances (which they never paid for) on to consumers, 
making thus a profit that they would not have made without gratis allowances – which they 
have, paradoxically, received on the basis of their high-polluting activity. Accordingly, 
Nash has considered that the internalisation of costs is not realised when costs are simply 
passed on to the consumers.
120
 This view has been challenged by Woerdman, & al., who 
argue that the passing on of opportunity costs arisen from freely allocated emission 
allowances does not contradict the efficiency interpretation of the polluter pays principle, 
as pollution costs are internalised due to the opportunity costs of the allowances, i.e. 
undertakings lose potential revenues by having to cover their emissions with allowances 
they could otherwise sell.
121
 In other words, the efficiency interpretation of the polluter 
pays principle does not require that the polluter should be worse off due to the pollution it 
causes, as simply the prospect of earning additional revenues provides sufficient 
incentives for the polluter to cut down its emissions. As the strong form of the polluter 
pays principle subsumes its weak form, free allocation should be compatible with the 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter pays principle. 
However, one could nevertheless claim that free allocation of allowances cannot be 
compatible with the weak form of the polluter pays principle, arguing that free allowances 
may indeed seem to constitute a subsidy to the undertaking,
122
 which it receives partly due 
to its high energy intensity (i.e. high level of pollution). This view has been adopted by 
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Nash, who argues that freely allocated allowances subsidise pollution as polluters are 
provided with a free entity of economic value, which they are then at liberty to sell. In 
contrast, Woerdman & al. have considered that free allowances cannot be considered to 
subsidise pollution as they only constitute lump sum –subsidies that are not directly linked 
to the costs of pollution control and prevention measures and do therefore not affect 
marginal emission reduction costs.
123
 As the amount of allowances is limited by the overall 
emissions cap set by the Commission, undertakings will be forced to reduce their 
emissions regardless of whether they have been obliged to pay for their allowances or not. 
Free allowances do therefore not alter the price and output decisions compared to 
auctioning in a way which would distort the product market.
 124
  
The view presented by Woerdman & al. seems accurate insofar as the polluter pays 
principle is interpreted solely from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. As noted above, 
opportunity costs provide equal incentives for polluters to reduce their emissions as 
“absolute” costs, at least under the classical assumption that undertakings aim at profit 
maximisation and provided that the overall cap for allowances is lower than the overall 
demand for allowances.
125
 From an economic perspective, emissions should therefore be 
reduced an equal amount both under free allocation and under auctioning, making free 
allocation no less efficient as an economic tool for encouraging emission reductions. As 
the strong form of the polluter pays principle subsumes the weak form, compatibility of the 
EU ETS with the strong form should make it compatible with the restricted interpretation 
of the principle.
126
 Even without making the said derivation, free allowances do not seem 
to constitute a subsidy for pollution. 
4.2.1b      State Aid for Indirect Emission Costs 
Additional State aid granted for carbon leakage sectors for compensation of costs relating 
to the increase in electricity prices under Article 10a(6) of the AETD may seem like a 
trickier question, as State aid compensates, in principle, the polluter’s costs deriving from 
its responsibilities under the EU ETS of paying for the emissions it causes.
127
 Should State 
aid under Article 10a(6) of the AETD therefore be considered as a subsidy for pollution? 
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The answer is no. State aid granted under Article 10a(6) is not used to compensate 
undertakings’ direct pollution abatement costs, but only the indirect costs resulting from 
the fact that electricity generators are able to partly pass on their respective costs resulting 
from the EU ETS while carbon leakage sectors are not. As with free allowances, State aid 
compensating the undertaking for those indirect costs does not change the fact that it will 
nevertheless have to fully stand for the costs resulting from abatement of its own 
emissions. State aid under Article 10a(6) of the AETD cannot therefore be considered to 
subsidise pollution. As both its weak and its strong form are fulfilled, the carbon leakage 
prevention measures under the EU ETS should not be considered to contravene with the 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter pays principle. 
4.2.2. Extended Interpretation of the Polluter Pays Principle 
Although free allocation of allowances seems to comply with the restricted interpretation 
of the polluter pays principle, it may result in problematic distributive effects from an 
equity perspective. The problem is not the participation of consumers in pollution costs as 
such. On the contrary, it seems self-evident even from an equity perspective that 
consumers should stand for at least a part of the industry’s pollution costs: by creating a 
demand for products, consumers can be seen to have, in fact, an indirect responsibility for 
the pollution that industry causes by producing those products. The question under the 
equity interpretation of the polluter pays principle is therefore not whether or not 
consumers should participate in pollution costs, but rather to what extent it should happen. 
Free allocation of allowances implies a wealth transfer from the public to the polluter, 
equalling the revenues that the government would have obtained in an auction.
128
 
Compared to auctioning, free allocation improves the financial position of the polluting 
undertaking’s shareholders by increasing the value of a share.129 Even though such a 
“capital gift” may not have distortive effects in terms of efficiency, it does provide an 
advantage of economic value to the polluter at the expense of the public (tax payers), who 
will face higher product prices as a result of the opportunity costs passed on. In other 
words, the main burden from emission reductions is laid on the consumer, as the public 
will eventually bear the majority of absolute costs of pollution whereas the costs that actual 
polluters will face are to a large extent of a relative nature. 
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An ETS generally burdens an energy intensive undertaking that faces competition beyond 
the ETS boundaries with three types of (absolute) costs, being: 
(1) Direct costs resulting from the purchasing of allowances; 
(2) Direct costs resulting from abatement measures the undertaking needs to take up in 
order to comply with the ETS; and 
(3) Indirect costs resulting from higher electricity prices. 
Under the current EU ETS, however, the carbon leakage sector is exempted from costs 1 in 
the form of free allowances and partly compensated for costs 3 in the form of State Aid. 
From the perspective of equity, would it not seem unfair that undertakings, being alone in 
charge of their activity and thus alone directly responsible for the emissions they cause, 
will only face costs 2 in their entity, added with the part of costs 3 which are not 
compensated, whereas consumers, having had no direct influence in the decision making of 
emitting undertakings and being thus not directly responsible for their emissions, will be 
responsible for a part of the costs of pollution in the form of higher consumer prices? The 
answer is that it would certainly seem unfair if applied as a general allocation rule – but 
this is not the situation with free allowances granted for carbon leakage sectors under 
Article 10a(12) of the AETD. Such free allowances are namely granted precisely due to the 
fact that sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage cannot pass on the cost 
increases resulting from the ETS without significant losses of market share or profits. In 
other words, carbon leakage sectors are provided a capital gift in the form of free 
allowances, since they do not have a possibility of making consumers pay for their fair 
share of pollution costs. In this respect, polluting undertakings do not seem to benefit at the 
expense of consumers in a way that would contradict the equity interpretation of the 
polluter pays principle. It may be concluded that, free allocation for carbon leakage sectors 
under the EU ETS seems, in theory, compatible even with the extended form of the 
polluter pays principle. 
In order to assess whether the free allocation for carbon leakage sectors under the current 
EU ETS is de facto compatible with the extended form of the polluter pays principle, it 
needs to be examined to what extent free allowances under Article 10a(12) of the AETD 
are in practice allocated to undertakings facing a significant risk of carbon leakage. As 
stated above in Section 2.4.1, the carbon leakage risk according to which undertakings are 
granted free allowances is considered to be present if:  
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(1) the direct and indirect increase of production costs exceeds 5%; and the trade-
intensity with third countries exceeds 10% (integrated approach); 
(2) the direct and indirect increase of production costs alone exceeds 30% (separate 
approach).  
(3) the trade-intensity with third countries alone exceeds 30% (separated approach). 
A study conducted by Stefano Clò in 2010 reveals that out of the 140 sectors exempted 
from auctioning, only three sectors comply with the requirements imposed by the 
integrated approach. While other three sectors have been considered exposed to Carbon 
Leakage according to the separated approach because of the high cost increase they face, as 
many as 134 sectors (98% of the exempted sectors) have been found exposed to Carbon 
Leakage according to the separated approach because of their high trade exposure.
130
 The 
majority of these 134 sectors are, in fact, not carbon intensive at all: as many as 83 of the 
134 sectors would face a (direct + indirect) cost increase lower than 1% of their Added 
Value and 92 sectors would face a cost increase lower than 1.5% of their Added Value. 
Only 39 exempted sectors would face a cost increase between 1.5% and 5% of their Added 
Value, while only the last three sectors would face a cost increase higher than 5%, thus 
resulting to be exposed to Carbon Leakage according to both the integrated and separated 
approaches.
131
 In other words, if the integrated approach was the only criterion adopted to 
assess quantitatively the ETS sectors’ exposure to Carbon Leakage, just six out of the 140 
exempted sectors would have been found exposed to the risk of Carbon Leakage. 
The results of Cló’s Study, revealing that the majority of the so called carbon leakage 
sector would in fact only suffer from marginal cost increases due to compliance with the 
EU ETS, seriously undermine the compatibility of the EU ETS with the extended 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle. A significant risk of carbon leakage, as stated 
in Article 10a(12) of the AETD, is present only if a sector or an undertaking faces higher 
production costs that it cannot pass on to its consumers without fearing that a significant 
amount of the latter ones will start buying cheaper corresponding products of competitors 
operating outside the EU. It does not seem likely that an almost inexistent increase (such as 
less than 1%) in product prices could have such a decisive effect on consumer behaviour 
which depends not only on prices, but on a variety of other factors as well (e.g. product 
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quality, consumer habits, loyalty etc.) Moreover, it can be argued that with prices 
increasing annually as a result of inflation, a marginal increase in prices due to costs from 
the ETS would, in many cases, go unnoticed.  
In conclusion, it seems like the EU ETS is, in its current form, granting free allowances 
based on a carbon leakage risk even to such undertakings that are not, in reality, exposed to 
a significant risk of carbon leakage in the sense of Articles 10a(12) and 10a(14) of the 
AETD. This can be considered questionable from the perspective of an equity based 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle, as such undertakings are compensated for not 
being able to pass on the increased costs resulting from the EU ETS, although these costs 
are marginal to the extent that the inclusion of them into prices is not likely to seriously 
increase the undertakings’ exposure to carbon leakage.  
4.3.   The EU ETS from a Dynamic Efficiency Perspective 
4.3.1.   Perverse Incentives and Overcompensation Related to Free Allocation 
4.3.1a     The Updating Problem 
As concluded above in Section 4.2.1, free allocation does, in principle, provide equal 
incentives to reduce emissions as auctioning in the form of opportunity costs. However, 
free allocation may give rise to the risk of several types of perverse incentives, especially if 
polluters receive their allowances on the basis of the (historical, average or planned) 
amount of emissions emitted by themselves or their respective sector. In this respect, 
grandfathering seems to be the more problematic allocation method. Since it is based on 
historical emissions or so called “business-as-usual” –projections regarding future 
emissions, grandfathering gives more allowances to the worst polluters, who can then, in 
theory, sell them at a profit on the market. This may not award so called “early actors” for 
having implemented emission reduction measures on their own initiative.
132
 It has even 
been argued that grandfathering provides perverse incentives for undertakings to maintain 
high emissions, or even increase their emissions in order to receive more allowances.
133
 
This so called updating problem is particularly significant in period-based ETSs, such as 
the EU ETS, where allowance allocations are regularly updated.  
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In relation to grandfathering, benchmarking appears less problematic from the perspective 
of dynamic efficiency, as benchmarks are not calculated at the level of individual 
undertakings, but on the basis of e.g. emission averages. Benchmarks may e.g. be defined 
as the activity-weighted average of emission values for a particular sector of industry. 
Within these sectors of industry, benchmarking favours carbon-efficient installations, as 
they receive their allowances based on a benchmark which is calculated on the basis of 
average or “normal” carbon efficiency in the sector.134 Correspondingly, undertakings 
whose carbon efficiency is below average will need to purchase missing allowances on the 
market. Nevertheless, the updating problem seems to affect emission-based benchmarking 
as well. In a cap-and-trade system, being based on sector-specific averages of produced 
emissions, benchmarks need to be updated on a regular basis in order to respond to 
dynamic changes in the respective emission averages resulting from e.g. growth (decline) 
in production or increases (decreases) in the number of new entrants to the market. Yet 
again, the fact that benchmarks may be updated to a more favourable level from the 
perspective of undertakings if emissions of the sector in question have been higher than 
anticipated may introduce perverse incentives not to reduce emissions in order to maintain 
the sector’s average emissions high.135 Depending on the basis on which benchmarks are 
set, benchmarking may also foster a psychology that undertakings should put their main 
emphasis on lobbying for as many allowances as possible, rather than on investing in 
emissions abatement measures.
136
  
As explained above, the revised EU ETS is, however, neither founded on grandfathering 
nor emission-based benchmarks, but product-based benchmarks that are defined 
specifically for each sector and subsector.
137
 As the overall amount of allowances to be 
allocated to each undertaking is based on its output instead of its emissions, undertakings 
do not have perverse incentives to increase their emissions in order to receive more 
allowances for future periods. On the other hand, as the amount of granted allowances 
increases alongside with an increase in output, undertakings are not “punished” for 
production growth in the same way as under auctioning, where growth in production 
signifies that the undertaking will have to buy more allowances on the market. However, 
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the overall emission cap sets a limit to emissions: even if output based benchmarks may 
lead into an increase in overall output, overall emissions must remain within the cap. This 
increases the price of emission allowances
138
, which in its turn encourages undertakings to 
improve their energy efficiency, in order to minimise the number of extra allowances to be 
bought on the market, and correspondingly, to maximise their number of eventual surplus 
allowances. As a result, output based benchmarks provide incentives for undertakings to 
increase their output in order to receive more allowances, but at the same time it also 
favours undertakings with high energy efficiency, as surplus allowances can then be sold at 
a profit on the market. It can therefore be concluded that the carbon leakage provisions of 
the EU ETS do not seem to provide perverse incentives related to updates in allowance 
allocation. 
4.3.1b      Incentives to Maintain Inefficient Facilities Operational 
Regardless of whether using grandfathering or benchmarking, the financial advantage 
granted in the form of free allowances may increase incentives to keep older, inefficient 
facilities operational, as installations cease to receive free allowances when they close.
139
 
This is the situation when allowances are granted on a periodic basis (e.g. once every year). 
An undertaking may e.g. have average costs that exceed the price of the product, making 
thus a loss which may however be offset by the value of the allowances it receives for the 
following trading period.
140
 The undertaking may therefore want to continue operating at 
minimum-run conditions in order to continue receiving free allowances.
141
 This would 
naturally hamper dynamic efficiency, as such inefficient facilities rarely come up with 
innovations. Inefficient undertakings that keep remaining on the market also reduce the 
amount of overall allowances to be allocated to other undertakings, which may in its turn 
increase the overall demand (and thus the price) of allowances. Higher allowance prices 
could impede new entrants from entering the market, especially under a grandfathering 
scheme that is based on historical emissions, causing thus a barrier to entrance.
142
  
Woerdman & al. point out that free allocation may, on the other hand, have a positive 
impact on such undertakings whose losses are only of a temporary nature and whom the 
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introduction of an auction-based system would force into bankruptcy.
143
 It can nevertheless 
be argued that efficient undertakings having a clear long term vision regarding emission 
reductions will manage to comply with the ETS without auctioning causing an 
insurmountable burden, and eventual bankruptcy would in most situations concern 
undertakings that do not possess adequate, cost-effective means to comply with the 
emission reduction targets in the long run, e.g. due to outdated production processes. One 
could claim that such a “natural selection” would, as a matter of fact, seem rather desirable 
from a dynamic efficiency perspective, as operators with inflexible adaptation facilities to 
challenges caused by climate change will be eliminated in favour of more modern, “better 
equipped” competitors. 
Woerdman & al. also note, accurately, that in the real world of imperfect foresight, a firm 
does not know whether the losses it makes will be permanent or temporary: it can hope for 
a better future and continue with its business.
144
 Woerdman & al. therefore conclude that 
free allocation of allowances provides incentives to keep in service less efficient plants 
only under the assumption of perfect foresight, which is rare.
145
 This view can be 
contested. Woerdman & al. seem to assume that free allocation provides incentives to keep 
inefficient facilities in service only for such undertakings who know for certain that their 
activity will make permanent losses. However, an undertaking may just as well continue 
keeping a de facto inefficient, loss-making facility in operation, under the falsely optimistic 
assumption that it can be transformed into a profit making venture in the future. 
Periodically granted free allowances may provide some incentives to increase such risk 
taking, as they may function as a “guarantee”: should a loss making undertaking decide to 
continue its activity in the hope of making it turn profitable will in any situation have the 
option of “giving up” and damp its eventual fall by cutting down production to a minimum, 
sell the surplus allowances on the market and use the profits to recover a part of the 
losses.
146
 This may be less problematic from a moral perspective compared to the situation 
where an inefficient undertaking keeps itself operational for the mere purpose of being able 
to sell surplus allowances. It nevertheless results in an equal situation from a dynamic 
efficiency perspective: the entrance to the market of new, more efficient undertakings is 
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hampered by existing, inefficient competitors. It can therefore be argued that periodically 
granted free allowances may provide perverse (or rather false) incentives to keep 
inefficient facilities operational, also in situations of imperfect foresight. 
4.3.1c      Free Allocation and Overcompensation 
Aside of providing some perverse incentives as described above, free allocation of 
allowances may lead to overcompensation in the form of too many free allowances granted 
to an undertaking due to dynamic changes in the undertaking’s production that have 
occurred after the initial distribution of allowances. The undertaking in question may e.g. 
suffer from a temporary fall in demand as a consequence of e.g. economic recession, being 
thus forced to temporarily cut down its output. It may also have deliberately increased its 
emissions in order to receive more free allowances under grandfathering on the basis of 
historical emissions. Alternatively, overcompensation may be the result of static ex-ante 
benchmarks.
147
  
When a facility produces less, it simultaneously reduces emissions, which in its turn leads 
to a surplus of allowances for a short term period. The undertaking may then bank those 
surplus allowances in order to use them in the future, which would imply that a temporary 
economic recession may allow an undertaking to pollute more than before once it has 
recovered from the slowdown. From a dynamic efficiency perspective, the ideal would be 
that a polluter gets rewarded in the form of surplus allowances only in situations where it 
has made permanent reductions in its emissions e.g. by improving the energy efficiency of 
its installations or shifting from CO2 – intensive fuel to more carbon-neutral fuel. In the 
situation in question, however, the undertaking receives surplus allowances as a bonus for 
a temporary reduction in emissions, which is by no means the result of any active efforts to 
reduce emissions. Surplus allowances resulting from a temporary slowdown in production 
may later enable an undertaking to emit higher amounts of greenhouse gases than it would 
have done without the slowdown, delaying thus investments in emissions abatements. This 
advantage in the form of surplus allowances seems even more unjustifiable in situations 
where the decline in production is the result of a poor business decision that has lead e.g. 
into a drop in the demand of the product in question.
148
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4.3.1.d      Solution of the EU ETS: “Ex-Post Adjustments” 
Controversial position of ex-post adjustments in a cap-and-trade system 
The problems regarding over-allocation as a result of temporary declines in output as well 
as the dilemma concerning incentives to keep inefficient facilities operational has been 
noticed in the revised EU ETS, as it seems to enable certain ex-post adjustments to the 
initial allocation of allowances. The Commission Decision 2011/278/EU regarding rules 
for harmonised free allocation (“harmonised free allocation Decision”) namely enables the 
withdrawal of surplus allowances in the cases of significant reductions in the capacity of an 
installation and partial or entire cessation of operations of an installation. This is rather 
interesting with respect to the Commission’s previously negative attitude towards ex-post 
adjustments in NAPs. In its Communication on the assessment of national allocation plans 
for the allocation of emission allowances in the second period of the EU ETS, the 
Commission namely considers that “ex-post adjustments contradict the essential concept of 
a cap-and-trade system”, as it is “an inherent feature of it that the use of prognoses always 
requires to a certain degree an ex-ante estimation of emissions the actual volume thereof 
may eventually deviate in reality”.149 According to the Commission, retroactive changes to 
the allocation already decided upon up-front cannot be justified other than in the form of 
allocation that takes place to new entrants from the pre-fixed new entrants’ reserve, as this 
would contradict the essential concept of a cap-and-trade system, with view to allowance 
retrievers’ possibilities of taking optimal economic decisions.150  
Ex-post adjustments that allow the withdrawal of allowances may indeed be problematic 
when used in the context of an ETS. Firstly, the possibility to remove overlap allowances 
ex-post seems to confront the principle of legal certainty as defined by the ECJ.
151
 
Increases and declines in output is considered to be a normal phenomenon in business on a 
free market, as each and every undertaking needs to adjust the supply of a product 
according to its demand, which in its turn varies constantly, depending on diverse, often 
unpredictable factors (business cycle, the emergence of competing products on the market, 
changes in consumer preferences, etc.). A possibility to penalise undertakings by 
withdrawing allowances on the basis of cuts it has been forced to make in output is bound 
to create uncertainty among undertakings, forcing them to take into account in their 
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decision making the eventuality of losing allowances in the not overly unlikely event of 
having to cut their output. In practice, this would mean that undertakings would have to 
take into account the eventual loss of allowances due to withdrawal as an additional 
opportunity cost.
152
  
Secondly, downward ex-post adjustments withdrawing allowances on the basis of a decline 
in production would affect undertakings’ incentives to make reductions in output in order 
to free up allowances.
153
 Accordingly, this would also increase undertakings’ reluctance to 
make permanent cutbacks in their production with the genuine aim of reducing emissions. 
In theory, this effect could be prevented by allowing ex-post adjustments only for 
temporary cuts in production and cuts that have been made solely in the purpose of 
keeping an inefficient plant active and receive more free allowances to be sold. In practice, 
however, it would be difficult to prove when an undertaking has reduced its output with the 
aim of achieving permanent emission reductions, when the decline in output is the result of 
“disloyal” attempts to receive free allowances and when the decline is simply the 
consequence of normal alterations on the market. 
The apparent contrast in the Commission’s view and the ex-post adjustment provisions 
included in the harmonised free allocation Decision has a simple explanation, as shall be 
demonstrated further below: the said provisions do not, in fact, enable ex-post adjustments 
in the traditional sense of the term. In order to facilitate the reading process, they shall 
nevertheless be referred to in this Section as “ex-post adjustments”. 
Ex-post adjustments in the harmonised free allocation Decision 
Article 21(3) of the harmonised free allocation Decision provides that the amount of 
allowances to be distributed to an undertaking that has cut its production capacity has to be 
adjusted to correspond to the reduced capacity, starting from the year following the one 
during which the capacity reduction took place. Articles 3(i) and 3(j) of the harmonised 
free allocation Decision define significant capacity reduction as an action that leads to a 
significant decrease in a sub-installation’s initial installed capacity and its activity level, 
provided that: 
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(1) the reduction in capacity amounts to at least 10%; or 
(2) the reduced capacity would entitle the installation in question to at least 50 000 
fewer allowances per year, representing at least 5% of the preliminary annual 
number of emission allowances allocated free of charge for the sub-installation in 
question before the change in capacity. 
Correspondingly, ceased installations shall not receive any allowances at all under the EU 
ETS. The cessation of an installation’s operation is defined in Article 22 of the harmonised 
free allocation Decision, pursuant to which an installation is deemed to have ceased 
operations if:  
(1) the greenhouse gas emissions permit or any other relevant environmental 
permit has expired or been withdrawn;   
(2) operation of the installation is technically impossible or it is technically 
impossible to resume operation; or 
(3) the installation is not operating, but has been operating before and the 
operator cannot establish that this installation will resume operation at the 
latest within 6 months after having ceased operations. Member States may 
extent this period up to a maximum of 18 months if the operator can 
establish that the installation cannot resume operation within 6 months due 
to exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances (force majeure). 
As for partial cessation of operations of an installation, Article 23 of the harmonised free 
allocation Decision states that an installation is deemed to have partially ceased operations, 
provided that one sub-installation, which contributes to at least 30 % of the installation’s 
final annual amount of emission allowances allocated free of charge or to the allocation of 
more than 50 000 allowances, reduces its activity level in a given calendar year by at least 
50 % compared to the initial activity level. The sub-installation can then at the most 
receive half of the initially allocated allowances.
154
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Internal coherence of the ex-post adjustment rules with the AETD 
The admissibility of ex-post adjustments in the EU ETS has so far been a polemic 
question. Despite the negative view adopted by the Commission vis-á-vis ex-post 
adjustments, the AETD does not explicitly allow nor forbid ex-post adjustments in general. 
Moreover, the Court of First Instance has considered that ex-post adjustments do not 
contradict the essence of the ETS.
155
 In the case of the ex-post adjustments to the allocation 
of allowances under the harmonised free allocation Decision, however, it needs to be 
contested whether such rules can even be regarded as ex-post adjustments in the first place. 
An ex-post adjustment within an ETS can be defined as a governmental decision that 
changes the legal circumstances under which the market and thus the market participants 
may operate.
156
 However, in the case of adjustments under Articles 3(i-j) and 20-23 of the 
harmonised free allocation Decision, there seems to be no such change in legal 
circumstances, as the Member States are not provided any discretionary power to actually 
change the circumstances under which free allowances are granted. The said provisions 
rather establish ex ante certain conditions that undertakings receiving free allowances must 
continuously fulfil in order to keep the amount of free allowances they have received.  
Member States have thus merely a competence of assessing ex-post whether these 
continuous conditions are fulfilled, and in the case of non-compliance, a responsibility to 
withdraw the surplus allowances. This does not change the legal position of undertakings 
that have received free allowances in the initial distribution, as they have known all along 
that should they reduce or increase their capacity or cease the operation of an installation in 
the way described in Articles 3(i-j) and 20-23 of the harmonised free allocation Decision, 
they will have to surrender allowances or have the right of applying for more allowances 
from the new entrants’ reserve. It follows that Articles 3(i-j) and 20-23 of the harmonised 
free allocation Decision cannot be considered to imply ex-post adjustments and are, in this 
respect, not incoherent with the AETD. 
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It needs to be noted, however, that the preamble of the AETD requires that allocations 
must be fixed prior to the trading period so as to enable the market to function properly.
157
 
The explicit content of this sentence has so far remained somewhat ambiguous.
158
 If 
interpreted strictly, it may be seen to require that the initial allocation of allowances needs 
to be fixed, i.e. it cannot be altered ex-post. Such an interpretation would, however, not 
seem plausible. Although the possibility to withdraw surplus allowances ex-post may 
increase the price of allowances and thus increase uncertainty, it can hardly be argued that 
such withdrawal, when conducted on the basis of pre-defined, unambiguous provisions, 
could have such serious consequences as impeding the “proper functioning” of the 
allowance market. Even the eventual price volatility may be damped in the not unlikely 
event that the Commission decides that the withdrawn allowances will eventually be 
returned to the market at the end of each emissions trading period, alongside with the 
eventual allowances that remain in the new entrants’ reserve in the end of the emissions 
trading period.
159
 Consequently, it seems more reasonable to interpret the sentence 
“allocations must be fixed prior to the trading period so as to enable the market to function 
properly” as to simply require that the initial allocation of allowances should always be 
conducted during the previous trading period and not when the trading period has already 
started. The adjustments under Articles 3(i-j) and 20-23 of the harmonised free allocation 
Decision should therefore not be incoherent with the purpose of the AETD. 
Coherence of the ex-post adjustment rules with the principle of legal certainty 
The problems related to the effect of ex-post adjustments on legal certainty are connected 
to the amount of discretion that the possibility of ex-post adjustments leaves to the State. 
The more discretion the State has in determining the content of the ex-post adjustment, the 
less the legal subject can rely on the original rule in determining its legal rights and 
obligations. Correspondingly, the more the State’s power of discretion is limited by the 
original rule, the more predictable is the content of an eventual ex-post change. This is 
reflected in the ECJ’s interpretation of the concept of legal certainty. According to the ECJ, 
the principle of legal certainty in the EU requires that Community rules enable those 
concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. 
Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are 
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and take steps accordingly.
160
 In this respect, the rules regarding ex-post judgments within 
the EU ETS do not seem problematic with regard to legal certainty. As the possibilities for 
ex-post adjustments are clearly limited ex-ante to of significant reductions and extensions 
of capacity as well as partial or complete cessations of operations of an installation, and as 
the concepts of the said situations are equally defined ex-ante in an unambiguous way in 
the harmonised free allocation Decision, it follows that Member States have, in fact, no 
discretionary power whatsoever as regards the content of the ex-post adjustments. 
Undertakings should therefore not have any trouble in “knowing precisely the extent of 
their rights and obligations” as required by the ECJ. The rules concerning ex-post 
adjustments in the harmonised free allocation Decision should therefore not be regarded as 
contradictory to the principle of legal certainty. 
Do ex-post adjustments solve the problems related to maintenance of inefficient facilities 
and overcompensation? 
The said rules enabling ex-post adjustments on the basis of significant reductions in 
production capacity and partial or total cessation of operations can be seen to efficiently 
remove eventual perverse incentives to keep inefficient installations operational at 
minimum-run conditions for the mere purpose of receiving free allowances. An 
undertaking does not gain any financial advantage from reducing its output to a minimum, 
as this would easily be interpreted either as a significant reduction of capacity, or perhaps 
more likely, a partial cessation of sub-installations. In each situation, the undertaking will 
only receive allowances corresponding to the new, minimised output. Moreover, this 
should also reduce false optimism that free allowances may contribute to. Inefficient 
undertakings may consider their future prospects more realistically, as they do not have the 
“plan B” option of simply shutting down its output to a minimum in order to be able to sell 
a maximum amount of surplus allowances that it would receive in the following emissions 
trading period. 
Although the rules of the harmonised free allocation Decision regarding ex-post 
adjustments due to changes in production capacity seem to remove quite effectively both 
perverse incentives and false optimism for maintaining inefficient facilities operational, it 
nevertheless does not entirely remove the risk of overcompensation arising from dynamic 
changes in output that result from changes in market conditions, as only significant 
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reductions in capacity may lead to the withdrawal of allowances. The absolute nature of 
the definition of a significant capacity reduction (>10% reduction or >50 000 fewer 
allowances representing at least 5% of the initially allocated allowances) implies that 
should an undertaking suffer a loss in market share due to a poor business decision and 
subsequently cut its production by less than 10% and by less than 49 999 allowances (or 
less than 4,9% of its initial amount of allowances), it would gain a financial benefit in the 
form of surplus allowances that it can sell at a profit on the market. As a result, 
overcompensation is avoided merely in situations where e.g. a sudden and substantial loss 
of market share has forced an undertaking to make relatively large cuts in output. 
Accordingly, the problem of overcompensation due to dynamic changes in production still 
remains in situations where the installation in question has made other than significant 
reductions in its capacity in the sense of Articles 3(i) and 3(j) of the harmonised free 
allocation Decision. 
4.3.2. Free Allocation and Uncertainty 
A key element in assessing the functionality of an ETS from a dynamic efficiency 
perspective is the predictability of the system and whether and to what extent it gives 
reason to uncertainty. So called business uncertainty, i.e. the potential that a chosen action 
will lead to a loss, is an inherent part of entrepreneurial activity and as such not a negative 
phenomenon. However, the more business uncertainty an ETS involves, the more 
difficulties participants will face in planning their activity on a long term. As uncertainty 
regarding future developments increases the potential risk of investments, it is likely to 
have a negative impact on dynamic efficiency. 
4.3.2a     Price Volatility and its Indirect Impact on Dynamic Efficiency 
Perhaps the most fundamental uncertainty related to emissions trading is the 
unpredictability of the price development of the emission allowances. As a general rule, 
uncertainty created by price volatility has been considered to have a harmful effect on 
innovations.
161
 Difficulties in predicting future allowance prices have a tendency to delay 
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investment decisions, as an undertaking can make better investment decisions by waiting 
and gaining more knowledge about future prices.
162
 Furthermore, in the presence of price 
uncertainty, risk aversion is also likely to reduce investments
163
: low-carbon investments 
become less attractive in the presence of a possibility of low CO2 prices, as the 
undertaking could thus cover its emissions with cheaper allowance in the future. On the 
other hand, Schleich & al. have pointed out that in the context of emissions trading, low-
carbon investments also reduce the undertakings’ exposure to high allowance prices, since 
less emissions will then need to be covered by allowances.
164
 Price volatility may therefore 
in some cases even increase innovations, depending inter alia on the expected net position 
(buyer / seller) of the undertaking in question and its preparedness to take risks.
165
 
However, as Grubb and Neuhoff note, even though companies are prepared to bear risks, 
they generally prefer to take those risks in their core business, where the additional 
management attention can at the same time create strategic opportunities.
166
 Also the 
irreversibility of investments in emission abatement technology tends to contribute to a 
rather risk aversive general attitude within emission allowance markets.
167
 Considering the 
view adopted by the majority of legal academics and economists, price volatility shall 
therefore be regarded as a prima facie negative phenomenon vis-à-vis dynamic efficiency 
in this Study. 
So far, the academic literature has been rather twisted as regards whether free allocation 
contributes to certainty or whether it by contrast increases the unpredictability of the ETS. 
It has been argued that free allocation may by its nature enhance legal certainty, as the 
quantity of allowances to be issued to each sector of industry is determined on the basis of 
administrative rules and decision making, and it should consequently be rather clear to 
operators how many allowances they will receive.
168
 The main uncertainty of free 
allocation, however, seems to relate to the unpredictability of future allowance prices on 
the market. In contrast to auction, where the initial allocation auction establishes a 
“preliminary price” for allowances that can be used as a base for future estimates of price 
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developments, free allocation does not provide any “hints” regarding the basic level where 
the allocation prices will be established. This may increase price volatility in the beginning 
of each emissions trading period, before a certain basic level of allowance prices has been 
established. Moreover, a survey studying the views and experiences of Finnish energy 
intensive industries regarding the EU ETS has indicated that partly due to the thinness of 
emission allowance markets (restricted supply of allowances), industries have not fully 
understood the mechanisms behind the determination of allowances prices.
169
 Such lack of 
understanding is bound to further increase unpredictability. 
4.3.2b     Flexibility Measures Applied in the EU ETS to Reduce Price Volatility 
Banking 
Banking enables participants in an ETS to use unused allowances in future emissions 
trading periods. The AETD allows unlimited intra-phase banking during 2008–2012 and 
2013–2020. This can be deduced from Article 13 of the AETD, which states that 
allowances issued from January 1 2013 onwards shall be valid for emissions during 
periods of eight years beginning on January 1 2013. Theoretical and empirical economic 
analyses suggest that banking reduces overall compliance costs, as it allows for 
intertemporal flexibility because cost savings can be traded over time.
170
 Likewise, 
banking allows for buffering of allowances which, in turn, tends to improve price stability, 
by reducing exposure to short term variations.
171
 In terms of dynamic efficiency, banking 
has been considered to accelerate innovations: as the freed up allowances may be saved for 
the future rather than being sold on the market, banking tends to improve the profitability 
of a new low-emission technology.
172
 Empirical analyses for the Acid Rain Program has 
indicated that because of banking, companies invested earlier in new technologies, which 
— as a side effect — was also beneficial for the environment.173  
The stabilising effect of banking on short term price variations depends on the stability of 
expectations for the market price of allowances in future periods
174
, which, in its turn, 
depends inter alia on expectations regarding future reductions in emissions. Under the EU 
ETS, the gradually tightening EU-wide allowance cap should have a stabilising impact on 
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future expectations as it gives an indication regarding how much emissions will be reduced 
on a long term. On the other hand, however, banking may also cause undesirable side 
effects. Firstly, as the transferred allowances may be used to cover emissions in future 
trading periods, banking may reduce the need for new technologies in the future, 
hampering thus long term dynamic efficiency.
175
 Moreover, when applied in a system of 
free allocation of allowances, banking may increase speculative activities. Free allocation 
under the EU ETS is conducted on the basis of sector specific benchmarks, meaning that 
allowances are not distributed according to their factual demand. As a consequence, and 
undertaking with high adaptability may be granted allowances which it will eventually not 
use as it can reduce its emissions at a lower marginal cost. This may provide the 
undertaking in question incentives to bank its allowances in the hope of raising thus their 
market prices, enabling the undertaking to sell the allowances at a higher price in the 
future. Such speculation, if occurring on a larger scale amongst undertakings, is likely to 
increase price volatility. This risk seems lower in a system based on auctioning, as each 
operator needs to pay for its allowances in the initial distribution. A risk aversive or a risk 
neutral undertaking is therefore likely not to buy more allowances than it actually plans to 
use.  
Borrowing 
Borrowing is a mechanism allowing participants to an ETS to borrow allowances from 
future periods and use them to cover emissions of the current period. Although it is 
generally considered that the increased flexibility resulting from borrowing allowances 
from future periods reduces the overall compliance costs of undertakings participating in 
an ETS, borrowing may cause several problems if allowed on a larger time frame. Firstly, 
borrowing may temporarily reduce the current demand for allowances and increase 
uncertainty about future demand, increasing thus price volatility. It has even been argued 
that borrowing may increase the incentives of undertakings to delay investments in 
abatement technologies by borrowing permits in early periods and reimbursing them later 
with cheaper permits.
176
 The concentration of emissions on early periods could therefore 
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lead to a situation where the level of global pollution is higher than it would have been 
without borrowing.
177
  
As for the EU ETS, although the AETD does not contain any specific provisions 
concerning borrowing, it can be deduced that borrowing is allowed to a limited extent 
within compliance periods. Article 12(3) of the AETD namely provides that allowances for 
emissions in period t have to be surrendered on 30
th
 April, i.e. after allowances for period t 
+ 1 have been issued on 28
th
 February in accordance with Article 11(2) of the AETD. In 
other words, undertakings can, in practice, use allowances for 2 years. Due to limited 
extent to which borrowing is allowed within the EU ETS, it is not likely that it would cause 
any of the negative consequences mentioned above. 
Reserve allowances 
The imposture of a predetermined price ceiling and a price floor is one solution to enhance 
price stability on the allowance market. An absolute, unbreakable price ceiling could, 
however, only be established if a governmental institution (or, in the case of the EU, a 
specific EU institution) were created to provide an unlimited supply of reserve allowances 
at a fixed price.
178
 This would be impossible under an overall emission cap without altering 
it ex-post. The solution under the EU ETS has been to introduce a reserve price mechanism 
designed to reduce extreme price fluctuations. Article 29a of the AETD namely enables the 
adoption of: 
(a) a measure which allows Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the 
quantity to be auctioned; and 
(b) a measure which allows Member States to auction up to 25 % of the remaining 
allowances in the new entrants reserve.   
However, the measures may only be applied if, for more than six consecutive months, the 
allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two 
preceding years on the European carbon market, on condition that the price evolution does 
not correspond to changing market fundamentals. In other words, as reserve allowances 
will only be auctioned in the rise in allowance prices has been truly extreme, the 
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mechanism adopted under Article 29a of the AETD is likely to be rarely applied in 
practice, and does not reduce the effects of “non-extreme” price fluctuations. 
4.3.2c    Price Volatility in the EU ETS 
Data regarding the first emissions trading period (2005-2007) shows that the EU ETS did 
indeed experience severe price volatility, as the allowance price tripled in the first six 
months, rising to over €30 before collapsing by half in a one-week period in April 2006, 
and declined to zero over the next twelve months.
179
 On the basis of empirical studies, 
however, the main reason for the huge volatility was not free allocation as such, but rather 
extensive over-allocation of allowances in the NAPs, which lead to an oversupply, and 
subsequently, a collapse in demand and in prices of allowances.
180
 Another main reason for 
the extreme price volatility was that inter-period banking was not enabled, meaning that 
undertakings possessing surplus allowances by the end of 2007 were forced to sell them at 
a near-zero price in order to get at least some revenue from them.
181
 Both of the 
aforementioned causes of price volatility reflect the experimental nature of the first 
emissions trading period and have been removed from the revised EU ETS: Over-
allocation should no longer be a problem due to the EU-wide emission cap as well as the 
harmonised allocation rules, and unrestricted banking within the third trading period 
should solve the problem of price drops (peaks) at the end of each year. However, the trial 
phase of the EU ETS raised a number of other potential causes of price volatility that are a 
more inherent part of free allocation, and thus more difficult to remove. 
Speculation and the Two-Way Effect of Banking on Price Stability 
Ellerman & al. have pointed out that during the first trading period, the EU allowance 
market suffered from an institutionally caused imbalance in the presence of buyers and 
sellers. In brief, undertakings with installations that were short allowances and needed to 
cover their emissions were disproportionately present on the market whereas undertakings 
that possessed surplus allowances held so called long positions
182
 were not as active in the 
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market.
183
 Installations with a long position are under no compulsion to sell to the market, 
unlike companies with short positions who must acquire allowances to cover emissions for 
the current year. Companies with a long position can take a wait-and-see attitude, and 
during the first emissions trading period of the EU ETS, many appear to have done so.
184
  
This wait-and-see attitude during the preliminary trading phase of the EU ETS is 
remarkable, especially since it occurred despite the fact that banking allowances for future 
periods was not allowed at the time. In other words, many undertakings seem to have 
preferred to save their allowances and wait for their price to increase, despite the risk that 
in the event of a price collapse they would have to sell their allowances at the end of the 
trading period at a loss. As noted above, although banking has, prima facie, a stabilising 
effect on allowance prices, banking may on the other hand increase speculative activities in 
the form of saving surplus allowances in order to sell them at a higher price in the future, 
as undertakings are not forced to sell their surplus allowances at the end of each trading 
period. The revised EU ETS cannot therefore be considered to have solved the 
“speculation problem”: it will be omnipresent even during the third trading period and may 
even be further incentivised by banking. Paradoxically, the stabilising effect of banking on 
allowance prices may therefore to a certain degree become undermined by increasing 
speculation.  
The New Entrants’ Reserve and its Impact on Price Stability 
Article 10a(7) of the AETD provides that 5% of the EU-wide quantity of allowances 
allocated for the third trading period shall be set aside to constitute the maximum of free 
allowances available for new entrants. The fact that all allowances will not be released on 
the market at once may give rise to price volatility. The new entrants’ reserve may, first of 
all, turn out not to be sufficient to cover the need of all new entrants, meaning that new 
entrants would partly have to buy their allowances on the market. This would increase the 
overall demand for allowances, and would consequently drive up allowance prices. On the 
other hand, should the new entrants’ reserve exceed the new entrants’ overall need for 
allowances, the surplus allowances would have to be released on the market at the end of 
the trading period by auctioning.
185
 The emergence of surplus allowances on the market at 
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the end of the emissions trading period would likely reduce the allowance prices, as most 
undertakings would have planned their activity according to a lower supply of allowances. 
The prospect of being able to buy eventual cheaper allowances from the surplus of the 
entrants’ reserve at the end of the trading period may to some extent further increase 
speculation and price volatility. 
It can be concluded that although the EU ETS contains mechanisms aiming at reducing the 
effects of price volatility, there are features in the free allocation based EU ETS that may 
cause price volatility, notably the imbalance between buyers and sellers on the allowance 
market. Furthermore, the factual effect of the mechanisms adopted in the EU ETS may 
only provide limited protection against price fluctuations. The EU ETS does not contain a 
price floor for allowances, and the “reserve price” enabling the auctioning of additional 
allowances is only designed for extreme situations. Although banking should bring more 
stability to the allowance market, it may have unpredictable side effects, as it may further 
increase the imbalance of buyers and sellers on the allowance market. 
4.3.2d     Uncertainty related to Updates 
A problematic feature of a system based on benchmarking is that it may turn out difficult 
to establish sector-specific emission benchmarks that would treat different sectors of 
activity in an equal way. The sector-specific benchmarks are based on estimates regarding 
the ideal level of emissions for each sector and subsector, but in reality there are no 
absolute, “watertight” criteria for defining how much each sector can reasonably be 
expected to emit. The result may be that the benchmarks turn out to be very strict for 
certain sectors, meaning that even the sector’s most emission efficient undertakings will 
remain net buyers of allowances. Meanwhile, other sectors may receive more favourable 
benchmarks, implying that an undertaking may become a net seller even though its 
emission efficiency is mediocre within the sector.  
If a sector of activity suffers disproportionally from the EU ETS due to benchmarks that 
turn out to be unrealistically strict, the competitiveness of the said sector decreases in 
relation to competitors operating outside the EU. This could increase the carbon leakage 
risk of the sector as a whole, undermining the overall efficiency of the EU ETS. One 
solution to the problem could be to update the benchmark of a sector ex-post in case that it 
turns out to be too strict (or too loose). In order for the overall emissions to remain within 
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the EU-wide cap, however, the loosening of the emission benchmarks of one sector could 
easily imply restrictions in the benchmarks of other sectors. The prospect of eventual 
(upward or downward) updates to the emission benchmarks would in any event increase 
uncertainty among undertakings as it would complicate their possibilities to evaluate their 
future compliance costs. It is also not evident whether the AETD or the Free Allocation 
Decision would enable such updates in the first place. 
Another potentially significant source of uncertainty in the revised EU ETS is related to the 
updating of the sectors entitled to free allocation due to their carbon leakage status. In this 
respect, the separate approach in determining whether a sector should be included in the 
list of sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage seems rather problematic. 
Pursuant to Article 10a(13) of the AETD, the Commission shall update the list of carbon 
leakage sectors every five years, meaning that sectors who have undergone structural 
changes either when it comes to their carbon intensity or their trade intensity with third 
countries, may be excluded from the preferential treatment granted by the carbon leakage 
status. This may give rise to uncertainty especially in the vast majority of sectors that have 
been given a carbon leakage status on the basis of their trade intensity with third countries 
under the separated approach.  
Trade intensity with third countries may well change within a period of five years, as the 
market structure of a sector depends on various, often unpredictable factors. The smaller 
the sector, the more even minor changes in the market structure may lead to the situation 
where the sector does not qualify as particularly exposed to carbon leakage under the 
requirements of the AETD. For instance, a sector that has been included in the carbon 
leakage list on the basis of a trade intensity with third countries of 32% may be excluded 
from the list after five years on the basis of a drop in trade intensity to 29%.
186
 This does 
not mean, however, that its exposure to the risk of carbon leakage would have radically 
changed. Moreover, a drop in trade intensity with third countries may just as well be of a 
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temporary nature. Once the carbon leakage sector is revised after the following period of 
five years, the trade intensity of the sector in question with third countries may well have 
risen back to over 30%, meaning that it should be classified as a carbon leakage sector 
again. The permanent uncertainty of undertakings regarding whether their sector will be 
granted a carbon leakage status in the future is likely to hamper dynamic efficiency, as 
such undertakings cannot know in advance whether they should save assets for buying 
future allowances in auctions or whether they will receive their allowances free of charge. 
Rather than using resources in investments that may have an uncertain outcome regarding 
the extent of emission reductions that will be achieved, undertakings may prefer to “be on 
the safe side” and make sure that they have sufficient resources for being able to cover 
their emissions even in the event that they will have to purchase their allowances in 
auctions.  
The uncertainties deriving from updates to the carbon leakage status are further increased 
as there is so far no legal certainty regarding the future allocations of a sector formerly 
considered exposed to carbon leakage.
187
 Article 10a(11) of the AETD provides in general 
that sectors other than electricity
188
 will be subject to a steadily growing proportion of 
auctioning, as the transitory rules envisage that free allocation is reduced annually by equal 
amounts, starting from 80% in 2013 and resulting in 30% of free allocation in 2020. If the 
general provisions of harmonised free allocation are applied to former carbon leakage 
sectors, however, it will cause those sectors severe hardships, as adjustments to auctioning 
would have to take place within a very short period of time.
189
 The adaptation will become 
more difficult with time, as the differential treatment of carbon leakage sectors (which will 
continue to receive 100% of their allowances for free until 2020) in relation to non-carbon 
leakage sectors (which will receive less and less free allowances) will increase every year. 
The adaptation of former carbon leakage sectors to auctioning could be facilitated e.g. by 
the introduction of a specific, lighter transitional schedule with declining free allocation for 
such sectors, or simply by imposing a sufficient transition period. The current AETD, 
however, does not seem to contain any provisions enabling such arrangements. 
Article 10a(6) of the AETD may, in theory, enable Member States to 
grant State aid for other sectors than those defined as carbon leakage 
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sectors by the Commission under Article 10a(13) as compensation for 
risen electricity costs. This is due to the obscurity of the different 
language versions of the AETD, which may allow to interpret Article 
10a(6) as to enable State aid also for sectors that the Member State 
itself considers to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon 
leakage.
190
 Such an interpretation would, however, seem rather far-
fetched. Moreover, as State aid granted under Article 10a(6) would 
only compensate for higher electricity costs, it would not facilitate the 
adaptation of former carbon leakage status –undertakings to 
auctioning. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether legal remedies are available under Article 263 of the 
TFEU to operators affected by a Commission decision to exclude them from the list of 
carbon leakage sectors.
191
 According to the case law of the ECJ, undertakings would have 
to prove that they are directly and individually concerned in order to have legal standing to 
challenge an administrative act of the European Commission.
192
 This is, however, 
interpreted strictly
193
, and it is not clear whether a decision directed to an entire sector 
would be considered to have such an effect. There may nevertheless be a possibility for an 
undertaking excluded from the list concerning sectors with a carbon leakage status to start 
a national procedure, claiming that it should have got a certain amount of allowances for 
free from the national authority by 28 February of a calendar year on the basis of Article 
11(2) of the AETD. Such a claim may ultimately end up before the ECJ under the 
preliminary rulings procedure of Article 267 of the TFEU. 
4.3.3. The Impact of CDM and JI Projects on Dynamic Efficiency 
In order to enhance its cost-effectiveness, the ETS is linked to the two project-based 
flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM and JI, meaning that undertakings 
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participating in the ETS may use offset credits from the CDM and JI to comply with their 
emissions allocations. The main motivation was to enable undertakings covered by the 
ETS to take advantage of the cost efficient mitigation opportunities in developing countries 
and countries in transition to a market economy.
194
 In theory, CDM and JI mechanisms 
could also mitigate the competitiveness concerns of carbon leakage sectors, as they could 
reduce their burden of cutting emissions by investing in more cost-efficient emission 
reductions in third countries. The availability of CDM credits also lowers the difference in 
carbon prices compared to non-participating countries, which is one of the most significant 
causes of carbon leakage.
195
  
However, both CDM and JI may have some negative impacts on dynamic efficiency. CDM 
seems, in this respect, more problematic. Firstly, eventual reductions in leakage are 
undermined by the fact that emission baselines (on the basis of which the value of the 
credit is calculated) established for CDM projects do not take into account that the 
implementation of all other CDM projects together reduces international carbon prices, 
leakage and thereby the estimated emissions of any other project considered.
196
 
Consequently, the amount of credits that are granted for each project is higher than if the 
baseline was calculated according to the factual level of emissions (which is lowered by 
other CDM projects). As a result, “too many” CER credits are granted compared to the 
factual reduction in worldwide greenhouse emissions achieved by the CDM project.
197
 In 
the absence of any constraint on the use of CERs in the EU ETS, CDM projects could 
result in lower overall emission reductions.  
Moreover, both JI and CDM projects may have a negative impact on dynamic efficiency, 
as instead of innovating new technologies in order to be able to reduce emissions in their 
respective countries, undertakings can achieve the same emission reduction in less 
developed countries by using simpler or more traditional emission reduction technology. It 
has also been argued that the large financial inflows that developing countries may benefit 
from under a future CDM may undermine their willingness to take on binding emission 
commitments at a later stage.
198
 This is because most developing countries obtain a larger 
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income gain under a well-functioning crediting mechanism than under most rules for 
allocating emission rights in a worldwide ETS.
199
 
Considering the potentially significant negative impact of the flexibility mechanisms – 
especially as regards CDM –the current EU ETS contains only loose constraints on the use 
of offset credits. Notably, Article 11a(8)(5) of the AETD merely provides that the overall 
use of credits allowed does not exceed 50 % of the EU-wide reductions below the 2005 
levels over the period from 2008 to 2020.  Pursuant to Article 11a(8)(1) of the AETD, the 
exact amount of offset credits to be used depends on the amount allowed in each respective 
NAP for emissions trading period 2008-2012. Should the overall use of offset credits – 
especially CDM credits – indeed amount close to 50% of the EU-wide reductions by 2020, 
the factual global emission reductions achieved by the EU ETS may, in the worst case, turn 
out to be significantly lower than projected in the climate and energy package. 
4.4. Competitive Distortions and the Carbon Leakage Provisions of the EU ETS 
Free allocation of allowances may have distortive effects on competition between 
undertakings operating on the internal market. This is somewhat ironic, as the raison d’être 
for free allocation of allowances for certain sectors instead of just using auctioning as a 
general means of allowance allocation for all sectors, has a competition-related 
background: as noted above, emission reduction programs tend to affect energy-intensive 
industries more than others, causing them competitive disadvantages in relation to 
competitors outside the emission reduction program. Free allocation of allowances is used 
to mitigate this competitive handicap. While free allocation contributes to the maintaining 
the competitiveness of European undertakings in relation to competitors operating outside 
the EU, it may simultaneously create distortions of competition between EU-undertakings. 
In this respect, two kinds of competitive relationships can be distinguished:  
(1) Incumbent undertakings vs. new entrants 
(2) Competing undertakings (whether new entrants or incumbents) 
4.4.1. Distortions between incumbents and new entrants 
The effect of the carbon leakage rules of the EU ETS on competition between incumbent 
undertakings and new entrants seem, at a first look, rather mild. Both incumbents and new 
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entrants are subject to product-based benchmarks and receive their allowances according to 
their (historical or standard-based) output and the access of new entrants to allowance is 
secured in the form of a new entrants’ reserve of allowances. Some competitive 
implications may nevertheless arise depending on how well the amount of allowances 
reserved for new entrants turns out to correspond to their projected overall emissions. If the 
new entrants’ reserve turns out to be too abundant, the impact on competition between 
incumbents and new entrants seems minimal: both receive allowances in the same 
proportion to their needs and both incumbents and new entrants will have equal access to 
the auctioning of surplus allowances.
200
 In contrast, if the case of vast entry to the market, 
the 5% of allowances reserved for new entrants may not suffice to cover the new entrants’ 
overall demand for allowances. This may lead to competitive inequalities in two respects:  
(1) new entrants will receive a proportionally lower amount of free allowances in 
relation to incumbents; and 
(2) if the allowances are distributed to new entrants on a “first come first served” basis, 
it may cause competitive inequalities between new entrants, as earlier entrants 
receive free allowances while later entrants do not. 
The first kind of competitive inequality does not seem ideal from a dynamic efficiency 
viewpoint, as older, less efficient technologies receive proportionally more allowances than 
newer, more environmentally friendly competitors. This would set new entrants at a 
comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbent undertakings and to some extent discourage 
entry to the market by creating a barrier to entry
201
, which may eventually lead to higher 
consumer prices and to potential x-inefficiency
202
. On the other hand, eventual competitive 
disadvantages for new entrants may be mitigated by the fact that as they have been able to 
take the costs of carbon into account in their investments beforehand, their preliminary 
need for allowances is usually lower than the one of incumbents. The latter ones have sunk 
costs in less efficient technologies that may nevertheless have been state of the art at the 
time of their adoption. The Commission has therefore previously argued that having new 
entrants buy all their allowances on the market is in accordance with the principle of equal 
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treatment, taking also into account the fact that new installations only fulfil the definition 
of a new entrant for a limited period of time.
 203
 It follows that although the favouring of 
incumbents over new entrants may, in theory, form a barrier to entry, the practical 
implications of a limited allowance reserve on the competitive position of new entrants 
may not be particularly significant. 
The risk of premature depletion of the new entrants’ reserve seems to create more 
problematic competitive distortions between new entrants, as a late entry to the market 
may hinder a new entrant from receiving free allowances. A “first come first served” 
approach in allocation may provide incentives for new entrants to simply enter the market 
as early as possible instead of trying to maximise the amount of surplus allowances by 
minimising their emissions. The solution of the Commission to this dilemma has been to 
include Article 19(6) in the harmonised free allocation decision, according to which when 
half of the amount of allowances set aside for new entrants has been distributed, the 
Commission shall assess whether a queuing system should be put in place to ensure that 
access to the reserve is managed in a fair way. Although this provision may reduce 
competitive inequality between new entrants, it also gives rise to some uncertainties, as it 
leaves it to the Commission’s discretion to decide whether a queuing system should be 
introduced and as the question regarding under which principles such a queuing system 
should be realised remains open.  
4.4.2.   Distortions between competing undertakings 
4.4.2a     Distortions caused by State aid for indirect emission costs 
The possibility to grant State aid for indirect emission costs in accordance with Article 
10a(6) of the AETD and the EU ETS State aid guidelines may cause competitive 
distortions between undertakings operating in different Member States. Although the EU 
ETS State aid guidelines does set detailed limits to the maximal amount of aid to be 
granted with the aim of minimising competitive distortions on the market, the discretion 
whether to grant such State aid in the first place is left to the Member States. It seems 
evident that if undertakings of Member State A are granted State aid that mitigates their 
indirect emission costs whereas undertakings of Member State B receive no State aid at all, 
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the former ones are put at a competitive advantage in relation to the latter ones regardless 
of whether the aid has been designed as to minimise competitive distortions. 
4.4.2b     Distortions Caused by ex-Post Adjustments 
The possibility of ex-post adjustments introduced by the harmonised free allocation 
Decision may have certain implications regarding aspects of competition. Firstly, 
inequalities between undertakings may arise from the fact that the eventuality of having 
allowances withdrawn should be taken into account as opportunity costs in the prices of 
final products. As the ability of adding opportunity costs into prices correlates with the 
extent to which the sector of the undertaking in question is exposed to international 
competition, some undertakings are not able to pass on the additional costs into prices 
while others are. Secondly, it can be argued that as Articles 3(i) and (j) set absolute limits 
for the reduction to be considered significant, undertakings that have undergone very 
similar reductions may be treated very differently. 
For instance, an installation that reduces its capacity only by 9,9% and by 49 999 
allowances (or 4,9% of its initial amount of allowances) would not be subject to any ex-
post adjustments and would thus continue receiving free allowances, whereas an 
installation reducing its capacity by 10% or by 50 000 allowances would lose 10% of its 
allowances. In this situation, the risk of unequal treatment is nevertheless diminished by 
the fact that absolute, ex-ante fixed limits defining a significant capacity reduction that 
leads to the withdrawal of allowances enable an undertaking to plan whether it is 
absolutely necessary for it to reduce capacity with more than 10% or 50 000 allowances, 
and consequently lose 10% of its initially allocated allowances, or whether a reduction of 
only 9% or 49 999 allowances will suffice. 
Another potential issue is the treatment of undertakings that have temporarily reduced their 
capacity in the beginning of the emissions trading period by more than 10% e.g. due to a 
strategic decision to reduce the production of product A in order to increase the production 
of product B. If product B turns out to be a success, the undertaking will have to gradually 
increase its capacity, possibly even above the initial capacity level. If, however, the 
undertaking has to struggle through the rest of the emissions trading period with a reduced 
amount of allowances, any increase in production capacity would then have to be covered 
by buying more allowances. This would hamper the undertaking’s possibilities to grow and 
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put it at a competitive disadvantage. The solution of the EU ETS to this problem is to treat 
as new entrants such installations that have undergone significant capacity extensions, 
enabling them to obtain more allowances. The Commission has considered such upward 
ex-post amendments to be compatible with the objective of the EU ETS, as the number of 
allowances in the entrants’ reserve remains within the overall emission cap.204 Pursuant to 
Article 3(i) of the harmonised free allocation Decision and correspondingly to the 
definition of significant capacity reduction, an undertaking may apply for additional free 
allowances on the basis of significant capacity extension under Article 20 of the Decision, 
if : 
(1) the extension in capacity amounts to at least 10%; or 
(2) the extended capacity entitles the installation in question to at least 50 000 more 
allowances per year, representing at least 5% of the preliminary annual number of 
emission allowances allocated free of charge for the sub-installation in question 
before the change in capacity. 
In summary, the withdrawal of allowances ex-post under the harmonised free allocation 
Decision may have minor negative consequences on the competitiveness of certain 
undertakings, as the eventuality of ex-post adjustments cause opportunity costs that 
undertakings facing strong international competition are not able to pass on into product 
prices. Allowance withdrawal may also, in theory, lead to minor competitive inequalities 
between undertakings whose capacity reduction is only slightly above the minimum 
conditions for significant capacity reductions and undertakings whose capacity reduction 
almost fulfils the requirements of significance. These inequalities are, however, damped by 
the fact that undertakings should be able to know in advance how much capacity they can 
reduce without having to give up allowances. Simply put, undertakings whose planned 
capacity reductions are only slightly greater than the minimum requirement for a 
significant capacity reduction, have in theory a possibility to choose to cut their capacity 
only by 9,9% or by 49 999 allowances instead of 10% and 50 000 allowances.  
4.4.2c     Distortions caused by the definition of carbon leakage sectors 
More severe distortive effects on competition between incumbent competitors within the 
EU ETS are nevertheless caused by the problematic definition of sectors exposed to carbon 
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leakage under the AETD. Firstly, the basic assessment of whether a sector of activity 
should be considered exposed to carbon leakage is conducted on an “either or” basis, 
meaning that sectors of activity that are operating under very similar factual conditions 
may receive a completely different treatment. It is not clear whether the 5%, 10% and 30% 
thresholds have been set arbitrarily or whether they have been specified according to some 
economic principles.
205
 Either way, deciding on the basis of rather inflexible thresholds 
whether permits should be assigned for free or auctioned, implying that sectors can be 
either fully exempted from auctioning or not exempted at all, will impose a regulatory 
measure which is not proportional to the sectors’ factual exposure to the risk of Carbon 
Leakage.
206
 Fully exempting a sector from auctioning whose carbon and trade intensities 
are 5.1% and 10.1%, respectively; while at the same time prima facie not exempting at all 
a sector whose carbon and trade intensities are 4.9% and 9.9% might induce perverse 
incentives for the latter sector to increase its carbon intensity with the purpose of reaching 
the threshold of 5%.
207
 This could lead into an increasing risk of collusions, especially in 
sectors with an oligopolistic structure. As non-carbon leakage sectors will have to purchase 
an annually increasing proportion of their allowances in auctions, the benefits of obtaining 
a carbon leakage status increases with time. This could further increase the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
Secondly, the current application of the separated approach implies that even a sector with 
an inexistent carbon intensity and which does therefore not face any substantial cost 
increases will be classified as prone to carbon leakage.
208
 The separate approach thus 
implies that such sectors will receive an unfounded financial advantage in the form of free 
allowances, which cannot be justified on the basis of a factual risk of carbon leakage. The 
competitive distortions arising from this inequality may not be that significant if the 
relevant sectors were defined in a way that would exclude all intra-sectorial competition. 
This would require that all installations competing in the same relevant market were 
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subject to a uniform allocation rule, which does not seem to be the situation within the EU 
ETS.  
The preamble of the NETD states that the carbon leakage risk should be assessed, as a 
starting point, at a 3-digit level (NACE-3 Code) or, where appropriate and where the 
relevant data are available, at a 4-digit level (NACE-4Code).
209
 The Commission, 
however, used European data disaggregated at a NACE 4 level, without clarifying the 
reason why it should be more appropriate to assess the risk of carbon leakage on the basis 
of industrial data disaggregation at a 4-digit level, and geographical data aggregation at a 
European level. It is not clear whether the decision regarding the level of data horizontal 
aggregation and vertical disaggregation has been taken according to the principles of 
competition policy, as an assessment based on data disaggregated at a 4-digit level might 
have the undesired effect of applying two different allocation rules to different sub-sectors 
which de facto compete in the same relevant market. 
210
 The result seems to be that the 
division of sectors under the current EU ETS does not fully reflect the relevant market 
where ETS sectors compete,
211
 meaning that a sector that has been exempted from 
auctioning may de facto compete on the same relevant market a sector that is not 
considered to be exposed to carbon leakage. Receiving 100% of its allowances for free, the 
former sector will then have a competitive advantage to the latter sector, the undertakings 
of which will have to buy a growing share of their allowances in auctions. This competitive 
distortion is further accelerated if the “carbon leakage” sector has been exempted from 
auctioning on the basis of the separated approach without it being subject to any real risk 
of carbon leakage. 
4.5. Does Free Allocation Prevent Carbon Leakage? 
Although free allocation of allowances relieves carbon leakage prone industries from the 
economic burden of buying their initial allowances through auctions, it is not evident that 
the EU ETS’s current system of free allocation of allowances combined with optional State 
aid for compensating risen electricity costs actually does efficiently remove the risk of 
carbon leakage. It has, first of all, been argued that the opportunity costs of free allowances 
may, in fact, contribute to carbon leakage instead of incentivising undertakings to reduce 
their emissions. This statement is based on the assumption that when assessing whether it 
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is more convenient to continue producing in Europe instead of delocalising production 
outside Europe, an undertaking would take into account the opportunity costs that it would 
face when deciding to stay in Europe and use its allowances, compared to the alternative of 
selling all its allowances on the market and delocalise production.
212
  
Although this assumption may be correct in economic theory, the importance of such 
opportunity costs in an undertaking’s decision to delocalise production must not be 
exaggerated. When delocalising its production outside the EU, an undertaking becomes 
subject to the rules regarding the cessation of the operation of an installation set out in 
Article 22 the Harmonised Free Allocation Decision, implying that allowances will not be 
issued to the installation as of the year following the cessation of its operations. It follows 
that delocalisation of production could only enable an undertaking to sell the unused 
allowances of the same calendar year during which the cessation of production within the 
EU has taken place. One can reasonably question whether the value of such a limited 
quantity of surplus allowances would play a decisive role in an undertaking’s decision to 
delocalise its production, which in its turn involves arrangements of a significantly higher 
cost scale (notably the construction of new factories). 
More importantly, however, it has been noted that the adoption of free allocation instead of 
auctioning may not significantly mitigate the risk of carbon leakage within the EU ETS, 
since the gradually tightening EU wide emission cap is anyhow imposing a unilateral, 
asymmetric and costly emission reduction burden on the European industries.
213
 This 
statement seems to make sense in principle, albeit somewhat exaggerated. Although free 
allocation may indeed not remove the risk of carbon leakage, it needs to be kept in mind 
that a complete elimination of carbon leakage may not even be realistic, as undertaking’s 
decisions regarding production location may depend on various other factors than carbon 
price. An undertaking may decide to relocate its production e.g. on the grounds of cheaper 
labour, lower corporate taxation or a more beneficial political environment, and become 
simultaneously relieved from emission reduction responsibilities as an “ancillary” benefit.  
It should not be ignored that although free allocation of allowances does not exempt 
industries from compliance costs, it undoubtedly eases to some extent the overall financial 
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burden that they face as a result of emission reductions. Moreover, the more or less 
unanimous opinion of industry has thus far been that auctioning would seriously 
undermine their competitiveness compared to free allocation. This gives a rather strong 
indication that receiving allowances for free instead having to pay for them in auctions 
does make a difference in undertaking’s decision making. Is also needs to be kept in mind 
that in terms of economic scale, the EU ETS is by far the biggest ETS in the world. At 
allowance prices in the range € 10–30/tCO2, the value of allowances issued every year 
would be € 22–66 billion, compared with the USA’s East Coast NOx trading programmes 
(€ 1.1 billion) or SO2 trading schemes (€ 2.8–8.7 billion). 214The sheer scale of the EU 
ETS suggests that it does make a difference whether undertakings will have to pay for their 
initial allowances or not.  
Although it may safely be concluded that free allowances have a mitigating overall effect 
on the compliance costs of industry, it is nevertheless not clear whether such a support 
measure guarantees sufficient long term incentives for all sectors to maintain their 
production within the EU and commit themselves to ever tightening emission reductions. 
Especially such carbon leakage sectors that are by their nature energy intensive may only 
have limited possibilities to achieve reductions in their emissions in a cost effective way, 
as their proper functioning may e.g. require the use of fossil fuels. In this situation, it may 
be impossible for undertakings of such sectors to achieve other than purely nominal 
emission reductions without a complete, costly reform in their production process. This 
may, in its turn, require substantial investments in experimental new technology with an 
uncertain outcome. Meanwhile, the sector specific benchmarks are essentially based on 
each sector’s emissions averages in the past and do not properly take into account the 
sectors’ emission reduction capacity in the future. This appears problematic with regard to 
the purpose of the EU ETS, as it does not aim at driving away energy intensive industries 
out of Europe, but rather seems to depart from the assumption that all sectors of industry 
participating in the system should achieve emission reductions on the long term. This 
assumption is illustrated by the following two features of the EU ETS: 
(1) Under the tightening overall emission cap, the quantity of free allowances 
distributed to each undertaking declines every year, meaning that in the absence of 
emission reductions an undertaking will have to purchase an ever growing share of 
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allowances on the market. As the freely obtained allowances will cover a declining 
proportion of an undertaking’s emissions, complying with the EU ETS on a longer 
term becomes more and more costly unless reductions in emissions are achieved. 
The absence of emission reductions could also make compliance with the EU ETS 
more uncertain, as the covering of emissions is constantly dependent on the 
availability of allowances on the market.  
(2) The pressure on carbon leakage prone sectors to actually cut their emissions instead 
of just covering them with allowances is bound to further increase due to the 
temporary nature of State aid for indirect emission costs under Article 10a(6) of the 
AETD. As the aid intensity declines on a regular basis, undertakings will receive 
aid for an ever diminishing proportion of their indirect emission costs, meaning that 
their compliance costs will increase if they have not managed to significantly 
reduce their carbon intensity.  
Under free allocation the benefits (i.e. spared allowances) resulting from investments in 
emission abatement do not grow in proportion to the investment costs, but in proportion to 
the achieved emission reductions. In other words, the higher marginal abatement costs an 
undertaking faces, the smaller is the benefit it receives from investments in abatement 
technology. One could, of course, argue that this seems to be precisely in line with one of 
the founding principle of emissions trading which is to achieve reductions in emissions 
where the costs of it are the lowest. Nevertheless, due to the regional scope of the EU ETS, 
this feature of emissions trading may in fact not lead to maximal efficiency when it comes 
to emission reductions, as undertakings facing high abatement costs are by no means 
forced to comply with the system: instead of remaining a net purchaser of allowances 
within the EU ETS, such an undertaking may simply consider it more attractive to transfer 
its production outside the EU as soon as it estimates that economically sustainable 
compliance with the EU ETS would require a significant, costly reform in its operational 
processes. Considering the rather static nature of the sector-specific emission benchmarks, 
the result may be that sectors facing high abatement costs will be collectively exposed to 
an increasing risk of carbon leakage in the future, as the decreasing overall emissions cap 
implies that entire sectors – including the most emissions efficient undertakings within 
those sectors – risk becoming net buyers of allowances.  
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What is more, incentives to delocalise production may be further increased by the fact that 
the costs of investments in abatement technology are by their nature sunk, meaning that 
they cannot be recovered in the event that the undertaking in question would at a later stage 
decide to delocalise its production to a country where no emission control is required.
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Price volatility and uncertainty related to free allocation may also further contribute to the 
direct risk of carbon leakage, as undertakings generally prefer to operate under stable and 
predictable conditions. In conclusion, even though the current EU ETS does provide 
incentives to invest in green technology, it does not change the fact that the undertaking 
alone will have to bear the full costs of such investments.
216
 Although freely allocated 
allowances certainly do mitigate the compliance costs induced by the EU ETS to 
undertakings, it is not given that they would sufficiently increase the long term attraction 
of investing in abatement technology and maintaining production in the EU compared to 
the alternative of delocalising production elsewhere, especially when it comes to sectors 
with limited possibilities of reducing their emissions on a long term.  
4.6.   Conclusions 
The EU ETS has adopted an approach to the carbon leakage problem which is based on 
free allocation of allowances to sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage. The EU ETS also enables the use of State aid, however only if restricted to 
compensating the rise in electricity costs which results from the ETS and which sectors 
exposed to carbon leakage cannot pass on to their respective prices. The EU ETS seems 
theoretically compatible with the restricted interpretation of the pollute pays principle, as it 
internalises the costs of pollution and as it does not compensate for direct pollution costs. It 
can also be argued that the EU ETS does, in theory, not contravene with the extended, 
equity based form of the polluter pays principle either, as free allocation is not used as a 
general allocation method, but only as a means to compensate carbon leakage sectors for 
not being able to pass on their pollution costs on to consumers.  
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As for dynamic efficiency, the EU ETS has adopted mechanisms that seem to solve a 
significant part of the distortions commonly occurred in ETSs based on free allocation. The 
EU ETS responds rather well to the updating problem, as the amount of free allowances to 
be allocated to each installation depends on the installations’ output and not their 
emissions, encouraging thus undertakings to increase their output in an energy efficient 
way instead of increasing emissions in order to receive more allowances. Distortive 
incentives to maintain inefficient facilities operational at a minimum-run condition are 
effectively removed by the possibility to adjust ex-post the allocated amount of free 
allowances as to correspond to the reduced output. However, as such downward 
adjustments can only be made for significant capacity reductions or the partial or complete 
cessation of an installation, undertakings receiving free allowances will continue to benefit 
from minor, temporary capacity reductions they have been forced to make e.g. due to an 
economic slowdown, as such reductions will free up surplus allowances that can be sold on 
the market. 
However, the EU ETS may give rise to price volatility, as a system based on free 
allocation, unlike auctioning, does not establish any clear initial price for allowances. As 
free allocation does not distribute allowances according to their factual demand, certain 
undertakings will receive more allowances than they actually need. This may increase 
speculative activities where such surplus allowances are withheld in order to wait for their 
prices to increase, which may in its turn increase price volatility. The use of banking has, 
on the one hand, a stabilising effect on prices, as it allows for intertemporal flexibility and 
buffering of allowances, reducing exposure to short term variations. On the other hand, 
banking may also undermine its stabilising effect by providing a possibility for 
undertakings to withhold their allowances from the market for speculative reasons. The EU 
ETS may also require updates to the sector-specific benchmarks in order to ensure its 
efficient functioning, which could make the system less predictable and increase business 
uncertainty.  
Furthermore, “ex-post adjustments” allowing the withdrawal of surplus allowances in 
situations of significant capacity reductions of installations may cause minor distortions to 
competition, as withdrawal of allowances is only possible when the capacity reduction 
amounts to a certain percentage. Unlike auctioning, free allocation also raises questions 
regarding the treatment of new entrants, as they should have equal access to allowances as 
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incumbents. Although the new entrants’ reserve guarantees that even new entrants will 
receive at least part of their allowances for free, the unpredictability of the reserve’s 
sufficiency is bound to create some minor competitive distortions between incumbents and 
new entrants as well as between new entrants. The latter distortion is partly mitigated by 
the Commission’s power of control, which allows it to establish a queuing system in case 
that the new entrants’ reserve threatens to be depleted prematurely. The current EU ETS 
may also give rise to competitive distortions between undertakings (whether incumbents or 
new entrants) operating in different Member States, due to the fact that Member States 
have a possibility – but not an obligation – to grant State aid for indirect emission costs. 
More severe problems are created by the definition of the sectors that are to be considered 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, on the basis of which a total exemption 
from auctioning should be granted. Under the current provisions of the AETD, the vast 
majority of so called carbon leakage sectors are exempted from auctioning on the basis of a 
criterion (separated approach) that fails to consider simultaneously the two risk factors 
(cost increases and trade intensities) that reflect the proneness of a sector to carbon 
leakage. As a result, the majority of sectors exempted from auctioning on the basis of their 
exposure to carbon leakage are, in fact, either not suffering from cost increases substantial 
enough or are not exposed to international competition to a degree which would de facto 
render them “exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage”. Moreover, the threshold 
values defining the exposure of sectors to carbon leakage appear to be both discrete and 
inflexible, and they do not correspond to the effective exposure of sectors to carbon 
leakage. 
This is, firstly, contrary to the extended form of the polluter pays principle, which requires 
an equitable distribution of costs related to pollution. Secondly, the arbitrary nature of the 
criteria defining whether or not a sector shall be granted a carbon leakage status increase 
uncertainty and may hamper dynamic efficiency, especially when it comes to the regular 
updating of the Commission’s list of carbon leakage sectors. Thirdly, as the criteria 
defining carbon leakage sectors are based on absolute thresholds (5, 10 and 30%) with only 
limited downward flexibility in the form of the qualitative assessment under Article 
10a(17) of the AETD, sectors that do not qualify as prone to carbon leakage under the 
AETD may have incentives to adopt opportunistic behaviour to e.g. increase their carbon 
intensity in order to reach the said thresholds and receive a carbon leakage status. Fourthly, 
75 
 
the sectors of activity under the EU ETS are not defined according to the relevant product 
and geographical market where the regulated sectors compete, meaning that a carbon 
leakage sector is put at a competitive advantage in relation to a sector which is not 
exempted from auctioning but is nevertheless competing (partly or fully) on the same 
market as the sector that has been granted a carbon leakage status. 
Last but not least, it is unclear whether free allocation of allowances to carbon leakage 
prone sectors combined with temporary State aid compensating for risen electricity costs 
provides sufficient long term incentives for sectors suffering from high investment costs to 
commit themselves to emission reductions, as the sector-specific benchmarks are not 
designed with regard to the sectors’ capability to reduce emissions in the future. Free 
allowances may not sufficiently compensate the (sunk) investment costs of undertakings 
belonging to such sectors and delocalising production outside the EU may consequently 
become a more attractive option for them than maintaining production within the EU.  
It can be concluded that although the revised EU ETS has successfully tackled some of the 
problems related to carbon leakage that arose during the first emissions trading period, it 
has, on the one hand, failed to solve other problems that are more inherent to free 
allocation in general (such as the possibly insufficient preventive effect on carbon leakage) 
and on the other hand, introduced some new major problems in relation to the definition of 
carbon leakage sectors. In order for the EU ETS to comply with its purpose to reduce 
greenhouse emissions in a cost efficient way that minimises distortions to competition, it 
may have to undergo even further changes in the future, at the latest when the third 
emissions trading period has come to an end. The next chapter shall discuss possibilities to 
improve the current EU ETS as to better respond to the requirements or carbon leakage 
prevention, the polluter pays principle, dynamic efficiency and competition.  
5.  HOW TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT SYSTEM? 
The following Chapter shall discuss possibilities to improve the EU ETS as to provide 
better protection against carbon leakage while remaining dynamically efficient, compatible 
with the EU State aid regulation as well as the polluter pays principle and while 
minimising competitive distortions. Two separate alternative models for the EU ETS 
carbon leakage prevention will be examined. It shall firstly be assessed how the current 
system could be improved by maintaining free allocation of allowances as the main 
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mechanism for carbon leakage prevention (alternative 1). Secondly, it will be examined 
whether and to what degree a system based on auctioning and financial aid would respond 
to the problems related to carbon leakage and analyse whether it could form a plausible 
alternative to the current, free allocation based model (alternative 2). 
5.1. Alternative 1: Free Allocation Continues as the Main Carbon Leakage 
Prevention Mechanism 
5.1.1. A Revision of the Rules regarding the Definition of Carbon Leakage Sectors 
The technically and probably also politically easiest alternative for ameliorating carbon 
leakage prevention under the current EU ETS would imply that free allocation for carbon 
leakage prone sectors of industry would remain as the main prevention mechanism, while 
the efficiency of the system would be improved by other means. This would, first of all, 
require a reform in the definition of sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage 
under Article 10a(13)-(18). As demonstrated above, the separated approach in defining 
whether a sector is prone to carbon leakage or not is bound to comprise even such sectors 
that do not face a substantial risk of carbon leakage in reality. If the integrated approach 
was used as the only criterion in determining carbon leakage sectors, it would ensure that 
only sectors de facto exposed to a substantial risk of carbon leakage, i.e. sectors facing (1) 
a substantial increase in production costs and (2) a high trade intensity with third countries, 
will be granted free allowances. However, it needs to be noted that the trade intensity of a 
sector to third countries is not a static, non-interdependent factor. A Sector may e.g. have a 
low exposure to international competition due to high transport costs which imply that it is 
simply not profitable to import products from outside the EU. A substantial cost increase 
passed through to prices may, however, seriously increase the sector’s exposure to 
international competition, as it becomes suddenly cheaper to import the products than to 
produce them in the EU. This suggests that the separated approach could still be 
maintained partially, meaning that sectors for whom participation in the EU ETS would 
imply a substantial increase in production costs could still be exempted from auctioning 
regardless of their trade intensity to third countries. 
Even if the use of the separated approach was restricted to the cost increase criterion, under 
the current threshold values of Article 10a(15) (an increase in production costs of at least 
5% + a trade intensity with third countries of at least 10% or an increase in production 
costs of at least 30%) applied in the 2010 carbon leakage decision, only a very limited 
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number of sectors would be exempted from auctioning.
217
 This could imply that the 
threshold values under the integrated approach should be modified as well. Moreover, as 
explained above, the absolute nature of the thresholds is problematic from both a dynamic 
efficiency (perverse incentives) and a competition viewpoint (sectors are either fully 
exempted from auctioning, or not exempted at all, on the basis of a criterion which is not 
proportional to their effective exposure to the risk of carbon leakage). One solution could 
be to increase the number of thresholds in order to make the assessment more flexible: 
aside of the basic criterion of a 5% increase in production costs and a 10% trade intensity 
with third countries, a carbon leakage status could also be given to sectors who e.g. face a 
3% increase in production costs but whose trade intensity outside the EU is above 20%, 
and vice versa, to sectors whose trade intensity with third countries is only e.g. 7% but who 
face a cost increase of more than 7% etc. Clò proposes that the carbon leakage risk could 
even be defined proportionally to a continuous variable proportional to the degree of 
carbon and trade intensities.
218
 The application of the continuous variable could have 
certain threshold values (e.g. the increase in production costs would have to amount to at 
least 3% and the trade intensity to third countries would have to be at least 7%) to ensure 
that only sectors facing a real carbon leakage risk are granted a carbon leakage status. The 
qualitative assessment could then be used especially in borderline cases for sectors that 
would nearly qualify as carbon leakage prone under the quantitative assessment. Both 
models could make the definition of carbon leakage sectors less arbitrary.  
As state above, the fact that assessment of carbon leakage sectors under the AETD is not 
conducted on the basis of data aggregated consistently with the relevant product and 
geographical market where the regulated sectors compete may imply that a sector 
exempted from auctioning on the basis of its carbon leakage status is, in fact, partly 
competing on the same market as another sector which has not been granted a carbon 
leakage status. The competitive distortions arising from the definition of sectors could be 
minimised if the installations competing in the same relevant market were considered 
belonging to the same sector of activity. Accordingly, Clò suggests that a qualitative 
assessment, which has so far only been used as a complementary measure in situations 
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sectors were exempted on the basis of their high trade intensity alone. See SWD(2012) 130 final, p. 2-3. 
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under Article 10a(17) where a sector has failed to be qualified as a carbon leakage sector 
under the quantitative assessment, could be integrated as an inherent part of the carbon 
leakage assessment.
219
 This would mean that before exempting a sector from auctioning on 
the basis of the quantitative criteria concerning its trade intensity and its projected 
increases in production costs, it should be evaluated whether the sector in question has 
been defined using the appropriate NACE level of data aggregation that reflects the 
relevant product and geographical market. Should it turn out that the sector in question 
does not cover all competitors operating on the relevant market, the sector could be 
redefined by using a more comprehensive NACE code (e.g. NACE 3). 
5.1.2. Introduction of an Offset Based Safety Valve 
Problems of the current EU ETS related to the propensity of free allocation to increase 
price volatility could be mitigated by the introduction of a safety valve. A safety valve can 
be imposed e.g. in the form of a buffer reserve of allowances which are released on the 
market when the allowance price exceeds a particular threshold.
220
 This would, however, 
practically constitute a price ceiling,
221
 which could eventually trigger perverse incentives 
for undertakings to exceed their allowances as explained above in Section 4.3.1. An 
interesting alternative for a safety valve has nevertheless been implemented in the RGGI 
and it could serve as a model for solutions within the EU ETS. The safety valve in the 
RGGI does namely not involve an allowance reserve, as the exceeding of the allowances 
price above certain trigger levels is mitigated by increasing the availability of offset credits. 
Under such conditions, the excess of allowance prices over the trigger levels (i.e. the 
emission reduction targets become too expensive to reach) does not relieve undertakings 
from abating emissions; it merely provides them a possibility of reaching the same 
emission reductions in areas where it can be done in a more cost effective way. Such a 
safety valve does therefore, in theory, not reduce the efficiency of the ETS. As the 
availability of offset credits reduces the costs of emission reductions, it nevertheless 
eventually results in a drop in allowance prices. Although the RGGI is based on auctioning 
rather than free allocation, a safety valve consisting merely of an increased possibility of 
using offset credits to accomplish the targeted emission reductions could, in principle, 
function also in a mixed system of free allocation and auctioning such as the EU ETS.  
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In the EU ETS, a similar mechanism could be established for CDM and JI credits, allowing 
undertakings to carry out a certain additional percentage of their emission reductions in the 
form of CDM and JI projects. Due to the different rules regarding the use of offsets under 
the current EU ETS in relation to the RGGI, however, the establishing of an efficient 
safety valve may require amendments to the AETD. In the RGGI, maximum offsets 
capped at each generating unit’s total compliance obligation is initially 3.3%, and will 
amount to 5.0% if the average price of an allowance during a period of 12 months exceeds 
$7, and to 10% if the said price exceeds $10. In the EU ETS, however, there is no similar 
initial annual cap for CDM and JI credits, as the discretion regarding maximal amount of 
credits to be used each year is left to Member States. Article 11a(8) of the AETD merely 
sets a long term limit to the overall use of credits, amounting to 50% of the EU-wide 
reductions below the 2005 levels over the period from 2008 to 2020.
222
 The establishing of 
an EU-wide safety valve would therefore require the introduction of EU-level limits to the 
annual use of offsets, on the basis of which it could be determined how many additional 
offsets the excess of the allowance price over the trigger level would make available. In 
order for the safety valve to have a concrete effect on allowance prices, the limits of 
regular annual use of offsets should be set rather low, meaning that the current limit of 
50% of offset reductions between 2008 and 2020 may have to be adjusted.  
Limits to the current use of offsets may be desirable for other reasons as well. As stated 
above in Section 4.3.3, abundant use of JI and especially CDM offsets may reduce the 
dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS, as undertakings use existent technology to reduce 
emissions in countries with a poorer abatement infrastructure instead of investing in new, 
more efficient technology which is required to achieve emission reductions in the said 
undertakings’ own installations. Moreover, CDM offsets may undermine the efficiency of 
an ETS, as the definition of emission baselines implies that too many credits are granted 
for a CDM project compared to the achieved factual reduction in worldwide greenhouse 
emissions. As JI seems to have milder negative impacts on the efficiency of the EU ETS 
compared to CDM, separate limits could be set for the use of JI offsets and CDM offsets. 
In other terms, the use of JI offsets could still be allowed to a fairly large extent, whereas 
the use of CDM offsets could be restricted more heavily. Should the allowance price reach 
a certain trigger level, a larger use of both JI and CDM credits would be allowed.   
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It could, however, be politically difficult to establish stricter EU-wide limits, as the 50% 
overall limit has thus far provided Member States a rather large discretion to determine 
generous limits to the use of offsets.
223
 A sudden change in the circumstances under which 
undertakings operate could easily run counter to the principles of legal certainty and 
reasonable expectations. Undertakings that have principally invested in CDM and JI 
programs instead of reducing their own emissions would suddenly not be able to use a part 
of their offset credits and would consequently suffer losses in competitiveness. The 
implementation of stricter limits to the use of offsets combined with an offset based safety 
valve would therefore either require a sufficient transitional period or gradually decreasing 
limits, in order to ensure the adaptation of undertakings to the new conditions. Gradual or 
delayed implementation would, however, also undermine the stabilising effect of the safety 
valve. The setting of uniform, EU-wide limits to the use of offsets may also have other 
practical complications, as incumbents and new entrants as well as aircraft operators are 
subject to different rules: Article 11a(8) of the AETD provides that the amount of credits to 
be used by incumbents shall not be set below 11 % of their allocation during the period 
from 2008 to 2012, whereas the use of credits by new entrants and aircraft operators shall 
not be limited to less than 4,5 % and 1,5% respectively of their verified emissions during 
the period from 2013 to 2020. As different undertakings are allowed to use a different 
percentage of credits, it could be difficult to establish a common baseline for the amount of 
extra offsets to be used in case that the safety valve is exceeded. It consequently seems like 
although an offset based safety valve could function in an ETS consisting of both 
auctioning and free allocation, the current generous EU-wide rules regarding the use of 
offsets could make it politically difficult to implement an efficient safety valve in the EU 
ETS, at least within a short period of time. 
5.1.3. A Harmonised Mechanism for Compensating Indirect Emission Costs 
As concluded above, the fact that State aid is applied as the mechanism for compensation 
of indirect emission costs is bound to create competitive distortions, as the discretion 
regarding whether to grant State aid or not is left entirely to the Member States. This raises 
the question whether a harmonised mechanism for compensation of indirect emission costs 
should be implemented as to guarantee that undertakings operating in different Member 
                                                          
223
 In practice, the use of offsets has indeed varied between different Member States. E.g. the Finnish NAP 
for emissions trading period 2008-2012 restricted the use of offsets to 11,7% of each undertaking’s annual 
allowances, whereas the corresponding percentage in the Swedish NAP was 20%.  
81 
 
States would not receive differential treatment. It seems, however, doubtable in the light of 
EU law whether the EU could impose an obligation for Member States to grant financial 
aid to undertakings operating within their jurisdiction, as this could be regarded as an 
interference with the States’ budgetary sovereignty. A possible alternative for State aid 
could be to impose an obligation for Member States to use a certain percentage of their 
auction revenues for support measures for indirect emission costs. 
5.1.4. An Obligation to Return All Unused Allowances 
As noted above, freely obtained allowances have, in theory, an opportunity cost when an 
undertaking decides not to delocalise its production, as it implies that the undertaking will 
have to use its available allowances to cover the emissions it will produce during the rest of 
the calendar year instead of selling the allowances on the market. Under the classic 
assumption that an undertaking aims at maximising its profit, free allocation may therefore 
have a reverse effect that undermines its preventive effect on carbon leakage.
224
 Although 
the factual effect of such opportunity costs has reasonably been questioned above, possible 
increased incentives to delocalise production outside Europe could in any event be reduced 
by imposing an obligation for undertakings that have delocalised their production to return 
all unused allowances of the same calendar year during which the delocalisation has taken 
place. Should the undertaking in question have sold its surplus allowances on the market, it 
could be subject to an additional payment equalling the amount of unused allowances. 
Such an obligation would ensure that freely obtained allowances only have opportunity 
costs as regards decisions whether to reduce emissions or use allowances to cover them, 
not as regards decisions whether to sell the allowances and delocalise or maintain 
production in the EU and use the allowances. 
5.1.5. Conclusion 
The suggested changes to the mechanism defining carbon leakage sectors would, first of 
all, improve the EU ETS’s consistency with the extended form of the polluter pays 
principle, as free allowances would only be allocated to such sectors that cannot pass on 
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the costs of pollution due to a real exposure to the risk of carbon leakage. If the separated 
approach was only maintained as regards the cost increase criterion and the thresholds 
defining carbon leakage sectors were more diverse, or alternatively, replaced by a 
continuous variable, the criteria for carbon leakage status would better reflect the effective 
exposure of sectors to the risk of carbon leakage. A more flexible definition of carbon 
leakage sector should thus improve the overall efficiency of the EU ETS and it could also 
reduce possible opportunistic behaviour of sectors that do not as such qualify as carbon 
leakage prone. Furthermore, competitive distortions could be reduced by defining each 
sector of activity in accordance with the relevant product and geographical market. An 
offset based safety valve could to some extent reduce price volatility related to free 
allocation but it may require a complete reform of the current rules regarding the use of 
offsets. On the other hand, the efficient functioning of the ETS would still require regular 
updates to the list of carbon leakage sectors, which could complicate undertakings’ 
possibilities of planning their activity on a longer term. Uncertainties caused by updates 
could be mitigated by introducing a transitional schedule specifically designed for former 
carbon leakage sectors, providing such sectors a “soft landing” to auctioning. The eventual 
(but probably insignificant) addition to the risk of carbon leakage that the opportunity costs 
of free allowances could cause could be removed by preventing undertakings from making 
a financial benefit from free allowances in situations where they plan to delocalise their 
production outside the EU. 
In conclusion, it seems like carbon leakage prevention within the EU ETS could be 
improved to some extent by making amendments to the process defining carbon leakage 
sectors as well as introducing an offset based safety valve, even with maintaining free 
allocation to carbon leakage prone sectors as the main preventive mechanism. However, 
the possible amendments suggested above would still not fully resolve all problems related 
to free allocation, such as competitive distortions between incumbent undertakings and 
new entrants. The most important question is whether and how efficiently an ETS based on 
free allocation truly prevents carbon leakage, considering that the decreasing overall 
emission cap imposes a unilateral emission reduction burden which an energy intensive 
undertaking may be reluctant to bear due to: 
1) benchmarks that do not take into account the sectors’ capability to reduce 
emissions; and  
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2) the sunken costs that long term compliance with the EU ETS would require.  
The said features may increase the risk of carbon leakage especially if delocalising 
production is otherwise a feasible alternative strategy for the undertaking in question.
225
 
The problem could, in theory, be mitigated simply by adjusting the benchmarks ex-post in 
case that they turn out to be too strict with regard to the sector’s capability to reduce 
emissions. However, as such ex-post adjustments would inevitably have the adverse effect 
of increasing business uncertainty, it is not evident that they would significantly reduce the 
risk of carbon leakage.  
On the basis of this Study, it can be argued that the mitigating effect of free allowances 
may not remove incentives of undertakings facing high emission abatement costs to 
commit themselves to the EU ETS instead of delocalising production where emissions are 
regulated less strictly (or not at all). It therefore seems like a unilateral ETS would leave 
some room for carbon leakage even under free allocation of allowances, despite the fact 
that the proposed revision would to some extent reduce this risk. Consequently, the next 
Section shall assess whether an auction based system where auction revenues are circulated 
back to carbon leakage prone undertakings in the form of financial, investment-bound aid 
would reduce the risk of carbon leakage compared to free allocation. It shall also be 
examined to what extent such a system would be compatible with the polluter pays 
principle and EU State aid regulation and how well it would respond to dynamic efficiency 
and competition requirements. 
5.2. Alternative 2: Auctioning Combined with Re-cycling of Auction Revenues 
This chapter shall evaluate the option of gradually abolishing free allocation and introduce 
auctioning as the principal allocation method even for carbon leakage sectors. The carbon 
leakage problem would then be addressed by imposing harmonised rules regarding the use 
of auction revenues for providing financial aid to support carbon leakage prone sectors in 
making investments in emission abatement technology. As mentioned above, auctioning 
has so far received a more or less unanimously negative reception from industry, which 
makes any suggestions regarding the replacement of free allocation with auctioning a 
highly delicate issue. Aside of purely economic aspects, the almost ferocious resistance of 
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industry towards auctioning may also have politically nuanced reasons. Considering the 
rise in environmental awareness which has taken place in our society during the last 
decades, industries may, to a growing extent, consider the costs resulting directly from 
emission reduction measures economically, morally and politically acceptable. In contrast, 
industries may find auctioning less acceptable politically, as it implies that in addition to 
the direct costs resulting from compliance with the overall emission reduction targets, 
industries will have to pay an extra sum to the State for each projected emission unit they 
produce.
226
 In this respect, industries may view auctions merely as an attempt of the State 
to increase its own revenues at the expense of industry. 
Unarguably, it is hardly justifiable from an industry perspective why the State should 
benefit from industry emissions. Accordingly, this Study will suggest that if carbon 
leakage sectors were to become subject to auctioning, the additional revenues gained from 
auctioning allowances to carbon leakage sectors should be circulated back to carbon 
leakage prone undertakings in the form of financial aid granted for investments in 
abatement technology
227
 and by investing the rest of the auction revenues so that the 
benefit will indirectly return to industry, e.g. by creating general programs to support the 
development of energy efficiency and emission abatement technologies. In addition, 
similarly to the suggestion presented above in Section 5.1.3, Member States could be 
obliged to use a percentage of the general auction revenues
228
 for support measures for 
indirect emission costs. The alternative models for carbon leakage prevention presented in 
this Study will depart from the assumption that 100% of the additional auction revenues 
would be used either to the direct or indirect benefit of undertakings. This would require 
EU-wide regulation regarding the extent to which auction revenues should be used for 
direct investment aid and to which extent they should be invested in indirect support 
measures, as well as harmonised rules regarding the maximal and minimal amount of 
support to be granted.
229
  
In principle, alternative 2 would aim at the highest possible compensation of the extra costs 
that auctions cause to carbon leakage prone undertakings by mitigating the costs caused to 
undertakings by investments in greener technology. This would imply that the State does 
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not benefit from auctioning compared to free allocation, and likewise, that the use of 
auctioning instead of free allocation would prima facie not induce significantly higher 
compliance costs for carbon leakage prone sectors of industry. The amount of investment 
aid could be determined according to the recipients’ presupposed exposure to the risk of 
carbon leakage, meaning that undertakings would receive a higher proportion of State aid 
the more they are affected by the carbon leakage risk. 
5.2.1. Examples of Re-cycling Auction Revenues 
The idea of using auction revenues to support investments in green technology is not a new 
one. A system of re-cycling auction revenues has been implemented in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), pursuant to which each State shall direct its own 
strategy for investing auction revenues in programs that benefit consumers and build a 
clean energy economy.
230
 The RGGI participating states have each committed to allocate a 
minimum of 25 percent of their CO2 allowances for a consumer benefit or strategic energy 
purpose.
231
 A report released in February 2011 shows that the RGGI participating states 
have, in fact, chosen to auction the vast majority of their CO2 allowances and to invest 
80% of CO2 their auction revenues, totalling more than $993 million, in various strategic 
energy programs.
232
 A similar approach has also been taken certain environmental tax 
systems, such as the UK Climate Change Levy (CCL), which provides that part of the 
revenues gained from the energy tax system shall be used to fund a number of energy 
efficiency initiatives, including the UK Carbon Trust.
233
 
Different models for re-cycling auction revenues have also been discussed in legal 
literature. It has for instance been suggested that revenues obtained through auctioning 
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could enable the State to make reductions in general taxes.
 234
 This could, however, be 
difficult to execute in the context of the EU ETS, as the EU’s competence in fiscal matters 
is rather limited and does not cover direct taxation.
235
  
Helm and Hepburn have proposed that the revenue from auctions could be re-cycled to 
industry in a technologically neutral way providing long-term carbon price certainty.
236
 They 
outline a scheme in which national governments would sign so called carbon contracts under 
which the government would pay the private sector a fixed price (to be determined by 
another auction) for the supply of emission reductions over a long period of time, such as 
20–30 years. A key feature of the scheme is that the “carbon contract” auction would be 
technology-neutral, so that the government would be able to avoid the fraught process of 
‘picking winners’. Winning a carbon contract would provide low-carbon innovators with a 
reliable forward revenue stream which could be employed to secure project finance. On the 
other hand, carbon contracts are likely to become allocated to undertakings that can reduce 
their emissions at the lowest marginal cost, as they are also likely to make the lowest bids in 
auctions. Consequently, carbon contracts do not seem to be the best tool to ameliorate the 
position of carbon leakage prone undertakings, as their proneness to carbon leakage is often 
expressly related to limited possibilities of making low-cost investments into emission 
abatement technology. 
Furthermore, it needs to be remarked that re-cycling of auction revenues was, in fact, taken 
up by the Commission in the Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the 
EU of 2000. The Commission stated that “the revenues raised by governments could be re-
cycled in a variety of ways, even keeping the overall revenue effect neutral, or by using the 
revenues to promote energy efficiency investments, research and development or public 
investment in other greenhouse gas abatement efforts”.237 In practice, however, the re-
cycling of revenues within the current EU ETS does not seem to pursue the ideal presented 
in the Green Paper of “keeping the overall revenue effect neutral”, as Article 10(3) of the 
AETD only provides that Member States shall use at least 50% of the revenues generated 
from auctioning of allowances for certain environmental purposes.
238
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5.2.2. Compatibility of Investment Aid with the EU State Aid Regulation 
5.2.2a    Definition of State Aid in the TFEU 
If auction revenues were to be used to grant direct financial support to carbon leakage 
prone undertakings, it needs to be examined whether and under what conditions such aid 
measures would be compatible with the EU State aid regulation. State aid is defined in 
Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as any aid 
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever. On the 
basis of legal literature, four basic conditions for State aid can be distinguished
239
: 
1) the aid needs to have been granted from the resources of a Member State; 
2) the aid needs to favour certain undertakings or production over others; 
3) the aid needs to distort or threaten to distort competition on the internal market; and 
4) the aid needs to affect trade between Member States. 
It seems obvious that financial aid granted to sectors of industry exposed to a significant 
risk of carbon leakage would fulfil criteria 2-4. As for criterion 1, however, the relevant 
questions are: 
240
  
(1) to what extent the decision of a Member State to grant investment aid can be 
considered imputable to the State; and  
(2) whether auction revenues can be considered to be State resources  
As stated above in Section 4.1, the aid is considered to be imputable to the State if it is the 
result of a unilateral and autonomous decision of the State and not motivated by its 
obligations e.g. under the EU Treaty.
 241
 However, it has been argued in legal literature that 
the existence of a Community obligation does not prevent the measure from being 
                                                                                                                                                                                
contributing to the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund and to the Adaptation Fund as 
made operational by the Poznan Conference on Climate Change (COP 14 and COP/MOP 4), (6) reducing 
deforestation and facilitate adaptation in developing countries as well as increasing forestry sequestration 
in the EU, (7) encouraging a shift to low-emission and public forms of transport, (8) mitigating 
administrative expenses of the management of the ETS and (9) addressing social aspects, such as eventual 
increases in electricity prices in lower and middle income households. 
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qualified as aid if some discretionary power is left to the State.
242
 If the harmonised rules 
regarding investment aid were to leave some discretion to the Member States regarding 
e.g. the determination of the amount of aid to be granted, the decision to grant aid could 
therefore be considered imputable to the State. Likewise, if auction revenues were to be 
considered as State resources, Member States should have at least some discretion 
regarding their use. It follows that the question whether investment aid granted from 
auction revenues is to be considered as State aid or not depends on the degree of 
harmonisation of the respective rules, notably the amount of discretion that is left to the 
Member States regarding the use of auction revenues and the granting of aid to 
undertakings. Under the current EU State aid legislation and jurisprudence, it is not clear 
whether auction revenues could be considered to constitute State resources in the event that 
100% of them were ”earmarked” to be used either to the direct or indirect benefit of 
undertakings. It can reasonably be questioned whether aid measures for carbon leakage 
prone sectors would in such a situation place a financial burden upon public authorities in 
a sense that they would qualify as State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU 
in the first place. Due to the unclear legal position, it needs to be examined on what 
conditions investment aid would fulfil the criteria of State aid compatible with the internal 
market, in case that it was to be considered to fulfil the criterion of State aid under Article 
107(1). 
5.2.2b     General Conditions for State Aid to be Compatible with the Internal Market 
Conditions for Allocation 
Although Article 107(1) of the TFEU prohibits, as a main rule, the use of State aid that 
would distort or threaten to distort competition as incompatible with the internal market, 
State aid with the purpose of environmental protection may nevertheless be accepted on 
the basis of exceptions to the main rule included in Article 107(3) of the TFEU. Article 
107(3) defines types of State aid which may be considered compatible with the internal 
market. State aid for environmental purposes are generally granted on the basis of Article 
107(3)(c) of the TFEU concerning aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
243
 The Commission’s Guidelines 
on State aid for environmental protection (“the Guidelines”) provide that aid involved in 
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tradable permit schemes may be declared compatible with the common market within the 
meaning of Article 107(3) of the TFEU.
244
 When assessing the compatibility of a State aid 
measure, the Commission applies the so called balancing test, the purpose of which is to 
compare the effects of the aid and ensure that its positive effects (increased environmental 
protection) outweigh its negative impacts (distortions of competition in the internal 
market).
245
 The Guidelines provide that State aid within the EU ETS must fill three 
conditions for compatibility: 
(1) the allocation must be transparent, based on objective criteria and on data sources 
of the highest quality available, and the total amount of tradable permits or 
allowances granted to each undertaking for a price below their market value must 
not be higher than its expected needs as estimated for the situation in absence of the 
trading scheme; 
(2) the allocation methodology must not favour certain undertakings or certain sectors, 
unless this is justified by the environmental logic of the scheme itself or where such 
rules are necessary for consistency with other environmental policies; 
(3) new entrants shall not in principle receive permits or allowances on more 
favourable conditions than existing undertakings operating on the same markets. 
Granting higher allocations to existing installations compared to new entrants 
should not result in creating undue barriers to entry. 
Investment aid for carbon leakage prone sectors does not seem contrary to these 
requirements. As direct investment aid (unlike e.g. freely granted allowances under NAPs) 
does not increase the overall amount of allowances, it does not endanger the emission 
reduction targets of the ETS, but merely makes complying with those targets less costly. 
Although investment aid granted for carbon leakage prone sectors would indeed favour 
certain sectors over others, it would seem justified with the environmental logic of the EU 
ETS, as it aims at preventing increases in emissions outside the EU. Auctioning also 
ensures that new entrants and incumbents are treated without distinction.  
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An Incentive Effect 
The Guidelines also require that State aid must have an incentive effect, i.e. it must result 
in the aid recipient changing its behaviour so that the level of environmental protection is 
increased.
246
 To demonstrate the incentive effect, the Member State concerned must prove 
that the more environmentally friendly alternative would not have been retained without 
the aid. For this purpose, the Member State concerned must provide information 
demonstrating that:
247
 
a) the counterfactual situation is credible; 
b) the eligible costs have been calculated in accordance with the Guidelines; and  
c) the investment would not be sufficiently profitable without aid, due account being taken 
of the benefits associated with the investment without aid, including the value of emission 
allowances which may become available to the undertaking concerned following the 
environmentally friendly investment. 
In the case of investment aid for carbon leakage prone sectors, requirement a) could be 
demonstrated simply by showing that the undertaking for which aid is granted belongs to a 
carbon leakage sector as defined by the Commission, and may therefore consider to 
delocalise its production instead of taking up an investment in abatement technology. As 
for eligible costs, the Guidelines provide that the amount of aid shall be calculated on the 
basis of extra (net) costs necessary to meet the environmental objectives. This concept 
implies that all the economic benefits which the company gains from the investment must 
in principle be subtracted from the additional investment costs.  
The calculation of the net costs of an investment in emission abatement is, however, far 
from a trivial issue, as it may be difficult to assess the eventual value for all possible 
economic benefits that may occur to an undertaking as a result of an investment. Firstly, an 
investment may cause both direct and indirect benefits to the recipient. Perhaps the most 
important direct benefit of an investment in emission abatement in the context of an ETS is 
the fact that it reduces the overall compliance costs of the undertaking, as it can cover its 
emissions with fewer allowances. An investment may also cause more general direct 
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benefits, e.g. in the form of an increase in energy efficiency which reduces the 
undertaking’s fuel expenses. In addition, investing in emission abatements may also cause 
benefits of an indirect nature, as it may e.g. improve the “green image” of the undertaking, 
which may in its turn increase its attraction in the eyes of investors.  
In order to extract such direct and indirect benefits from the overall costs of an investment, 
the benefits would have to be given a monetary value, which may be difficult not only for 
ambiguous indirect benefits, such as a green image, but also for direct economic benefits. 
A simple example regarding the calculation of reductions in compliance costs will 
highlight the said difficulties:  
Let us suppose that an undertaking makes an investment that reduces its annual 
emissions from 100 units to 90. Assuming that the market price of allowances is Z, 
the undertaking obtains an annual benefit of (100-90=10) x Z. The overall benefit to 
the undertaking then depends on the amount of years it will stay operational (Y), 
meaning that the equation for the overall benefit would be 10 x Z x Y. The problem 
is that there is no way of knowing in advance the future development of the 
variables Z, let alone Y. The question that follows is then to what extent future 
benefits of the investment should be taken into account when assessing the eligible 
costs of the investment. Should Y be calculated for the rest of the projected 
existence of the EU ETS, i.e. 2050? This may result in the overestimation of the 
investment’s direct benefits, leading to disproportionately low State aid. Should Y 
instead be fixed on the basis of an assumption that undertakings will remain 
operational for e.g. 10 years, the amount of State aid may still not correspond to the 
investment’s factual benefit incurred to the aid recipient. Likewise, it can be asked 
whether Z should be defined according to the market price of allowances at the time 
of the investment or the decision to grant State aid or whether it should be fixed 
according to e.g. an average price. 
Due to the difficulties to fully take into account all economic benefits which an 
undertaking will derive from an additional investment, the Guidelines provide that 
operating benefits are not taken into account beyond an initial period of five years 
following the investment.
248
 Likewise, indirect benefits which are difficult to measure – 
such as the ‘green image’ enhanced by an environmental investment – are not taken into 
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account in this context either. The solution adopted in the guidelines has been to take into 
account such difficultly measurable benefits by imposing maximal aid intensities which are 
generally lower than the eligible costs. It follows that in order for investment aid for carbon 
leakage prone undertakings to be compatible with the Guidelines, the eligible costs would 
have to be defined as the subtraction of investment costs and direct investment benefits 
incurred to the undertaking during an initial period of five years. Eventual benefits caused 
to the undertaking after the initial period as well as indirect benefits would then be 
considered by imposing maximal aid intensities that are lower than 100% of the eligible 
costs. 
If eligible costs are calculated according to the formula presented above, the need for 
specific assessment under requirement c) regarding the investment’s profitability without 
State aid seems rather limited, as State aid is only granted for investments that have net 
costs, i.e. that are prima facie not profitable anyway. It would thus seem more appropriate 
if an additional, specific analyse regarding the profitability of the investment under 
requirement c) was merely conducted in situations where it seems likely that the 
investment produces long term (economic) benefits to the undertaking which go well 
beyond the period of five years on the basis of which the eligible costs are calculated. 
In conclusion, even in the case that investment aid for carbon leakage sectors granted from 
auction revenues was to be considered to fall within the definition of State aid under 
Article 107(1) of the TFEU, such aid measures should be compatible with the current State 
aid provisions of the TFEU and the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental 
Protection on condition that: 
(1) the eligible costs have been calculated on the basis of net costs of investments; and  
(2) it can be demonstrated that the investment would not likely cause any long term 
benefits that would make it sufficiently profitable for the recipient to make the 
investment without the State aid.  
5.2.3. Compatibility with the Polluter Pays Principle 
An auction based ETS is prima facie unproblematic in relation to the polluter pays 
principle, as undertakings have to buy an allowance for each emission unit they produce. 
Unlike free allocation, where the assumption seems to be that the amount of allowances 
allocated to each undertaking reflects the tolerated amount of emissions, auctioning clearly 
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signals that every emission unit that an installation produces is, in principle, illegitimate, 
and causes a direct economic loss for the undertaking in question. Accordingly, the 
Commission has stated that auctioning is the allocation method that best complies with the 
polluter pays principle.
249
 A system where the auction revenues are circulated back to the 
polluters nevertheless needs a closer examination. 
5.2.3a    Restricted Interpretation of the Polluter Pays Principle 
The use of financial aid to mitigate compliance costs incurred to undertakings from having 
to reduce their emissions may at first appear contrary to the weak form of the polluter pays 
principle, which requires that pollution control equipment should not be subsidised. 
Financial aid for investments in emission abatement technologies namely seems to 
constitute precisely the kind of a subsidy which is “directly linked to pollution prevention 
and control equipment” that the weak form of the polluter pays principle forbids. In order 
to properly prevent carbon leakage, investment aid would have to be targeted to sectors 
effectively exposed to the risk of carbon leakage. The amount of aid to be granted would 
therefore has to depend on each respective sector’s (1) trade intensity with third countries 
and (2) its carbon intensity. The latter criterion seems to imply that sectors causing more 
pollution receive a higher proportion of aid than less emitting sectors would receive for the 
same investment, which could be viewed as “subsidising pollution”.  
The weak form of the polluter pays principle, however, needs to be put into perspective. It 
aims at prohibiting governments from subsidising pollution where no active measures to 
ensure cost internalisation have been implemented.
250
 If, in contrast, a policy or an 
instrument ensuring the internalisation of costs has been implemented in accordance with 
the requirement of the strong form of the polluter pays principle, its weak form is 
considered to be fulfilled in any situation. The relevant question is therefore: are costs of 
pollution internalised in a system where auction revenues are re-cycled back to 
undertakings? In economic theory, cost internalisation is achieved as soon as an externality 
has been established a monetary value, which is above zero. In other words, the concept of 
cost internalisation does not contain any requirements regarding the level where the price 
will settle. Within an ETS, the costs of pollution are therefore internalised when each unit 
of emission produces a cost for the undertaking, i.e. the price of emission allowances is 
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above zero.
251
 This will be the situation so long as there is a shortage of allowances on the 
market, i.e. the overall demand for allowances is higher than their overall supply, which is 
easily achieved under a gradually tightening emission cap as long as investments in 
abatement technology produce costs for undertakings.  
As long as the financial aid only covers a percentage of the net value of undertakings’ 
investment costs,
 
emission abatement will continue to produce costs for undertakings, 
meaning that they will consider purchasing allowances if the marginal costs of pollution 
abatement surpass the price of an emission allowance.
252
 In other words, provided that the 
aid only mitigates part of the net emission abatement costs of undertakings, emission units 
will continue to have a cost that undertakings are forced to internalise. As emission costs 
are internalised, the strong form of the polluter pays principle is fulfilled, suggesting that 
using auction revenues for investment aid would not contradict the efficiency interpretation 
of the polluter pays principle. 
If the restricted form of the polluter pays principle was interpreted strictly as to require the 
full internalisation of all costs incurred due to emissions, one could nevertheless argue that 
as investment aid to carbon leakage prone sectors reduces their compliance costs, the full 
costs of pollution abatement are not internalised as a part of those costs are covered with 
investment aid. Such an argument would, however, not seem plausible in the context of 
emissions trading, as the concept of emissions trading does not contain any absolute 
variable defining the “full costs of pollution”. The cost of pollution is namely defined by 
the market and is established depending on how ambitious the overall emission cap is. As 
the setting of the emission cap is a purely discretionary, politically nuanced decision made 
by the participants of the ETS, the cost of pollution varies in different ETSs, depending on 
how radical reductions each ETS aims at. Consequently, it would not seem appropriate to 
interpret the polluter pays principle in a way which would require the internalisation of 
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“full” costs of pollution, as the mere concept itself cannot be defined in a non-discretionary 
way in the context of emissions trading.
253
  
5.2.3b     Extended Interpretation of the Polluter Pays Principle 
Similarly with free allocation, investment aid for carbon leakage prone sectors imply a 
wealth transfer from the public to the polluter, improving the financial situation of 
shareholders of polluting undertakings compared to a scenario where no aid is granted. 
This may seem particularly problematic when such aid is only granted for carbon leakage 
sectors (who are often the worst polluters), especially if the aid intensity increases in 
proportion to the sectors’ carbon leakage risk (which depends partly on the sectors’ energy 
– and indirectly emission – intensity). It may be argued that as financial aid for investments 
in abatement technology makes emission abatement less expensive, reducing the 
compliance costs of the typically energy intensive carbon leakage sector. Aid granted for 
carbon leakage sectors may, in other words, seem like a reward for extensive use of 
energy.  
However, as with free allocation, the support granted to carbon leakage sectors in the form 
of investment aid is founded on the assumption that such sectors tend to suffer 
disproportionally from being subject to an ETS compared to other sectors, since they lack 
the ability to pass on the additional costs arising from their obligations under the ETS. 
When an undertaking belonging to a non-carbon leakage sector makes an investment in 
abatement technology, it can, in theory, pass on at least part of the costs into product 
prices, as it is not particularly exposed to international competition and as it knows that its 
competitors within the EU are either forced to make similar investments or to purchase 
additional allowances. An undertaking facing the risk of carbon leakage, in contrast, 
cannot pass on pollution costs in a similar way without risking a loss of market share to 
competitors outside the EU. As such undertakings cannot compensate their investment 
costs by raising prices, it would not seem inequitable if part of their net investment costs 
were compensated through financial aid. 
As carbon leakage prone undertakings will have to bear the full costs of their investments 
while other undertakings can partly pass on those costs to consumers, it can be argued that 
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financial aid mitigating the investment costs of carbon leakage sectors should, as a main 
rule, not cause any major problems in relation to the equity based interpretation of the 
polluter pays principle after all, provided that the aid measures are necessary and 
proportional to the effective exposure of sectors to carbon leakage. It rather seems like 
proportionate investment aid for carbon leakage prone sectors merely counterbalances the 
distortion caused between sectors due to different abilities to pass the costs of the ETS on 
to consumers. In conclusion, a system of auctioning where auction revenues are circulated 
back to undertakings in the form of proportionate financial aid covering part of the net 
value of undertakings’ investment costs does not seem to contradict with the restricted nor 
the extended interpretations of the polluter pays principle. 
5.2.4. Impact on Dynamic Efficiency 
A system enabling the use of auction revenues for investment-bound aid seems to be 
promoting the goal of dynamic efficiency, as it gives direct incentives for carbon leakage 
prone undertakings to make such long term investments in emission abatement technology 
which they may otherwise have considered to be too costly due to their inability to pass 
abatement costs on to consumers. On the other hand, financial aid reduces emission 
abatement costs of carbon leakage sectors, meaning that they are to an increasing extent 
likely to reduce their emissions rather than to cover emissions with allowances. This would 
reduce the overall demand of allowances, resulting in a drop in allowances prices. 
Consequently, non-carbon leakage sectors may find it more convenient to cover their own 
emissions with cheaper allowances rather than to invest in emission abatement 
technologies, as they do not benefit from a similar financial aid that would mitigate their 
own investment costs. In the short run, investment aid for carbon leakage sectors may 
therefore simply lead to a shift in green investments from non-carbon leakage sectors to 
carbon leakage sectors.
254
 This problem could, on the other hand, be mitigated by imposing 
an auction reserve price which would establish a minimum price for allowances. 
5.2.4a     Unrealistic Risks of Perverse Incentives 
As investment aid is to be granted for carbon leakage sectors only, it needs to be assessed 
whether undertakings may have perverse incentives to form collusions in order to 
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artificially increase their factors according to which the carbon leakage risk is defined. It 
would indeed be utterly problematic from a dynamic efficiency perspective if undertakings 
e.g. first increased their energy intensity in order to suffer from a higher increase in 
production costs which would allow them to be classified as carbon leakage prone and 
receive (more) investment aid for abating the emissions they have deliberately increased. 
However, several reasons indicate that such behaviour of undertakings would not seem to 
make much economic sense under a system which would merely mitigate – not fully 
compensate – the extra costs that increased carbon leakage proneness induces.  
First of all, an increase in energy intensity would increase the undertaking’s production 
costs resulting from having to buy additional allowances to cover the increased emissions. 
As obtaining a carbon leakage status would require that the sector in question is at least to 
some extent exposed to international competition, undertakings aiming at fulfilling the 
criteria of a carbon leakage sector by increasing their energy intensity would not be able to 
fully pass on the increased costs in their prices. If the carbon leakage status of sectors was 
defined on the basis of data regarding the sectors’ trade, production and value added during 
the three most recent years as under the current AETD
255
, it would take years before the 
changed circumstances would actually lead into an update in the sector’s carbon leakage 
status. Secondly, the investment aid that a carbon leakage status could enable would only 
cover part of the undertakings’ net investment costs, meaning that they would still have to 
stand for the rest of the costs themselves. Moreover, if the intensity of the investment aid 
would depend on the sector’s effective carbon leakage risk, obtaining a carbon leakage 
status may not as such lead to a particularly significant financial benefit, as the aid 
intensity would be relatively low for sectors that only barely qualify as carbon leakage 
prone. 
Provided that the increase of investment aid is proportional in relation to the increased 
costs, i.e. the amount of additional aid gained does not surpass the sum of such additional 
costs incurred to the undertaking due to the increased carbon leakage exposure as 
presented above, covering emissions with allowances or making a financially independent 
investment in abatement technology would, in fact, induce less overall costs than the 
fraudulent procedure of obtaining a carbon leakage status. Under aid intensities that 
increase in proportion to the effective carbon leakage risk and considering the numerous 
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additional costs that a deliberate increase in carbon leakage proneness would imply, it 
seems very unlikely that a carbon leakage status would render an undertaking better off 
than it would be without such a status. Consequently, it seems like the risk of perverse 
incentives to obtain a carbon leakage status would, under the proposed system, be merely 
hypothetic. 
5.2.4b    Updates to the List of Carbon Leakage Sectors 
As stated above in Section 4.3.2d, updates to the carbon leakage status of sectors may 
create uncertainty, as undertakings do not know in advance whether they will be included 
in or excluded from the list of carbon leakage sectors. In a system of free allocation, such 
uncertainty may cause undertakings to hesitate to adopt new technologies, as the amount of 
resources available for investments may depend on whether they will receive free emission 
allowances or whether they will have to buy their allowances in auctions. An auction based 
system where carbon leakage sectors are supported in the form of investment aid is, 
however, different: uncertainty concerning whether a carbon leakage sector will preserve 
its status in the future would rather seem to incentivise an undertaking to invest in 
abatement technology while it can still gain financial support for it on the basis of its 
carbon leakage status.  
On the other hand, the prospect of being classified as a carbon leakage prone sector and 
receiving investment aid in the future could, in theory, undermine dynamic efficiency in 
non-carbon leakage sectors. An undertaking belonging to a sector which nearly meets the 
requirements for carbon leakage proneness may prefer to postpone more costly 
investments over the next update of carbon leakage sectors in order to “wait and see” 
whether their status is altered. This dynamic distortion would nevertheless be mitigated by 
imposing a possibility for the Commission to annually update the list of carbon leakage 
prone undertakings by adding a sector or a subsector at the request of a Member State or at 
its own initiative, similarly to the current Article 10a(13)(2) of the AETD.  An alternative, 
or possibly complementary, solution could be to enable (to a limited extent) the granting of 
aid ex post to undertakings whose carbon leakage status has been altered, if it can be 
demonstrated that the sector in question has de facto been exposed to carbon leakage for a 
certain period of time before its carbon leakage status has been updated. 
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5.2.4c     Reserve Prices Could Reduce Price Volatility  
As for price volatility, an auction based allocation system could solve a variety of 
problems related to the current, free allocation based EU ETS. First of all, auctioning 
would ensure that allowances are allocated according to their actual demand, meaning that 
undertakings would not receive any surplus allowances free of charge as under free 
allocation. As every initial allowance is auctioned for a price, it seems likely that 
undertakings would mainly buy initial allowances to cover their projected emissions and 
surplus allowances would only occur insofar as an undertaking attains higher emission 
reductions than it has originally projected. Even in such a situation, the undertaking in 
question may often prefer to simply bank the surplus allowances for its own future use, as 
it would have to pay for its future allowances anyway. This could reduce the scale of 
possible speculative banking of allowances with the purpose of selling them on at higher 
prices. Secondly, auctioning would create an early price indicator, which could improve 
undertakings’ facilities to develop their investment and trading strategies. Such a base 
price could thus reduce price volatility compared to free allocation, where undertakings do 
not have a clear knowledge concerning the supply and demand of allowances in the 
beginning of trading periods.  
On the other hand, the positive impact of auctioning on price stability in the period 
following shortly after the implementation of the system must not be overestimated, as the 
early allowance price is formed by market operators with an incomplete knowledge 
concerning other market operators’ demand of allowances. Such uncertainty regarding the 
bidding behaviour of other participants may increase pre-auction uncertainty of where the 
price level will settle. Risk aversive bidders could then make overly high bids in initial 
auctions, resulting in a falsely high early indicator of allowance prices, which would 
eventually result in a drop in prices once it has turned out that the real demand for 
allowances is lower.  
Additionally, a mechanism of using auction revenues to support investments made by 
carbon leakage prone undertakings to emission abatement technology may further 
undermine the stabilising effect of auctioning on allowance prices. As stated above, 
investment aid to carbon leakage sectors reduces their abatement costs, meaning that a 
greater number of undertakings may prefer to invest in green technology instead of 
purchasing emission allowances. The following reduction in the overall demand of 
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allowances results in a drop in allowances prices. Undertakings are aware of the fact that 
the existence of investment aid may reduce allowances prices, but they do not possess any 
prior knowledge regarding how much the aid will increase overall investments in emission 
abatements and how significant the impact on allowance prices will be. This may further 
increase unpredictability of bidding behaviour and thereby cause price volatility, at least in 
the period following the initial auctioning.  
However, it is not clear whether the use of auction revenues for investment aid would 
cause any severe volatility of prices on a longer term, assuming that the aid is granted in a 
proportional way, i.e. emission abatement will not become overly cheap to the degree that 
the allowance price falls close to zero.
256
 Although undertakings may overestimate or 
underestimate the future development of allowance prices and overpay or underpay in the 
initial auction, the allowance price will eventually settle according to the existing demand. 
Unless the nature of the regulatory measure causes strong temporal variation in demand, 
undertakings will rapidly discover the “new”, level of allowance prices. It is hard to see 
why predetermined, foreseeable rules on investment aid would cause any major price 
volatility in this respect, as the long term effect of such rules on the demand of allowances 
should be of a rather stationary nature. In contrast, minor instability of prices is an inherent 
feature of a market economy and the demand of allowances may vary from time to time, 
depending on various factors. An economic slowdown may force undertakings to cut down 
on production, resulting in a simultaneous reduction in emissions, which in its turn reduces 
the general need to cover emissions with allowances. The discovery of a new abatement 
technology may cause a temporary drop in allowance prices, as undertakings adopt the new 
technology in their production processes. As the allowance price is already subject to 
“natural” temporal variation, the possible effect of investment aid on price volatility should 
not be overestimated. It may merely imply that allowance prices will be established on a 
lower level than where they would have been in the absence of investment aid, without 
causing any extraordinary price volatility that would differ from normal price variations. 
Furthermore, an auction based ETS provides several possibilities of using mechanisms to 
enhance price stability. Auctioning could e.g. enable the use of certain price stabilising 
mechanisms less applicable in a system based on free allocation, such as the establishing of 
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a price floor.
257
 A price floor indicating e.g. that a part of the allowances to be auctioned 
would be sold above a reserve price (such as €15/tCO2) could to some extent reduce pre-
auction uncertainty regarding the level where allowance prices will settle. A reserve price 
would also provide further protection against possible price shocks resulting from a 
reduced demand of allowances caused by investment aid for carbon leakage sectors. A 
safety valve consisting of offset credits as presented above in Section 5.1.2 could likewise 
be established in an auction based system, as has been done in the RGGI, although it could 
turn out to be politically challenging as concluded above in Section 5.1.2. Although reserve 
prices and safety valves would not remove all uncertainties related to initial allowance 
prices, they would nevertheless indicate a certain margin within which undertakings can 
reasonably expect that the price level will settle. 
5.2.4d     Conclusion 
It can be concluded that an auction based ETS where auction revenues would be used as 
financial aid mitigating the costs induced to carbon leakage prone undertakings by 
investments in emission abatements is not likely to significantly affect overall dynamic 
efficiency compared to a free allocation based system. It could increase dynamic incentives 
of carbon leakage sectors on the one hand, but reduce dynamic incentives of other sectors 
on the other hand, making the overall impact rather neutral. The proposed system could, 
however, reduce distortions caused to dynamic efficiency arising from uncertainties related 
to the definition of carbon leakage sectors, compared to the situation under free allocation. 
An auction based system could to some extent enhance price stability, as it would create an 
early price indicator and enable the use of a reserve price, although this effect may be 
somewhat undermined by uncertainty related to the price reducing influence of investment 
aid on allowance prices. Although nothing seems to directly indicate that the proposed 
system would increase price volatility on a longer term, it needs to be borne in mind that 
such long term effects are, in any situation, difficult to predict. 
5.2.5. Impacts on Competition 
5.2.5a    New Entrants are Favoured over Incumbents 
An auction based system enabling the use of auction revenues for financial aid for 
investments in abatement technology should not as such cause more severe competitive 
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distortions than a system based on free allocation. An auctioning based system would, first 
of all, remove any differential treatment of incumbents and new entrants, as both will have 
to purchase their allowances at the market. As the entrance of a new undertaking on the 
market increases the overall demand of allowances, both incumbents and new entrants will, 
in principle, operate under equal conditions. However, auctioning may de facto render 
incumbents worse off in relation to new entrants due to the fact that the former ones have 
typically sunk costs in old, inefficient technology that causes higher emissions, forcing 
them to buy more allowances. Although the use of auction revenues for investment aid 
would mitigate the compliance costs of energy intensive sectors with a limited ability to 
pass on compliance costs to consumers, the fact that the carbon leakage risk is assessed on 
the level of sectors instead of individual undertakings implies that incumbents would still 
be worse off than new entrants operating within the same sector, regardless of whether the 
sector in question has been granted a carbon leakage status or not.  
On the other hand, it may be argued that such competitive inequalities seem, in fact, to be 
quite in line with the aims of both dynamic efficiency and the polluter pays principle: new, 
greener facilities are favoured over old facilities that cause higher emissions. It could, of 
course, be argued that incumbents are not necessarily more inefficient due to a conscious 
choice to use less efficient technology; they may simply have invested in technology that 
was the most efficient available at the time of the investment, but that has later become 
inefficient in relation to new technology. However, the fact that technological development 
tends to favour new entrants in relation to incumbents can hardly be seen problematic in 
relation to competition. It rather encourages incumbent undertakings to invest in 
technology that has maximal efficiency and to thoroughly examine before adapting a new 
technology whether it can be further developed. This seems to correspond to the essential 
aims of the EU competition policy to provide better products at lower prices as well as to 
promote innovations and improve international competitiveness.
258
 Moreover, as new 
entrants of today are incumbents of tomorrow, they will quickly face the same challenges 
arising from technological development, meaning that only truly competitive new entrants 
will eventually manage to establish themselves on the market. 
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 These goals have been emphasised by the Commission as essential advantages of equal competition, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_fi.html  
103 
 
An auction based system may favour large corporations over smaller undertakings, as 
auctions cause transaction costs which bigger firms with more abundant resources can bear 
better than their smaller competitors.
259
 However, is must be kept in mind that even free 
allocation implies transaction costs, especially as the political nature of the allocation 
method tends to invite businesses to extensive lobbying in order to maximise their own 
share of allowances.
260
 In this respect, it cannot be directly concluded that small 
undertakings would be worse off in an auction based system than under a system of free 
allocation of allowances. Furthermore, the administrative costs and transaction costs of 
auctioning vary depending on the particular design of auctions, and may thus be reduced 
by choosing a less costly auction model.
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5.2.5b     No Overcompensation Problems 
The risk of overcompensation does not seem particularly significant in an auctioning based 
system, as auctioning does not involve a “capital gift” in the form of freely granted, 
tradable allowances. Even though a temporary reduction in the output of an undertaking 
would equally provide it access to surplus allowances, these would not constitute an 
unmerited benefit for the undertaking, as it has already paid a market price for the overlap 
allowances. The undertaking has simply bought a commodity that later turns out not to 
have been necessary and which it can then either save for future use or sell onwards on the 
market. 
5.2.5c     A More Flexible Definition of Carbon Leakage Sectors 
Differential treatment of undertakings on the basis of their proneness to carbon leakage 
may cause competitive distortions, depending on how the carbon leakage risk is assessed. 
As explained above in Section 4.4.2c, competitive inequalities are caused under the current 
EU ETS due to the arbitrary criteria defining carbon leakage proneness as well as the fact 
that an undertaking either receives 100% of its allowances for free or is subject to the 
general allocation rules. Similarly to the suggested solution model presented in Section 
5.1.1, the competitive distortions caused by the arbitrary, threshold based rules concerning 
the definition of carbon leakage sectors under the current EU ETS could be mitigated by 
imposing more flexible conditions defining the sectors entitled to investment aid on the 
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 See Peeters - Weishaar 2008, p. 18 and Hepburn & al. 2006, p. 143. 
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 Hepburn & al. 2006, p. 143. 
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 This Study shall not discuss how emission allowances should be auctioned. For a discussion regarding 
auction designs, see Hepburn & al. 2006, p. 144-148. 
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basis of a carbon leakage risk. With aid intensities that increase in proportion to each 
sector’s degree of carbon leakage risk, the supportive measure would better correspond to 
the effective exposure of undertakings to carbon leakage. This would reduce the current 
gap caused by the EU ETS between carbon leakage sectors themselves as well as between 
carbon leakage sectors and other sectors which results from the fact that 100% free 
allocation is granted equally to sectors with a high exposure to carbon leakage and to such 
sectors that only barely fulfil the criteria for a carbon leakage status. Under a more flexible 
support measure, the definition of carbon leakage sectors could be maintained rather broad, 
comprising even such sectors whose carbon leakage risk is more moderate. Such sectors 
would simply receive a lower proportion of investment aid. 
5.2.5c     Conclusion 
A system based on auctioning where carbon leakage is prevented by using auction 
revenues to grant investment aid to carbon leakage prone sectors does not seem to cause 
any major competitive distortions compared to a system of free allocation. It would 
improve the competitive position of new entrants in relation to incumbents, and to a certain 
degree even produce reverse competitive distortions compared to free allocation by 
favouring new entrants at the expense of incumbents. However, from the perspective of 
dynamic efficiency and the polluter pays principle and considering especially the goals of 
the EU competition policy, such “distortions” favouring the adoption of new technologies 
does not seem particularly problematic.  
5.2.6. Better Protection against Carbon Leakage? 
As stated above in Section 4.5, free allocation of allowances to carbon leakage prone 
sectors may not necessarily provide adequate long term protection against carbon leakage, 
as  
(1) the EU-wide cap on emissions is anyhow imposing an asymmetric, costly burden 
on the European industry; and 
(2) free allowances may not significantly improve the long term position of such 
sectors or undertakings that can only achieve emission reductions through costly 
(low benefits in relation to costs) or uncertain investments. 
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When applied without any support mechanisms for carbon leakage sectors, using 
auctioning as a uniform allocation mechanism would increase the overall compliance costs 
induced to undertakings by the ETS, increasing thus potential carbon leakage. However, 
the use of auction revenues to support investments made by carbon leakage prone sectors 
in emission abatement technology would seem to tackle some of the inefficiencies related 
to free allocation.  
5.2.6a     A Direct Remedy for Sunk Costs 
First of all, investments in abatement technology induce sunk costs for undertakings, 
reducing their incentives to delocalise their production outside the EU once an investment 
has been made. On the other hand, the sunk costs imply that undertakings whose emissions 
can only be reduced by making high cost investments may be discouraged to invest in 
emission abatement in the first place, especially if they consider delocalising production to 
be a tempting alternative. Such undertakings may fear that making investments in emission 
abatement would only bind them to participate in an ETS which they will eventually not 
manage (or want) to comply with on a long term. The fact that the support for carbon 
leakage sectors is, unlike in a system of free allocation, directed at investments, should 
increase the willingness of undertakings to take up investments despite the sunk costs they 
induce.  
It is nevertheless crucial that the investment aid granted to carbon leakage prone 
undertakings is sufficiently high as to truly mitigate their abatement costs and provide a 
true incentive to make long term emission reduction commitments. At the same time, the 
efficient functioning of an ETS requires that emissions must have a price, meaning that the 
financial aid cannot reduce abatement costs to a degree that the price of emission 
allowances would drop to a purely ostensible level. The best solution to these seemingly 
contradictory aims seems to be to limit the investment aid to cover only a part of the net 
value of undertakings’ abatement costs. If the eligible costs of investment aid are limited to 
the net costs of the investment, aid is only granted for such investments that an undertaking 
would not have made in the absence of financial aid. Moreover, net costs -bound 
investment aid mitigates precisely the differential of costs and benefits of an investment, 
increasing thus incentives to invest in emission abatement even for such carbon leakage 
prone sectors that cannot reduce emissions in a cost efficient way. This incentive is further 
increased by imposing aid intensities that increase in proportion to the effective carbon 
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leakage risk. Provided that aid is granted for a percentage of the net value of investment 
costs and that the said percentage will be sufficiently high for carbon leakage prone sectors 
as to provide a real support for their abatement costs, undertakings should have incentives 
to invest in abatement technology regardless of the sunk costs such investments imply.  
Moreover, as the possibility of receiving financial aid for investments in abatement 
technology is not tradable, the only way an undertaking can profit from this support is by 
maintaining its production in Europe and commit itself to the emission reduction targets set 
out by the EU. Investment aid does therefore not have an opportunity cost in the sense that 
tradable units of economic value, such as freely allocated allowances, have. 
5.2.6b     Full Circulation of Auction Revenues 
When assessing whether the proposed system truly reduces the risk of carbon leakage, it 
nevertheless needs to be kept in mind that unless the investment aid fully covers the costs 
induced to undertakings from auctioning, which may often not be the case as the aid is 
only calculated for net investment costs, part of the auction revenues are “left over”, 
implying that the overall costs of an auction based system to undertakings would still be 
higher than in a system of free allocation. Higher overall costs may increase the risk of 
carbon leakage compared to a free allocation based system in spite of the positive effects 
that investment aid granted from auctioning revenues would have. It is therefore important 
that the auction revenues that have not been used for direct financial support are, in one 
way or another, circulated back to undertakings.
262
  
In conclusion, it seems like an auction based ETS where auction revenues would be 
circulated back to carbon leakage prone undertakings could, under certain conditions, 
reduce the risk of carbon leakage compared to a system of free allocation. Proportional 
investment aid granted on the basis of the net value of investment costs reduces the 
discouraging effect of sunk costs on decisions to invest in abatement technology, 
encouraging undertakings to make investments and maintain their production in the EU 
instead of delocalising. Compared to a system based on free allocation, undertakings facing 
high abatement costs should have a stronger incentive to reduce emissions instead of 
delocalising production elsewhere. The encouraging effect of financial aid on investments 
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 This could be done either in the form of direct financial support or by investing the “overlap” auction 
revenues in support measures that would indirectly benefit undertakings. The latter alternative shall be 
discussed more in detail below. 
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is maintained even for those sectors that face the highest carbon leakage risk with aid 
intensities that increase in proportion to the effective carbon leakage risk. However, as 
investment aid may not as such fully cover the costs induced to undertakings from 
auctioning, a system ensuring the full circulation of auction revenues back to undertakings 
should be put in place in order to minimise the potential increase of carbon leakage risk 
resulting from extending auctioning even to carbon leakage sectors. 
5.2.7. Conclusions 
It has been demonstrated above that a system of auctioning where auction revenues would 
be circulated back to carbon leakage prone undertakings could, at least in theory, be a 
plausible alternative for the model under the current EU ETS where carbon leakage is 
prevented by granting free allocation to carbon leakage prone sectors. Such a system would 
be compatible with the EU State aid regulation and it does not seem to contradict the 
polluter pays principle. Likewise, its effects on dynamic efficiency as well as competition 
should be rather mild – and hardly negative – compared to the situation under free 
allocation. The proper functioning of a system based on auctioning and investment aid 
would nevertheless require that: 
(1) A carbon leakage status should only be granted to sectors facing a real carbon 
leakage risk. This is necessary for compatibility of the ETS with the extended 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle.  It requires that both the cost increases 
that a sector faces due to the ETS and the trade intensity of the sector with third 
countries have to be taken into account simultaneously in the carbon leakage risk 
assessment.  
(2) The relevant sectors of industry should be defined on the basis of the product 
and geographical market where they compete. This would minimise 
competitively distortive situations where a carbon leakage sector and a non-carbon 
leakage sector de facto compete on the same market. 
(3) The eligible costs for investment aid should be calculated on the basis of net 
investment costs in accordance with the Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and that it can be demonstrated that the recipient would not have made 
the investment in the absence of the aid. This would ensure the proportionality and 
necessity of the aid measure and thus ensure the compatibility of investment aid 
granted from auction revenues with the internal market in accordance with the EU 
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State aid regulation. It would also reduce possible perverse incentives for non-
carbon leakage sectors to increase their carbon intensity in order to receive 
differential treatment under the carbon leakage status. Moreover, it could increase 
the incentives of sectors facing high abatement costs to invest in emission reduction 
technology, reducing thus the risk of carbon leakage. 
(4) the investment aid should be granted in proportion to the effective carbon 
leakage risk, implying that the intensity of investment aid increases in proportion to 
the respective sectors’ effective carbon leakage risk. This should ensure the 
compatibility of State aid for carbon leakage sectors with both the restricted and the 
extended form of the polluter pays principle, as each emission unit would have a 
cost and the aid would mitigate the costs in proportion to the ability of sectors to 
include those costs in their prices. As the differential treatment between non-carbon 
leakage sectors and sectors that only barely qualify as carbon leakage prone would 
diminish, the advantages gained from obtaining a carbon leakage status will be 
reduced. This should further reduce perverse incentives for obtaining a carbon 
leakage status. 
(5) A reserve price should be set in order to reduce pre-auction uncertainty regarding 
allowance prices. It should also be assessed whether an offset based safety valve 
could be imposed to protect undertakings from high allowance prices. 
(6) The Commission should have a possibility to annually include sectors to the 
carbon leakage list, or alternatively, Member States should have the possibility to 
grant financial aid ex-post to undertakings whose carbon leakage status has been 
altered, in order to ensure that investment decisions are not delayed due to prospects 
of receiving a carbon leakage status in the future. 
Most importantly, it seems like an auction based system could in certain aspects provide a 
better tool for carbon leakage prevention compared to free allocation, provided that 
auction revenues are properly circulated back to undertakings. Instead of being used for 
further direct financial support – which could further reduce the allowance price and have 
impacts on competition – the “overlap” auction revenues could be invested in support 
measures that produce indirect benefits to undertakings. 
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How to Ensure the Full Circulation of Auction Revenues 
Ensuring that auction revenues are fully circulated back to undertakings is not a simple 
issue. Interesting models for indirect support measures have nevertheless been 
implemented in the RGGI as well as the UK Carbon Trust. As noted above in Section 
5.2.1, Member States participating in the RGGI have invested auction revenues in strategic 
energy programs improving inter alia energy efficiency and renewable energy 
technologies. In other words, rather than using direct cash flow in the form of investment 
aid directed to certain sectors of industry, auction revenues under the RGGI are mainly 
directed to State administered programs and projects that will, in principle, benefit each 
sector and each undertaking equally. Programs and projects under the RGGI provide e.g. 
incentives for the purchase of energy-efficient appliances and equipment and grants for 
large-scale commercial and industrial energy efficiency projects. They also foster 
community-wide commitments to improve energy efficiency and provide job training for 
workers in the energy efficiency field. The programs and projects include deployment of 
solar energy generation technologies on residential, municipal, and non-profit buildings, as 
well as deployment of wind, solar and biomass technologies in commercial and industrial 
settings. Some programs likewise aim at promoting research, development and deployment 
of carbon emission abatement technologies.  
Similarly, the UK Carbon Trust provides sourcing of high quality and competitive 
suppliers of energy efficient equipment as well as flexible and affordable financing in the 
forms of leases, loans and hire purchase, designed to be offset by energy cost savings. The 
Carbon Trust also works with governments, innovators and corporates with the aim of 
accelerating the commercialisation of low carbon technologies, and leads projects to 
deliver commercial partnerships and design and develop innovation initiatives in low 
carbon technologies. In addition, the Carbon Trust also offers various forms of advice to 
businesses, governments and the public sector on their opportunities in a sustainable low 
carbon world, inter alia by making appraisals regarding green investments and green 
growth opportunities, developing corporate sustainability strategies as well as footprinting 
organisations, products and services. 
The advantage of investing auction revenues in such indirect programs as those within the 
RGGI and the UK Carbon Trust is that it relieves decision makers from the always difficult 
and politically nuanced task of defining which sectors should be granted beneficial 
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treatment and which can cope without. As such programs would not be specifically 
directed for a certain sector, also non-carbon leakage sectors could benefit from them. This 
could, in the best case, reduce the negative impact that cheaper allowances would have on 
the dynamic incentives on non-carbon leakage sectors that do not receive investment aid. 
On the other hand, as the support measure is purely of an indirect nature and does not 
provide any direct aid for carbon leakage sectors, it seems doubtable whether the use of 
auction revenues for general programs and projects would as such improve the conditions 
of carbon leakage prone sectors as to significantly reduce the risk of carbon leakage.
263
 It 
rather seems like State administered programs of indirect support could therefore function 
as an adequate complementary measure for direct investment aid, considering especially 
that although the support measure is not directly targeted at carbon leakage sectors, those 
energy intensive sectors which face the greatest difficulties in complying with the ETS are 
typically the ones that benefit most from new techniques improving energy efficiency, 
increased applicability of renewable energy or other improvements in emission abatement 
achieved by general programs. Most importantly, the use of “overlap” auction revenues for 
indirect support programs would provide a signal for carbon leakage prone undertakings 
that 100% of the assets they are forced to spend in auctions will be used to their own 
benefit, either directly or indirectly. 
6. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
This Study has assessed the functionality of the carbon leakage prevention mechanism of 
the EU ETS implemented by the NETD with regard to goals and objectives of the EU ETS 
as well as the policies and objectives of the EU in general. The assessment has been 
conducted from five different viewpoints. It has been examined whether the EU ETS: 
(1) is compatible with EU State aid regulation;  
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 The fact that the carbon leakage prevention mechanism under the RGGI mainly consists of indirect 
support mechanisms does not mean that a similar approach could be used in the EU ETS. Firstly, the risk of 
carbon leakage under the RGGI is not comparable to the one under the EU ETS. As Stated by Faure & al. 
2008, p. 230, the RGGI imposes only a modest CO2 reduction target of 10% below 2009 levels by 2018 and 
its offset safety valve is triggered at a relatively low CO2 price of $7, implying that the compliance costs to 
industry remain in any situation very low. Secondly, from the viewpoint of an individual undertaking, 
general State administered programs and projects may have an uncertain outcome, especially as regards 
the applicability of technologies and solutions developed by such programs in the undertaking’s own 
processes. In contrast, both investment aid and free allowances ensure that individual undertakings may 
decide themselves in what kind of technology to invest in order to achieve a maximally efficient solution 
suitable for their particular circumstances. State administered programs alone may, in other words, not 
ensure the fulfillment of allocative efficiency. 
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(2) complies with the polluter pays principle in accordance with Article 191(2) of the 
TFEU; 
(3) promotes dynamic efficiency; 
(4) responds to the objectives related to the EU’s competition policy; and 
(5) adequately prevents carbon leakage.  
On the basis of the assessment, it can be concluded that the carbon leakage provisions of 
the current EU ETS: 
(1) Appear to be compatible with the State aid provisions of the TFEU. It has been 
demonstrated why only optional free allocation of allowances should be considered 
as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and why obligatory free 
allocation, such as free allocation to carbon leakage sectors in accordance with 
Article 10a(12) of the AETD, should not fulfil the criteria for State aid. 
(2) Should be considered compatible with the restricted, efficiency based 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle. Neither free allocation of 
allowances nor financial aid for indirect emission costs seem to contradict with the 
weak and strong forms of the principle, as it has been showed that such measures 
do not affect marginal emission reduction costs of undertakings and that pollution 
costs are internalised due to the opportunity costs of the allowances. However, it 
seems questionable whether the current EU ETS is compatible with the 
extended, equity based interpretation of the polluter pays principle, as the 
separated approach adopted in the definition of carbon leakage sectors implies that 
free allowances are granted even to such undertakings that are not, in reality, 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage in the sense of Articles 10a(12) and 
10a(14) of the AETD.  
(3) May have some negative effects on dynamic efficiency, despite the fact the 
NETD has improved dynamic efficiency by introducing amendments that minimise 
possible perverse incentives to increase emissions or to maintain inefficient 
facilities operational. Being based on free allocation, the EU ETS may namely still 
cause effects that undermine dynamic efficiency, such as price volatility resulting 
from imbalance on the allowance market and overcompensation. In addition, the 
arbitrary criteria defining the sectors that receive special treatment on the basis of 
proneness to carbon leakage may cause uncertainty when it comes to updates of the 
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carbon leakage status, which may hamper dynamic efficiency. As the assessment 
criteria are based on absolute thresholds, undertakings may adopt opportunistic 
behaviour to e.g. increase their carbon intensity in order to reach the said thresholds 
and receive a carbon leakage status. The loose constraints regarding the use of 
CDM and JI credits may also have a negative impact on dynamic efficiency, if 
offsets were to be used to a large extent. 
(4) May give rise to competitive distortions. The separate approach used in defining 
carbon leakage sectors implies that certain sectors will receive a financial benefit in 
the form of free allowances, which cannot be justified on the basis of a factual risk 
of carbon leakage. As the sectors of activity under the EU ETS are not defined 
according to the relevant product and geographical market where the regulated 
sectors compete, a carbon leakage sector is put at a competitive advantage in 
relation to a sector which is not exempted from auctioning but is nevertheless 
competing (partly or fully) on the same market as the sector which has been granted 
a carbon leakage status. Furthermore, competitive distortions may also occur 
between undertakings operating in different Member States due to the fact that 
certain Member States may grant State aid for indirect emission costs while others 
may choose not to do so. Minor competitive distortions may also be caused by “Ex-
post adjustments” allowing the withdrawal of surplus allowances in situations of 
significant capacity reductions of installations, as withdrawal of allowances is only 
possible when the capacity reduction amounts to a certain percentage. Depending 
on the sufficiency of the new entrants’ reserve, minor competitive distortions may 
also occur between incumbents and new entrants as well as between new entrants.  
(5) May not provide the best possible protection against carbon leakage, as it is 
unclear whether free allocation of allowances to carbon leakage prone sectors 
combined with temporary State aid compensating for risen electricity costs 
provides sufficient long term incentives for such undertakings suffering from high 
investment costs to commit themselves to emission reductions. The sector-specific 
benchmarks do not properly take into account the sectors’ capability of achieving 
emission reductions in the future and free allowances may not sufficiently 
compensate the (sunk) investment costs of such undertakings. Consequently, 
delocalising production outside the EU may consequently become a more attractive 
long term option for them compared to maintaining production within the EU.  
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In summary, although the current EU ETS has undergone a massive change which has 
removed many of its previous inconsistencies and improved its efficiency and 
functionality, there are still certain problematic features in the system that may undermine 
the fulfilment of its objectives. Part of those problems can be considered inherent to free 
allocation in general (such as its possibly insufficient preventive effect on carbon leakage), 
whereas other problems have been created by the NETD itself, (such as the problems 
related to the definition of carbon leakage sectors). This Study has assessed the 
functionality of two alternative options for how the inconsistencies and inefficiencies 
found in the current EU ETS could be reduced. The politically and technically easier 
alternative 1 presented in this Study consists of maintaining free allocation of allowances 
as the main mechanism for carbon leakage prevention while improving the functionality of 
the system by other means. The more challenging alternative 2 would imply a gradual shift 
from free allocation to auctioning also as regards carbon leakage sectors. In such an 
auction based system, the carbon leakage problem would be addressed by imposing 
harmonised rules regarding the use of auction revenues for providing (direct and indirect) 
financial aid to support carbon leakage prone sectors in making investments in emission 
abatement technology. 
Alternative 1 consists of four separate suggestions for amendments. The most important 
improvement would concern the rules regarding the definition of carbon leakage sectors. 
This Study suggests that the use of the separated approach should be restricted to the cost 
increase criterion and that the assessment done on the basis of the integrated approach 
should be conducted on the basis of criteria of a more continuous character, e.g. on the 
basis of multiple thresholds or according to a continuous variable proportional to the 
degree of carbon and trade intensities. This would better ensure that a carbon leakage 
status is only given to such sectors where the carbon leakage risk is real, improving thus 
the EU ETS’s consistency with the extended form of the polluter pays principle. 
Furthermore, if the regulated sectors were defined in accordance with the relevant product 
and geographical market where they compete, the current competitive distortions caused 
between carbon leakage sectors and non-carbon leakage sectors. Secondly, Problems of the 
current EU ETS related to the propensity of free allocation to increase price volatility could 
be mitigated by the introduction of a safety valve based on CDM and JI offset credits. 
Thirdly, competitive distortions caused by State aid for indirect emission costs allowed by 
the current EU ETS could be reduced by imposing a harmonised mechanism for 
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compensation of indirect emission costs. If Member States were obliged to e.g. direct a 
certain part of their auction revenues for support measures for indirect emission costs, 
undertakings operating in different Member States would not receive differential treatment. 
Fourthly, although freely obtained allowances are unlikely to have such opportunity costs 
that would significantly increase the incentives of undertakings to delocalise production 
outside Europe, such opportunity costs could nevertheless be removed by imposing an 
obligation for undertakings that have delocalised their production to return all unused 
allowances of the same calendar year during which the delocalisation has taken place. 
In Alternative 2, carbon leakage would be prevented by circulating the additional revenues 
gained from auctioning allowances to carbon leakage sectors back to carbon leakage prone 
undertakings in the form of investment-bound aid and by investing the rest of the auction 
revenues so that the benefit will indirectly return to industry, e.g. by creating general 
programs to support the development of energy efficiency and emission abatement 
technologies. As in alternative 1, Member States could be obliged to use a percentage of 
the general auction revenues
264
 for support measures for indirect emission costs. This 
Study has presented how a system of auctioning where auction revenues would be 
circulated back to carbon leakage prone undertakings could, in theory, improve carbon 
leakage prevention compared to a system based on free allocation while being compatible 
with the EU State aid regulation, the EU competition policy and the polluter pays principle 
and while remaining dynamically efficient.  
When assessing the outcome of this Study, it needs to be kept in mind that  
1) the perspective of the analysis is limited to cover only judicial and economical 
aspects; and 
2) the object of the Study is a system which has not yet been put into practice, 
wherefore the analysis relies to a large extent on economic theory, with only 
limited empirical evidence to support the reasoning.  
The scope and methodology of this Study naturally puts certain limits to the conclusions 
that can be made on the basis of the findings. Although the theoretical approach adopted in 
this Study seems to suggest that Alternative 2 would be a plausible – if not a preferable – 
option for the development of the EU ETS compared to a model based on free allocation, 
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 I.e. revenues gained from auctioning allowances to non-carbon leakage sectors. 
115 
 
practical and political reasons may nevertheless make it a less attractive solution compared 
to free allocation. Although questions regarding the practical design of the EU ETS have 
been left beyond the scope of this Study, it must not be ignored that the implementation of 
an auction based system implying circulation of auction revenues back to undertakings 
could cause various practical and political challenges. How much discretion should, for 
example, be left to the Member States regarding the use of auction revenues? If Member 
States have too much discretion, some of them may focus on using auction revenues for 
direct support measures while others lay more emphasis on indirect support, meaning that 
the effect of the EU ETS on the competitiveness on undertakings may depend on the 
Member State where they are operating. On the other hand, it may be politically 
challenging to implement a system where Member States would only be left minimal 
discretion (or no discretion at all) regarding how to invest auction revenues. Another 
question is whether the granting of aid should be strictly limited to revenues gained from 
auctioning allowances to carbon leakage sectors or whether a broader use of auction 
revenues from non-carbon leakage sectors should be allowed e.g. in the case that revenues 
obtained from carbon leakage sectors would not suffice to cover the demand of investment 
aid.
265
 Last but not least, it may turn out difficult to establish an auction based system that 
would convince industry that carbon leakage protection is truly improved – and not 
weakened – under a system which does not include any free allocation.  
What can be concluded on the basis of this study is that carbon leakage prevention under 
the current EU ETS can and should be improved. Several positive amendments can already 
be made without changing the basic structure of the current carbon leakage prevention 
mechanism, i.e. free allocation of allowances. However, it may be worthwhile to adopt a 
larger perspective when assessing the future design of European emissions trading. This 
Study has showed that free allocation should not blindly be assumed to be the only 
plausible option for carbon leakage prevention, as a carbon leakage prevention mechanism 
may be theoretically possible to establish even under a system which is entirely based on 
auctioning. Considering especially the fact that the EU has announced that it will gradually 
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 This risk would not be entirely unlikely, considering that in order to gain political acceptance – notably 
the support of industry – an auction based system would have to be implemented gradually, e.g. by 
imposing that only a certain annually increasing percentage of the carbon leakage sector’s allowances 
would be subject to auctioning. This would also mean that the revenues gained from auctioning allowances 
to carbon leakage prone sectors would remain very limited during the first phase of implementation. 
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increase the proportion of auctioning at the expense of free allocation,
266
 it may seem 
surprising that the alternative of auctioning allowances even to carbon leakage prone 
sectors and preventing carbon leakage by recycling auction revenues has so far been hardly 
at all discussed in the EU. One of the main reasons for this may be the fact that auctioning 
has thus far be viewed very critically by industries, which may have made it a taboo to 
even discuss the possibility of preventing carbon leakage by other means than free 
allocation of allowances. This Study has nevertheless showed that alternatives to free 
allocation should also be given some attention. Although auctioning and circulating 
auction revenues may have its own problems and challenges, it nevertheless seems like an 
alternative worth further examination when designing the EU ETS for future emissions 
trading periods. Improving the efficiency and functionality of the EU ETS is in the interest 
of all stakeholders and should not be constrained a fixed idea that free allocation of 
allowances is the one and only way of preventing carbon leakage. 
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Tiivistelmä/Referat – Abstract 
 
EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmä uudistuu perusteellisesti direktiivin 2009/29/EY astuessa voimaan 1.1.2013. 
Päästökauppajärjestelmän kenties keskeisin muutos liittyy päästöoikeuksien jakoon: kasvihuonepäästöille asetetaan ensimmäistä 
kertaa EU-laajuinen, vuotuinen kokonaispäästökatto ja huutokaupan merkitys päästöoikeuksien jakomekanismina lisääntyy, sillä 
Euroopan komission tavoitteena on tehdä huutokaupasta pääasiallinen jakomekanismi vähentämällä asteittain päästöoikeuksien 
ilmaisjakoa siten, että se kattaisi vuoteen 2020 mennessä enää 30 % päästöoikeuksista. Ilmaisjaon vähentämiseen liittyy kuitenkin 
riski ns. hiilivuodon lisääntymisestä, sillä huutokauppa lisää päästökaupasta yhtiöille koituvia kustannuksia, minkä seurauksena 
yhtiöille saattaa muodostua kannattavammaksi siirtää tuotantoaan EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmän ulkopuolisiin maihin. 
Hiilivuotoriskin torjumiseksi uusi päästökauppadirektiivi sisältää tiettyjä hiilivuodon torjuntaan tähtääviä mekanismeja, joista 
merkittävin on päästöoikeuksien ilmaisjako sellaisille teollisuussektoreille, joiden Euroopan komissio katsoo olevan erityisen 
herkkiä hiilivuodolle. 
 
Tutkielman tarkoituksena on arvioida EU:n uudistetun päästökauppajärjestelmän ja sen ilmaisjaolle perustuvien 
hiilivuodontorjuntamekanismien tehokkuutta eli sitä, miten hyvin ne todella vastaavat hiilivuotoriskin asettamaan haasteeseen ja 
vaikuttaako hiilivuoto-ilmiö ja sen torjunta toisaalta EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmän yleisiin tavoitteisiin eli kustannustehokkaiden 
päästönvähennysten aikaansaamiseen ja päästöjen kustannusten sisäistämiseen osaksi yhtiöiden päätöksentekoa. Tutkielmassa 
arvioidaan myös niitä mahdollisia ongelmia, joita uudistettu päästökauppajärjestelmä hiilivuodontorjuntamekanismeineen saattaa 
aiheuttaa EU:n muiden tavoitteiden ja politiikkojen kannalta. Näiden tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi tutkielmassa uudistettua 
päästökauppajärjestelmää analysoidaan viidestä näkökulmasta: 
 
1) yhteensopivuus EU:n valtiontukilainsäädännön kanssa; 
2) yhteensopivuus EU:n perustamissopimuksen 191(2) artiklan mukaisen aiheuttamisperiaatteen kanssa; 
3) dynaamisen tehokkuuden toteutuminen; 
4) yhteensopivuus EU:n kilpailupolitiikan ja sen tavoitteiden kanssa; 
5) hiilivuodon torjunnan tosiasiallinen tehokkuus. 
Analyysin perusteella nykyisessä päästökauppajärjestelmässä on havaittavissa useita heikkouksia. Hiilivuotosektorit, jotka saavat 
100 % päästöoikeuksistaan ilmaiseksi, on määritelty varsin laajasti, minkä seurauksena päästöoikeuksia myönnetään 
kokonaisuudessaan ilmaiseksi myös sellaisille teollisuussektoreille, joiden tosiasiallinen hiilivuotoriski on alhainen. Tämä on 
ongelmallista niin aiheuttamisperiaatteen kuin dynaamisen tehokkuuden kannalta. Sektoreita ei myöskään ole määritelty niiden 
tuottamien tuotteiden markkinoiden perusteella, minkä seurauksena ilmaisjako saattaa aiheuttaa kilpailuetua hiilivuotosektorille 
tilanteessa, jossa sen tuotteet ovat osittain substituutteja ei-hiilivuotosektorin tuotteiden kanssa. Ilmaisjakojärjestelmä saattaa 
myös lisätä markkinaepävarmuutta suhteessa puhtaasti huutokaupalle perustuvaan järjestelmään, mikä puolestaan on omiaan 
heikentämään kannustimia innovaatioille. On lisäksi epäselvää, ehkäiseekö ilmaisjakojärjestelmä riittävällä tavalla sellaisten 
sektoreiden hiilivuotoriskiä, joiden mahdollisuus vähentää päästöjä kustannustehokkaasti on rajallinen. Sektorikohtaisesti 
laskettavat vertailuarvot, joiden perusteella ilmaiseksi jaettavien päästöoikeuksien määrä määräytyy, eivät nimittäin huomioi 
sektoreiden tulevaa päästönvähennyskapasiteettia, minkä vuoksi vertailuarvot saattavat muodostua tietyille sektoreille muita 
ankarammiksi.  
 
Analyysin pohjalta tutkielmassa on tuotu esille kaksi vaihtoehtoista tapaa kehittää EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmän 
hiilivuodontorjuntamekanismiin liittyviä heikkouksia. Poliittisesti ja teknisesti toteuttamiskelpoisin vaihtoehto olisi kehittää 
järjestelmää ilmaisjaolle perustuvan hiilivuodontorjuntamekanismin puitteissa.  Tällöin kyettäisiin todennäköisesti ratkaisemaan 
merkittävimmät aiheuttamisperiaatteen, dynaamisen tehokkuuden sekä kilpailupoliittisten tavoitteiden toteutumiseen liittyvät 
ongelmat, mutta hiilivuodon torjumisen tehokkuutta ei merkittävästi kyettäisi lisäämään. Toisena vaihtoehtona tutkielmassa on 
esitetty kokonaan huutokaupalle perustuvaa järjestelmää, jossa hiilivuotoriskiä torjuttaisiin myöntämällä huutokauppatuloista 
suoraa taloudellista tukea hiilivuotosektoreiden päästöjenvähennysinvestointeihin. Kyseinen vaihtoehto vaikuttaisi tutkielman 
perusteella teoreettisesti jopa ilmaisjaolle nojaavaa järjestelmää tehokkaammalta niiden viiden näkökulman kannalta, joiden 
pohjalta tutkielma on kirjoitettu. Kokonaan huutokauppaan siirtyminen saattaisi kuitenkin aiheutua käytännöllisiä vaikutuksia ja olisi 
poliittisesti vaikea toteuttaa. Selvää kuitenkin on, että EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmän hiilivuodontorjuntamekanismeja on syytä 
kehittää nykyisestä, mikäli järjestelmän tavoitteiden tehokas saavuttaminen halutaan turvata. 
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